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Abstract
Preserving Privacy Against Side-Channel Leaks
Wen Ming Liu, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2014
The privacy preserving issues have received signiﬁcant attentions in various do-
mains. Various models and techniques have been proposed to achieve optimal privacy
with minimal costs. However, side-channel leaks (such as, publicly-known algorithms of
data publishing, observable trafﬁc information in web application, ﬁne-grained readings in
smart metering) further complicate the process of privacy preservation. In this thesis, we
make the ﬁrst effort on investigating a general framework to model side-channel attacks
across different domains and applying the framework to various categories of applications.
In privacy-preserving data publishing with publicly-known algorithms, we ﬁrst the-
oretically study a generic strategy independent of data utility measures and syntactic pri-
vacy properties. We then propose an efﬁcient approach to preserving diversity.
In privacy-preserving trafﬁc padding in Web applications, we ﬁrst propose a formal
PPTP model to quantify the privacies and costs based on the key observation about the
similarity between data publishing and trafﬁc padding. We then introduce randomness into
the previous solutions to provide background knowledge-resistant privacy guarantee.
In privacy-preserving smart metering, we propose a light-weight approach to simul-
taneously preserving privacy on both billing and consumption aggregation based on the key
observation about the privacy issue beyond the ﬁne-grained readings.
iii
Acknowledgments
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Lingyu Wang, for
his constant support, heartily guidance and enduring patience in every stage of my graduate
study. This thesis would not have been possible without his unselﬁsh help. He is always
willing to share his knowledge, vision, and discipline with me. I also wish to express
my sincere thanks to my research collaborators. My gratitude also goes to my committee
members for providing valuable comments and feedback.
I also wish to express my appreciation to all the faculty and staff at CIISE for having
such a warm and friendly working environment. To each of my professors, I owe a great
debt of gratitude for their wonderful teaching, which has helped me in reaching this stage.
Moreover, I would like to thank Concordia University and the NSERC postgraduate awards
program for providing ﬁnancial supports throughout my graduate career.
I thank my late parents for teaching me valuable lessons of life. I am especially
grateful to my wife for her love, encouragement, and sacriﬁce at all times. Thanks (or
rather apologies) also go to my little children who were accompanied insufﬁciently during




List of Figures x
List of Tables xii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Summary of Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Chapter 2 Related Work 9
2.1 Privacy Preservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Side-Channel Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 The case that disclosure algorithms is publicly known in PPDP . . . 13
2.2.2 The case that visible patterns in encrypted trafﬁc are observed in
Web applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.3 The case that readings are used for inferences in smart metering . . 16
Chapter 3 PPDP: k-Jump Strategy for Privacy Preserving Data Publishing 18
3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2.1 The Basic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2.2 The Algorithms anaive and asafe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3 k-jump Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
v
3.3.1 The Algorithm Family ajump(k) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.3.2 Properties of ajump(k) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4 Data Utility Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4.1 Data Utility of k-Jump Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4.2 Reusing Generalization Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4.3 asafe and ajump(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.5 Computational Complexity of k-Jump Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.6 Making Secret Choices of Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.6.1 Secret-Choice Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.6.2 Subset Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.6.3 The Safety of Subset-Choice Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Chapter 4 PPDP: An Efﬁcient Strategy for Diversity Preservation With Publicly
Known Algorithms 63
4.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.2.1 The Basic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2.2 l-Candidate and Self-Contained Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2.3 Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3 The Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3.1 The RIA Algorithm (Random and Independent) . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.3.2 The RDA Algorithm (Random and Dependent) . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3.3 The GDA Algorithm (Guided and Dependent) . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.3.4 The Construction of SGSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.4 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.4.1 Computation Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4.2 Data Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
vi
Chapter 5 PPTP: k-Indistinguishable Trafﬁc Padding in Web Applications 96
5.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.2.1 The Basic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.2.2 Privacy and Cost Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.2.3 The SVMD and MVMD Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.3 PPTP Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.3.1 Ceiling Padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.3.2 The SVSD and SVMD Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.3.3 MVMD Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.4 The Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.4.1 The svsdSimple Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.4.2 The svmdGreedy Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.4.3 The mvmdGreedy Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.5 Extension to l-Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.5.1 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.5.2 The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.5.3 The Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.6 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.6.1 Implementation Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.6.2 Experimental Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.6.3 Communication Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.6.4 Computational Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.6.5 Processing Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Chapter 6 PPTP: Background-Knowledge Resistant Trafﬁc Padding for Privacy
Preserving in Web Applications 133
6.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
vii
6.2.1 Trafﬁc Padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.2.2 Privacy Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.2.3 Padding Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.2.4 Cost Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.3 The Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
6.3.1 The Random Ceiling Padding Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.3.2 Instantiations of the Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.4 The Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.4.1 Analysis of Privacy Preservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.4.2 Analysis of Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
6.4.3 Analysis of Computational Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.5 Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.5.1 Experimental Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.5.2 Uncertainty and Cost v.s. k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.5.3 Randomness Drawn from Bounded Uniform Distribution . . . . . . 158
6.5.4 Randomness Drawn from Normal Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . 159
6.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Chapter 7 PPSM: Privacy-Preserving Smart Metering 162
7.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
7.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
7.2.1 Adversary Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
7.2.2 Privacy Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
7.2.3 Cost Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
7.3 The Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
7.3.1 Smart Meter Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
7.3.2 Reading Modiﬁcations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
7.3.3 Implementation Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
7.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
viii
Chapter 8 Generic Model for Privacy Preserving against Side-Channel Leaks 178
8.1 Outline of Generic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
8.1.1 Privacy-related Components of an Application . . . . . . . . . . . 178
8.1.2 Privacy Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
8.1.3 Cost Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
8.1.4 Obfuscating Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
8.2 Instantiations of Generic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
8.2.1 Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
8.2.2 Privacy-Preserving Trafﬁc Padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
8.2.3 Privacy-Preserving Smart Metering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
8.2.4 Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Chapter 9 Conclusion and Future Direction 189
9.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189




3.1 The Decision Process of Different Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2 The Construction for ajump(1) and ajump(i) (1 < i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3 The Construction for ajump(i) and ajump(j) (1 < i < j) . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4 The Construction for ajump(k1) and ajump(k2) (k1 = k2) . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1 Execution Time vs. Dataset Cardinality n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2 Data Utility Comparison: DM Cost vs. l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3 Data Utility Comparison: Query Accuracy vs. Query Condition(l = 6) . . . 92
4.4 Data Utility Comparison: Query Accuracy vs. Query Condition(l = 7) . . . 92
4.5 Data Utility Comparison: Query Accuracy vs. Query Condition(l = 8) . . . 92
4.6 Data Utility Comparison: Query Accuracy vs. Query Condition(l = 9) . . . 93
4.7 Data Utility Comparison: Query Accuracy vs. Query Condition(l = 10) . . 93
5.1 The Vector-Action Set in MVMD Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.2 Padding Cost Overhead Ratio (k-Indistinguishability) . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.3 Padding Cost Overhead Ratio (l-Diversity) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.4 Execution Time in Seconds (k-Indistinguishability) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.5 Execution Time in Seconds (l-Diversity) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.6 Processing Cost Overhead Ratio (k-Indistinguishability) . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.7 Processing Cost Overhead Ratio (l-Diversity) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.1 Uncertainty and Cost Against k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.2 Uncertainty and Cost for Bounded Uniform Distribution Against Top Limit 158
x
6.3 Uncertainty and Cost for Bounded Uniform Distribution Against Minimal
Cardinality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
6.4 Uncertainty and Cost for Normal Distribution Against Mean . . . . . . . . 160
6.5 Uncertainty and Cost for Normal Distribution Against Standard Deviation . 160
7.1 Sequence of Meter Readings For a Smart Meter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
xi
List of Tables
1.1 A Micro-Data Table and its Two Generalizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Packet Sizes for the First Character Input of a Search Engine . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 An Reading Example for Smart Metering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1 A Micro-Data Table and Three Generalizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2 Two Tables in the Permutation Set and Their Corresponding Generaliza-
tions under g1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3 The Disclosure Set of g2(t0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4 A Table t3 in the Permutation Set of g3(t0) and its Corresponding Disclo-
sure Set Under g2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.5 The Notation Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.6 The Algorithm anaive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.7 The Algorithm asafe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.8 The Algorithm Family ajump(k) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.9 The Case Where ajump(i) Has Better Utility Than ajump(1) . . . . . . . . . 38
3.10 The Data Utility Comparison Between ajump(j) and ajump(i) (1 < i < j) . 42
3.11 The Case Where Reusing Generalization Functions Improves Data Utility . 48
3.12 Algorithms: ajump(k) and ds
k
i With Any Given Privacy Property p(.) . . . . 52
3.13 The Secret-Choice Strategy asecret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.14 The Subset Approach For Designing the Set of Unsafe Algorithms . . . . . 57
3.15 The Counter Example for Secret Choice among Unsafe Algorithms . . . . . 59
xii
3.16 The Possible Subsets of Functions and the Corresponding Probability of
A,B, and C Being Associated With C0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1 The Motivating Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2 The Notation Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.3 An Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.4 procedure: l-candidate-to-P lm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.5 Notations for Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.6 The RIA Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.7 The RDA Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.8 The GDA Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.9 Description of OCC and SAL Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.1 User Inputs and Corresponding Packet Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2 s Value for Each Character Entered as the First (Second Column) and Sec-
ond (3-6 Columns) Keystroke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3 Mapping PPTP to PPDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.4 The Notation Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.5 The svsdSimple Algorithm for SVSD-Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.6 The svmdGreedy Algorithm For SVMD-Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.7 The mvmdGreedy Algorithm For MVMD-Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.8 The svsdDiversity Algorithm For SVSD-Diversity Case . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.9 The svmdDiversity Algorithm For SVMD-Diversity Case . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.1 User Inputs and Corresponding Packet Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.2 Rounding and Ceiling Padding for Table 6.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.3 Proposed Solution for Table 6.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.4 The Notation Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.5 The Random Ceiling Padding Scheme: Stage One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.6 The Random Ceiling Padding Scheme: Stage Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
xiii
6.7 The Sample Space for Transient Groups by Random Ceiling Padding and
Corresponding Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7.1 An Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
7.2 The Possible Cases For a 200 Noise Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.3 The Notation Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
7.4 The Safe Candidate Producer (SCP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
7.5 The Cyclical Reading Converter (CRC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
7.6 The Perpetual Reading Converter (PRC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
7.7 The Light Reading Converter (LRC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
8.1 Customized Notions in Three Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
8.2 A Micro-Data Table and its Generalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
8.3 Original Set and Possible Released Set for an Action-Sequences . . . . . . 186




1.1 Background and Motivation
The privacy preserving issue has attracted signiﬁcant attentions in various domains,
such as, data publishing and data mining, location-based service, mobile and wireless net-
work, social network, web application, smart grid, and so on. However, side-channel leaks
further complicate the privacy preservation. Various side-channel attacks have been dis-
covered in many different domains, such as:
- data publishing (e.g. adversarial knowledge about a generalization algorithm itself
may allow adversaries to infer sensitive information from the disclosed data);
- Web-based Application (e.g. user input can be inferred from the packet sizes of
encrypted trafﬁc between client side and server side);
- smart metering (e.g. the ﬁne-grained meter readings may be used to track the appli-
ance usage patterns and consequently the sensitive information of households, such
as, the daily activities);
- cloud computing (e.g. the sharing of physical infrastructure among users allow ad-
versaries to extract information about co-resident VMs);
1
- Android smartphone (e.g. per data-usage statistics and speaker status may allow an
application without any permission to obtain the smartphone user’s identity and geo-
location as well as driving route);
- VoIP telephony (e.g. users’ conversations can be partially reconstructed from en-
crypted VoIP packets due to the use of VBR codecs for compression and length-
preserving stream ciphers for encryption in VoIP protocols);
- cryptography (e.g. information about the secret key may be retrieved from the physi-
cal characteristics of the cryptographic modules during the algorithm execution, such
as, timing, power consumption, and so on).
In summary, side-channel attacks are prevalent in different applications. On the
other hand, several approaches have been proposed to mitigate the threats of such attacks
for each speciﬁc application, such as, trafﬁc shaping [95], trafﬁc morphing [103], side-
buster [110] for web trafﬁc, HTTPO [76] against encrypted HTTP leaks, DREAM [1],
EPPA [75] for smart metering, and so on.
However, there are no existing works on studying the generic model under the same
framework for different side-channel leaks. Such a study will establish a common under-
standing on the side-channel attacks, and enable us to apply similar solutions to different
applications and new applications.
In this thesis, we make the ﬁrst effort on investigating a general framework to model
side-channel attacks across different domains and applying the framework to three emerg-
ing domains, namely, privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP), privacy preserving traf-
ﬁc padding (PPTP), and privacy-preserving smart metering (PPSM). More speciﬁcally, the
following questions are to be answered in each phase of the research.
- Firstly, can we design a generic model for different side-channel attacks?
While different domains may have different requirements for privacy, they similarly
need to balance two seemingly conﬂicting goals: privacy preservation and cost minimiza-
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tion. Our main goal is to formulate a generic model for privacy preserving against side-
channel leaks. The model encompasses privacy requirements (such as, indistinguishability,
diversity, uncertainty), costs (such as, data utility, data accuracy, communication overhead,
computation overhead), the corresponding methods to ensure privacy and minimize the
costs 1. We will address this question in Chapter 8. Nonetheless, to make our discussion
more concrete and easy the understanding, we will ﬁrst discuss three speciﬁc applications.
- Secondly, can we apply the generic model to data publishing with publicly-known
algorithms (PPDP)?
Most of existing solutions for PPDP assume that the only knowledge the adversaries
possess are the disclosed table and the required privacy properties. Actually, the adversaries
may also know the disclosure algorithm. Such extra knowledge may assist the adversaries
in further precisely predicting the possible original micro-data tables, and ﬁnally compro-
mise the privacy properties.
For example, the generalization g2(t0) shown in Table 1.1(c) satisﬁes 3-diversity
(the highest ratio of any person being associated with any condition is no greater than 1
3
,
see Chapter 2 for detail). However, when the adversary knows the generalization algorithm
has considered g1(t0) shown in Table 1.1(b) before it discloses g2(t0), he can infer that both
Charlie and David are deﬁnitely associated with cancer. We will detail the theoretical study
and efﬁcient solution later in Chapters 3 and 4 , respectively.






















Table 1.1: A Micro-Data Table and its Two Generalizations
1We shall explain the concepts and discuss the details in the following chapters.
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- Thirdly, can we apply the generic model to privacy-preserving trafﬁc padding in
Web-applications (PPTP)?
Web-based applications essentially rely on the distrusted Internet as an internal com-
ponent for carrying the continuous interaction between users and servers. While encryp-
tions prevent adversaries from reading the data between these two components, some in-
formation is still observable, such as, packet sizes, directions, timings. By analyzing such
encrypted trafﬁc features, the adversaries can potentially identify an application’s internal
state transitions as well as users’ inputs.
For example, Table 1.2 shows the identiﬁable packet sizes of each char as the ﬁrst
keystroke entered in a popular real-world search engine. We can observe that six characters
(i, j, p, r, v, x) can be identiﬁed by a unique packet size. We will elaborate on the formal
PPTP model and the enhancement of prior-knowledge resistance later in Chapters 5 and 6
, respectively.
Char a b c d e f g
Size 509 504 502 516 499 504 502
Char h i j k l m n
Size 509 492 517 499 501 503 488
Char o p q r s t
Size 509 525 494 498 488 494
Char u v w x y z
Size 503 522 516 491 502 501
Table 1.2: Packet Sizes for the First Character Input of a Search Engine
- Fourthly, can we apply the generic model to privacy-preserving smart metering (PPSM)?
Smart grid essentially relies on the ﬁne-grained usage information to provide sig-
niﬁcant beneﬁts for both utility and customers. However, the ﬁne-grained meter readings
could also be used to track the appliance usage pattern and then infer sensitive information
of households, such as their daily activities.
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For example, Table 1.3(b) shows when the reading is 300, the adversary can infer
that Fan is deﬁnitely used at that read period in the case that all the appliances in a house-
hold are shown in Table 1.3(a) (To ease the understanding of main problem, we assume that
each appliance consumes the labeled electricity). We will discuss the formal PPSM model
in detail later in Chapter 7.












Table 1.3: An Reading Example for Smart Metering
1.2 Summary of Contributions
As introduced in Section 1.1, the main purpose of this research is to understand and
provide model and solution to the privacy threats in different applications due to various
side-channel attacks. The rest of this Section overviews the ﬁve lines of the research in
three categories of applications as well as the study on the generic model, and delay the
details to the corresponding chapters.
Privacy-preserving data publishing with publicly-known algorithms
- Recent studies show that adversarial inferences using knowledge about a disclosure
algorithm can usually render the algorithm unsafe. The ﬁrst line of the research
theoretically study a generic yet costly strategy which is independent of data utility
measures and syntactic privacy property [73, 74].
More speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst show that a given unsafe generalization algorithm can be
transformed into a large family of distinct algorithms under a novel strategy, called k-
5
jump strategy. Second, we discuss the computational complexity of such algorithms
and prove that different algorithms under the k-jump strategy generally lead to in-
comparable data utility. We also conﬁrm that the choice of algorithms must be made
among safe algorithms (Chapter 3).
- While k-jump strategy is theoretically superior to existing ones due to its indepen-
dence of utility measures and privacy models, it incurs a high complexity. To over-
come this challenge, the second line of the research proposes an efﬁcient privacy
streamliner approach to preserving diversity [68].
More speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst observe that a high computational complexity is usually
incurred when an algorithm conﬂates the processes of privacy preservation and utility
optimization. Based on such observations, we then propose a novel privacy stream-
liner approach to decouple those two processes for improving algorithm efﬁciency.
We also conﬁrm our algorithms to be efﬁcient through both complexity analysis and
experimental results (Chapter 4).
Privacy-Preserving Trafﬁc Padding in Web Applications
- Recent studies show that many popular Web applications actually leak out highly
sensitive data from encrypted trafﬁc due to side-channel attacks. The third line of
the research proposes a formal model for privacy-preserving trafﬁc padding (PPTP)
which can quantify the effectiveness of mitigation techniques [69–71].
More speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst observe an interesting similarity between PPTP and PPDP
issues. Based on such a similarity, we then establish a mapping between these two
issues and propose a formal PPTP model, which encompasses the quantiﬁcation of
privacy requirements and padding costs. Such a model lays the foundation for further
studies of this issue. We also design efﬁcient heuristic algorithms and conﬁrm their
effectiveness and efﬁciency through experiments using real-world Web applications
(Chapter 5).
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- While the model in previous line of research is among the ﬁrst efforts on formally
addressing the PPTP issue, it relies on the assumption that adversaries do not possess
prior background knowledge about possible user inputs. In the fourth line of the
research, we propose a novel random ceiling padding approach whose results are
resistant to such adversarial knowledge [72].
More speciﬁcally, the approach injects randomness into the process of forming padding
groups, such that an adversary armed with background knowledge would still face
sufﬁcient uncertainty in estimating user inputs. We formally present a generic scheme
and discuss two concrete instantiations. We then conﬁrm the correctness and perfor-
mance of our approach through both theoretic analysis and experiments with two real
world applications (Chapter 6).
Privacy-Preserving Smart Metering
- Recent studies show that ﬁne-grained meter readings may allow adversaries to infer
sensitive information about the households. In the ﬁfth line of the research, we pro-
pose a novel light-weight technique for privacy-preserving smart metering (PPSM),
which can achieve multiple objectives through a single set of data and procedures.
More speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst observe that satisfying certain privacy property for reading
does not necessarily lead to preserving the household’s privacy. Based on such ob-
servations, we propose a formal PPSM model, which encompasses the privacy prop-
erties and consumption accuracy. This model is among the ﬁrst efforts on preserving
the household’s sensitive information (compared with preserving the readings). We
also design efﬁcient algorithms and analyze their privacy preservation (Chapter 7).
Generic Model for Privacy Preserving against Side-Channel Leaks
- We make the ﬁrst step to extract a generic model under the same framework for
various side-channel leaks in different categories of applications. Such a study will
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bridge the gap among different communities on study of side-channel attacks. To
the best of our knowledge, there was no such an effort on the generic model in the
literature (Chapter 8).
Implications of Our Study
Our research shows the possibility of a generic framework for privacy preserving against
side-channel leaks and also leads to practical solutions with quantiﬁable privacy guarantee
for different applications against side-channel attacks. The generic framework will facili-





The privacy preserving issue has received signiﬁcant attentions in various domains,
such as, data publishing and data mining [25,46,90], mobile and wireless network [9] [11] [45],
social network [31] [83] [44], outsourced data [18] [97], multiparty computation [82], web
applications [9] [14] [22] [94], and so on.
In the context of privacy-preserving data publishing, various generalization tech-
niques and models have been proposed to transform a micro-data table into a safe version
that satisﬁes given privacy properties and retains enough data utility. In particular, data
swapping [30, 35, 39] and cell suppression [29] both aim to protect micro-data released in
census tables, but those earlier approaches cannot effectively quantify the degree of pri-
vacy. A measurement of information disclosed through tables based on the perfect secrecy
notion by Shannon is given in [80]. The authors in [34] address the problem ascribed
to the independence assumption made in [80]. The important notion of k-anonymity has
been proposed as a model of privacy requirement [90]. The main goal of k-anonymity is
to anonymize the data such that each record owner in the resultant data is guaranteed to
be indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other record owner. That is, each quasi-identiﬁer
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value in a micro-data should be at least shared by k tuples. Since the data owner modi-
ﬁes the data, some information is distorted. Therefore, it is desirable to ﬁnd the modiﬁed
table for k-anonymity with the minimum information loss. However, to achieve optimal
k-anonymity with the most data utility is proved to be computationally infeasible [79].
Since the introduction of k-anonymity, privacy-preserving data publishing has re-
ceived tremendous interest in recent years [27, 28, 37, 42, 46, 93, 100]. A model based on
the intuition of blending individuals in a crowd is proposed in [21]. A personalized re-
quirement for anonymity is studied in [104]. In [17], the authors approach the issue from a
different perspective, that is, the privacy property is based on generalization of the protected
data and could be customized by users. Much efforts have been made around developing
efﬁcient k-anonymity algorithms [3–5, 12, 38, 61, 90], whereas the safety of the algorithms
is generally assumed.
Many more advanced models are proposed to address limitations of k-anonymity.
Many of these focus on the deﬁciency of allowing insecure groups with a small number of
sensitive values. For instance, l-diversity [77] requires that each equivalence class on the
disclosed table should contain at least l well-represented sensitive values; t-closeness [63]
requires that the distribution of a sensitive attribute in any equivalence class is close (roughly
equal) to the distribution of the attribute in the whole table; (α, k)-anonymity [102] requires
that the number of tuples in any equivalence class is at least k and the frequency (in fraction)
of each sensitive value is at most α, where k and α are data publisher-speciﬁed thresholds.
In addition, a generic model called GBP was proposed to unify the perspective of privacy
guarantees in both generalization-based publishing and view-based publishing [33]. These
privacy models in PPDP have been adjusting and applying to other domains.
In contrast to micro-data disclosure, aggregation queries are addressed in statistical
databases [2,42,92]. The main challenge is to answer aggregation queries without allowing
inferences of secret individual values. The auditing methods in [23, 36] solve this problem
by checking whether each new query can be safely answered based on a history of previ-
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ously answered queries. The authors of [23, 56, 58] considered the same problem in more
speciﬁc settings of ofﬂine auditing and online auditing, respectively.
Compared with the aforementioned syntactic privacy models, recently, a seman-
tic privacy notation to provide provable resistance to adversaries’ background knowledge,
differential privacy [40] has been widely accepted as a strong privacy model mostly for an-
swering statistic queries. Differential privacy aims to achieve the goal that the probability
distribution of any disclosed information should be similar enough regardless of whether
that disclosed information is obtained using the real database, or using a database without
any one of the existing records.
However, although differential privacy is extended to privacy preserving data pub-
lishing (PPDP) [64,106], most existing approaches that ensure differential privacy are ran-
dom noise-based and are suitable for speciﬁc types of statistical queries. Further, Kifer
et al. [57] disproved some popularized claims about differential privacy and showed that
differential privacy cannot always guarantee the privacy in some cases. differential privacy
is also less applicable to our trafﬁc padding due to the less predictable but larger sensitiv-
ity and the nature of budget share among executions of web applications(Chapters 5, 6).
Moreover, while the qualitative signiﬁcance of the privacy parameter  is well understood
in the literature, the exact quantitative link between this value and the degree of privacy
guarantee has received less attention. Actually, more and more works have concluded that
both differential privacy and syntactic privacy models have their place, and any one cannot
replace the other [26, 65]. It is also shown that differential privacy cannot always guaran-
tee the privacy in some cases [57]. Due to these reasons, we focus on syntactic privacy
properties in this research and regard the differential privacy as future work.
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2.2 Side-Channel Attack
Various side-channel leakages have been extensively studied in the literature. By
measuring the amount of time taken to respond to the queries, an attacker may extract
OpenSSL RSA privacy keys [16], and similar timing attacks are proved to be still practical
recently [15]. By differentiating the sounds produced by keys, an attacker with the help of
the large-length training samples may recognize the key pressed [7]; Zhuang et al. further
present an alternative approach to achieving such attack which does not need the training
samples [115]. By exploiting queuing side channel in routers by sending probes from a far-
off vantage point, an attacker may ﬁngerprint websites remotely against home broadband
users [49, 50]. Ristenpart et al. discover cross-VM information leakage on Amazon EC2
based on the sharing of physical infrastructure among users [87]. Search histories may
be reconstructed by session hijacking attack [19], while web-browsing histories may be
compromised by cache-based timing attacks [43]. Saponas et al. show the transmission
characteristics of encrypted video streaming may allow attackers to recognize the title of
movies [91].
Meanwhile, much efforts have been made on developing techniques to mitigate the
threats of such leakages. Countermeasures based on trafﬁc-shaping mechanisms (such as,
padding, mimicking, morphing, and so on) are suggested against the exposure of identiﬁ-
cation of encrypted web trafﬁc in [95]. HTTPOS, a browser-side system, is proposed to
prevent information leakages of encrypted HTTP trafﬁc through conﬁgurable trafﬁc trans-
formation techniques in [76]. Timing mitigator is introduced to achieve any given bound
on timing channel leakage by delaying output events to limit the amount of information
in [6]. Zhang et al. present an approach to verifying the VMs’ exclusive use of a physical
machine. The approach exploits a side-channel in the L2 memory cache as a defensive
detection tool rather than a vector of attack [114]. Provider-enforced deterministic execu-
tion by eliminating all the internal timing channels has been proposed to combat timing
channel attack in cloud [8]. In the rest of this section, we review the work related to the
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side-channel attacks targeted in our lines of research.
2.2.1 The case that disclosure algorithms is publicly known in PPDP
While most existing work assume the disclosed generalization to be the only source
of information available to an adversary, recent work [111] [101] shows the limitation of
such an assumption. In addition to such information, the adversary may also know about
the disclosure algorithm. With such extra knowledge, the adversary may deduce more in-
formation and eventually compromise the privacy property. In the work of [111] [101], the
authors discover the above problem and correspondingly introduce models and algorithms
to address the issue. However, the method in [101] is still vulnerable to algorithm-based
disclosure [52, 53], whereas the one in [111] is more general, but it also incurs a high
complexity.
In [111], Zhang et al. presented a theoretical study on how an algorithm should be
designed to prevent the adversary from inferring private information when the adversaries
know the algorithm itself. The authors proved that it is NP-hard to compute a generalization
which ensure privacy while maximizing data utility under such assumptions of adversaries’
knowledge. The authors then investigate three special cases of the problem by imposing
constraints on the functions and the privacy properties, and propose a polynomial-time
algorithm that ensures entropy l-diversity.
Wong et al. in [101] showed that a minimality attack can compromise most existing
generalization techniques with the aim of only a small amount of knowledge about the
generalization algorithm. The authors assume that the adversaries only have one piece
of knowledge that the algorithm discloses a generalization with best data utility. Under
this assumption, minimality attacks can be prevented by simply disclosing sub-optimal
generalizations. Unfortunately, the adversaries, equipped with knowledge of the algorithm,
can still devise other types of attacks to compromise sub-optimal generalizations.
Since the problem is discovered, some work have been developed to tackle the prob-
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lem in the case that l − diversity is the desired privacy property [53, 68, 105, 113].
To improve the efﬁciency, a so-called exclusive strategy is proposed in [112] to
penalize the cases where a recursive process is required to compute the adversarial mental
image about the micro-data table. To examine the general case, we have proposed a k-
jump strategy [73](see Chapter 3 for the ﬁrst line of our research) to penalize such cases
where with more control in the sense that only k, instead of all, generalization functions
will be skipped. Our proposed family of algorithms is general to handle different privacy
properties and different measures of data utility. Despite the improved efﬁciency, most of
those methods are still impractical due to the high complexity.
The concept of l-cover in [113] has been proposed for efﬁcient diversity preserva-
tion. However, no concrete methods for building identiﬁer partitions that can satisfy the
l-cover property was reported in [113], which is the main focus of the second line of our
research(see Chapter 4). The correctness and ﬂexibility of our approach can be further con-
ﬁrmed by the following work in the literature. The authors of [105] introduce algorithms
that share the same spirit with our algorithms, and can achieve similar performance (more
precisely, their algorithms are slightly less efﬁcient than ours since their time complexity
is O(n2logn)). In fact, under slight modiﬁcation, their algorithms, such as ACE algorithm
which is originally intended to publish dynamic datasets [108], can be regarded as another
instantiation of our model and approach.
2.2.2 The case that visible patterns in encrypted trafﬁc are observed
in Web applications
In the context of web applications, many side-channel leakages in encrypted web
trafﬁc have been identiﬁed in the literature which allow to proﬁle the web applications
themselves and their internal states [8,19,22,50]. Meanwhile, several approaches have been
proposed to analyze and mitigate such leakages, such as [6,76,95,103]. Recently, a black-
box approach has been proposed to detect and quantify the side-channel vulnerabilities in
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web application by extensively crawling a targeted application [20].
Chen et al. in [22] demonstrated through case studies that side-channel problems are
pervasive and exacerbated in web applications due to their fundamental features. Then the
authors further study approaches to identifying such threats and quantifying the amount of
information disclosed in [110]. They show that an application-agnostic approach generally
suffers from high overhead and low level of privacy protection, and consequently effective
solutions to such threats likely will rely on the in-depth understanding of the applications
themselves. Finally, they design a complete development process as a fundamental solution
to such side channel attacks.
Trafﬁc morphing is proposed in [103] to mitigate the threats by trafﬁc analyzing
on packet sizes and sequences through network. Although their proposed system morph
classes of trafﬁc to be indistinguishable, trafﬁc morphing pads or splits packets on the ﬂy
which may degrade application’s performance.
The aforementioned works share an important limitation, that is, they are lack of
privacy requirements, In such case, the degree of privacy, which the transformation of the
trafﬁc is able to achieve, cannot be evaluated during the process of padding. Consequently,
it cannot ensure the privacy being satisﬁed. In contrast, our proposed algorithms follow-
ing the proposed model in the third line of our research theoretically guarantee the desired
privacy property. Our model and solutions provide ﬁner control over the trade-off between
privacy protection and cost, and those solutions can certainly be integrated into the devel-
opment process.
Nonetheless, these solutions assume that adversaries do not possess prior back-
ground knowledge about possible user inputs. Our fourth line of research enhance pre-
vious works by mitigating the threats of background knowledge. Closest to this research,
most recently, a formal framework is proposed to measure security in terms of the amount
of information leaked from the observations without the assumption of any particular at-
tacks [10]. However, the main deﬁciency of [10] regarding to the estimation of privacy
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renders it less applicable in practice.
2.2.3 The case that readings are used for inferences in smart metering
Electrical appliances, even small electric devices, generate detectable electric con-
sumption signatures [51, 60]. Based on such signatures, electric consumption data (col-
lected at a pre-conﬁgured granularity) of a household can be decomposed to identify the
status of appliances. A domestic electricity demand model based on occupant time-use data
has been presented and its example implementation is made for free download [86]. Worse
still, even simple off-the-shelf statistical tools can be used to extract complex usage patterns
from the consumption data without a priori knowledge of household activities [81], while
Rouf et al. showed that real-world automatic meter reading (AMR) systems are vulnerable
to spooﬁng attacks due to the unsecured wireless transmission and continuous broadcast of
ﬁne-grained energy data [88].
Many surveys have been conducted to review and discuss the security and privacy
requirements and challenges(e.g. [99]). Some efforts have been made to preserve privacy
for the load monitoring [41]. In-residence batteries, together with corresponding battery
privacy algorithms such as Non-Intrusive Load Leveling (NILL) and stepping approach,
used to mask load variance of a household to the grid and consequently avoided recovering
of appliance proﬁles by grid [78, 109]. A distributed Laplacian Perturbation Algorithm
(DLPA) has been proposed to achieve provably privacy and optimal utility without the need
of a third trusted party [1]. An aggregation protocol is introduced to privately sum readings
from many meters without the need of disclose those raw meter readings [59]. A scheme
is designed to provide personal enquiry and regional statistics through anonymously-sent
readings [24]. EPPA achieves privacy-preserving multi-dimensional data aggregation by
using the homomorphic cryptosystem [75].
The other efforts were made to preserve privacy for billing. Rail et al. proposed a
set of protocols which allow uers themselves to produce a correct provable ﬁnal bill without
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disclosing ﬁne-grained consumption data [84], and then the authors combined differentially
private mechanisms with oblivious payments to eliminate leakages drawn from the ﬁnal
bill [32]. Recently, Lin et al. used trusted platform module (TPM) and cryptographic
primitive to support privacy preserving billing and load monitoring simultaneously [67].
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Chapter 3
PPDP: k-Jump Strategy for Privacy
Preserving Data Publishing
In this chapter, we study the privacy issue for data publishing in the case that the
adversaries utilize the knowledge about the algorithms themselves as side-channel to reﬁne
their guess about the original data, and then propose the strategy to transform an existing
unsafe algorithm into a large family of safe algorithms.
3.1 Overview
The issue of preserving privacy in micro-data disclosure has attracted much atten-
tion lately [46]. Data owners, such as the Census Bureau, may need to disclose micro-data
tables containing sensitive information to the public to facilitate useful analysis. There are
two seemingly conﬂicting goals during such a disclosure. First, the utility of disclosed data
should be maximized to facilitate useful analysis. Second, the sensitive information about
individuals contained in the data must be to an acceptable level due to privacy concerns.
The upper left tabular of Table 3.1 shows a toy example of micro-data table t0.
Suppose each patient’s name, DoB, and condition are regarded as identiﬁer attribute, quasi-
identiﬁer attribute and sensitive attribute, respectively. Simply deleting the identiﬁer Name
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is not sufﬁcient because the sensitive attribute Condition may still potentially be linked to
a unique person through the quasi-identiﬁer Age (more realistically, a quasi-identiﬁer is
usually a combination of attributes, such as Age, Gender, and Zip Code). Nonetheless, we
shall not include identiﬁers in the remainder of the chapter for simplicity.






























Table 3.1: A Micro-Data Table and Three Generalizations
To prevent such a linking attack, the micro-data table can be partitioned into anonymized
group and then generalized to satisfy k-anonymity [90, 96]. The upper right tabular in Ta-
ble 3.1 shows a generalization g1(t0) that satisﬁes 2-anonymity. That is, each generalized
quasi-identiﬁer value is now shared by at least two tuples. Therefore, a linking attack can
no longer bind a person to a unique tuple through the quasi-identiﬁer.
Nonetheless, k-anonymity by itself is not sufﬁcient since linking a person to the
second group in g1(t0) already reveals his/her condition to be cancer. To avoid such a sit-
uation, the generalization must also ensure enough diversity inside each group of sensitive
values, namely, to satisfy the l-diversity property [77]. For example, assume 2-diversity is
desired. If the generalization g2(t0) is disclosed, a person can at best be linked to a group
with three different conditions among which each is equally likely to be that person’s real
condition. The desired privacy property is thus satisﬁed.
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However, adversarial knowledge about a generalization algorithm itself may cause
additional complications [101, 111]. First, without considering such knowledge, an ad-
versary looking at g2(t0) in Table 3.1 can guess that the three persons in each group may
have the three conditions in any given order. Therefore, the adversary’s mental image of
t0 is a set of totally 3! × 3! = 36 micro-data tables, each of which is equally likely to be
t0 (a common assumption is that the quasi-identiﬁer attribute, such as Age in t0, is public
knowledge).We shall call this set of tables the permutation set with respect to the given gen-
eralization. The left-hand side of Table 3.2 shows two example tables in the permutation































Table 3.2: Two Tables in the Permutation Set and Their Corresponding Generalizations
under g1
The permutation set would be the adversary’s best guesses of the micro-data table, if
the released generalization is his/her only knowledge. However, adversary may also know
the generalization algorithm, and can simulate the algorithm to further exclude some invalid
guesses from the permutation set. In other words, such knowledge may allow adversary to
obtain a more accurate estimation of the private information than that can be obtained from
the disclosed data alone. For example, assume that the adversary knows the generalization
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algorithm has considered g1(t0) before it discloses g2(t0). In Table 3.2, t1 is not a valid
guess, because g1(t1) satisﬁes 2-diversity and should have been disclosed instead of g2(t0).
On the other hand, t2 is a valid guess since g1(t2) fails 2-diversity. Consequently, the
adversary can reﬁne his/her guess of t0 to a smaller set of tables, namely, the disclosure
set, as shown in Table 3.3. Since each table in the disclosure set is equally like to be t0,
the desired 2-diversity should be measured on each row of sensitive values (as a multiset).
From this set of tables, the adversary can infer that both Charlie and David, whose DoB
are 1974 and 1962 respectively, are deﬁnitely associated with cancer. Clearly, 2-diversity
is violated.
DoB Condition
1990 ﬂu cold ﬂu cold
1985 cold ﬂu cold ﬂu
1974 cancer cancer cancer cancer
1962 cancer cancer cancer cancer
1953 headache headache toothache toothache
1941 toothache toothache headache headache
Table 3.3: The Disclosure Set of g2(t0)
A natural solution to the above problem is for generalization algorithms to evaluate
the desired privacy property, such as l-diversity, on disclosure set in order to determine
whether a generalization is safe to disclose. For example, consider how we can compute
the disclosure set of next generalization, g3(t0), in Table 3.1. We need to exclude every table
t in the permutation set of g3(t0), if either g1(t) or g2(t) satisﬁes 2-diversity. However, to
determine whether g2(t) satisﬁes 2-diversity, we would have to compute the disclosure set
of g2(t), which may be different from the disclosure set of g2(t0) shown in Table 3.3. The
left-hand side of Table 3.4 shows such an example table t3 in permutation set of g3(t0).
The disclosure set of g2(t3) as shown in right-hand side of Table 3.4 is different from the
disclosure set of g2(t0). Clearly, such a recursive process is bound to have a high cost.
The contribution of this research is three fold. First, we show that a given gen-
eralization algorithm can be transformed into a large family of distinct algorithms under
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1990 cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer
1985 cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer
1974 ﬂu ﬂu ﬂu ﬂu ﬂu ﬂu
1962 cold cold headache headache toothache toothache
1953 headache toothache cold toothache cold headache
1941 toothache headache toothache cold headache cold
Table 3.4: A Table t3 in the Permutation Set of g3(t0) and its Corresponding Disclosure Set
Under g2
a novel strategy, called k-jump strategy. Intuitively, the k-jump strategy penalizes cases
where recursion is required to compute the disclosure set. Therefore, algorithms may be
more efﬁcient under the k-jump strategy in contrast to the above safe strategy. Second,
we discuss the computational complexity of such algorithms and prove that different algo-
rithms under the k-jump strategy generally lead to incomparable data utility (which is also
incomparable to that of algorithms under the above safe strategy). This result is somehow
surprising since the k-jump strategy adopts a more drastic approach than the above safe
strategy. Third, the result on data utility also has a practical impact. Speciﬁcally, while all
the k-jump algorithms are still publicly known, the choice among these algorithms can be
randomly chosen and kept secret, analogous to choosing a cryptographic key. We also con-
ﬁrm that the choice of algorithms must be made among safe algorithms. Furthermore, the
family of our algorithms is general and independent of the syntactic privacy property and
the data utility measurement. Note that in this research we focus on the syntactic privacy
properties which has been evidenced as complementary and indispensable to the semantic
notion of privacy, such as differential privacy [26, 64].
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives our model of
two existing algorithms. Section 3.3 then introduces the k-jump strategy and discusses its
properties. Section 3.4 presents our results on the data utility of k-jump algorithms. We
analyze the computational complexity of k-jump algorithms in Section 3.5, and conﬁrm
that the secret choice must be made among safe algorithms such as the family of k-jump
algorithms in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter.
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3.2 The Model
We ﬁrst introduce the basic model of micro-data table and generalization algo-
rithm in Section 3.2.1. We then review two existing strategies and related concepts in
Section 3.2.2. Table 3.5 lists our main notations which will be deﬁned in this section.
t0, t Micro-data table
a, anaive, asafe Generalization algorithm
gi(.), gi(t) Generalization (function)
p(.) Privacy property
per(.), per(gi(t)), peri, perki Permutation set
ds(.), ds(gi(t)), dsi, dski Disclosure set
path(.) Evaluation path
Table 3.5: The Notation Table
3.2.1 The Basic Model
A secret micro-data table (or simply a table) is a relation t0(QID, S) where QID
and S is the quasi-identiﬁer attribute and sensitive attribute, respectively (note that each of
these can also be a sequence of attributes). We make the worst case assumption that each
tuple in t0 can be linked to a unique identiﬁer (which the identiﬁer is not shown from t0)
through theQID value (if some tuples are to be deemed as not sensitive, they can be simply
disregarded by the algorithm). Denote by T the set of all tables with the same schema, the
same set of QID values, and the same multiset of sensitive values as those of t0.
We are also given a generalization algorithm a that deﬁnes a privacy property p(.) :
2T → {true, false} and a sequence of generalization functions gi(.) : T → G (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
where G denotes the set of all possible generalizations over T . Note that the discussion
about Table 3.3 in Section 3.1 has explained why p(.) should be evaluated on a set of,
instead of one, tables, and we follow the widely accepted notion of generalization [90].
Given t0 as the input to the algorithm a, either a generalization gi(t0) will be the output and
then disclosed, or ∅ will be the output indicating that nothing is disclosed.
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Note that in a real world generalization algorithm, a generalization function may
take an implicit form, such as a cut of the taxonomy tree [101]. Moreover, the sequence of
generalization functions to be applied to a given table is typically decided on the ﬂy. Our
simpliﬁed model is reasonable as long as such a decision is based on the quasi-identiﬁer
(which is true in, for example, the Incognito [61]), because an adversary who knows both
the quasi-identiﬁer and the generalization algorithm can simulate the latter’s execution to
determine the sequence of generalization functions for the disclosed generalization.
3.2.2 The Algorithms anaive and asafe
When adversarial knowledge about a generalization algorithm is not taken into ac-
count, the algorithm can take the following naive strategy. Given a table t0 and the gen-
eralization functions gi(.) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) already sorted in a non-increasing order of data
utility, the algorithm will then evaluate the privacy property p(.) on each of the n gener-
alizations gi(t0) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) in the given order. The ﬁrst generalization gi(t0) satisfying
p(gi(t0)) = true will be disclosed, which also maximizes the data utility. Note that our
discussion does not depend on speciﬁc utility measures as long as the measure is deﬁned
based on quasi-identiﬁers.
Before giving the detail of naive strategy, we ﬁrst formalizes the set of all tables in
T whose generalizations, under a given function, are identical with that of a given table in
Deﬁnition 3.1.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Permutation Set) Given a micro-data table t0, a generalization function
gi(.), the permutation set of t0 under gi(.) is a function per(.) : G→ 2T , deﬁned by:
per(gi(t0)) = {t : gi(t) = gi(t0)}
Note that per(gi(t0)) is also written as peri when both gi and t0 are clear from
context. It is easily seen that, in the naive strategy, evaluating the privacy property p(.) on
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a generalization gi(t0) is equivalent to evaluating p(.) on the permutation set per(gi(t0)).
Next we introduce the evaluation path in Deﬁnition 3.2. Informally, evaluation path
represents the sequence of evaluated generalization functions.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Evaluation Path) Given a micro-data table t0, an algorithm composed of
a sequence of generalization functions gi(.)(1 ≤ i ≤ n), the evaluation path of t0 under the
algorithm is a function path(.) : T → 2[1,n], deﬁned by:
path(t0) = {i : (the algorithm will evaluate t0 under gi) ∧ (1 ≤ i ≤ n)}
Note that although path(t0) is deﬁned as a set, the indices naturally form a sequence
(we shall need this concept for later discussions). With these two concepts, we can describe
the above algorithm as anaive shown in Table 3.6.
Input: Table t0;
Output: Generalization g or ∅;
Method:
1. Let path(t0) = ∅;
2. For i = 1 to n
3. Let path(t0) = path(t0) ∪ {i};
4. If p(per(gi(t0))) = true then
5. Return gi(t0);
6. Return ∅;
Table 3.6: The Algorithm anaive
Unfortunately, the naive strategy leads to an unsafe algorithm as illustrated in Sec-
tion 3.1 (that is, an algorithm that fails to satisfy the desired privacy property). Speciﬁcally,
consider an adversary who knows the quasi-identiﬁer ΠQID(t0), the above algorithm anaive,
and the disclosed generalization gi(t0) for some i ∈ [1, n]. Given any table t, by simulating
the algorithm’s execution, the adversary also knows path(t).
First, by only looking at the disclosed generalization gi(t0), the adversary can de-
duce t0 must be one of the tables in the permutation set per(gi(t0)). This inference
itself does not violate the privacy property p(.) since the algorithm anaive does ensure
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p(per(gi(t0)) = true holds before it discloses gi(t0). However, for any t ∈ per(gi(t0)), the
adversary can decide whether i ∈ path(t) by simulating the algorithm’s execution with t
as its input.
Clearly, any t ∈ per(gi(t0)) can be a valid guess of the unknown t0, only if i ∈
path(t) is true. By excluding all invalid guesses, the adversary can obtain a smaller subset
of per(gi(t0)). We call such a subset of per(gi(t0)) the disclosure set, as formally stated in
Deﬁnition 3.3.
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Disclosure Set) Given a micro-data table t0, an algorithm composed of a
sequence of generalization functions gi(.)(1 ≤ i ≤ n), the disclosure set of t0 under gi(.)
is a function ds(.) : G→ 2T , deﬁned by:
ds(gi(t0)) = per(gi(t0)) \ {t : i /∈ path(t)}
A natural way to ﬁx the unsafe anaive is to replace the permutation set with the cor-
responding disclosure set in the evaluation of a privacy property. From above discussions,
after gi(t0) is disclosed, the adversary’s mental image about t0 is ds(gi(t0)). Therefore,
we can simply modify the algorithm to ensure p(ds(gi(t0))) = true before it discloses
any gi(t0). We call this the safe strategy, and formally describe it as algorithm asafe in
Table 3.7.
Input: Table t0;
Output: Generalization g or ∅;
Method:
1. Let path(t0) = ∅;
2. For i = 1 to n
3. Let path(t0) = path(t0) ∪ {i};
4. If p(ds(gi(t0))) = true then
5. Return gi(t0);
6. Return ∅;
Table 3.7: The Algorithm asafe
Taking the adversary’s point of view again, when gi(t0) is disclosed under asafe, the
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adversary can repeat the aforementioned process to exclude invalid guesses from per(gi(t0)),
except that now dsj (j < i) will be used instead of perj . As the result, he/she will conclude
that t0 must be within the set per(gi(t)) \ {t′ : i /∈ path(t′)}, which, not surprisingly, co-
incides with ds(gi(t0)) (that is, the result of the adversary’s inference is t0 ∈ ds(gi(t0))).
Since asafe has ensured p(ds(gi(t0))) = true, the adversary’s inference will not violate the
privacy property p(.). That is, asafe is indeed a safe algorithm.
A subtlety here is that the deﬁnition of disclosure set may seem to be a circular
deﬁnition: ds(.) is deﬁned using path(.), path(.) using the algorithm asafe, which in turn
depends on ds(.). However, this is not the case. In deﬁning the disclosure set, ds(gi(t))
depends on the truth value of the condition i /∈ path(t). In table 3.7, we can observe
that this truth value can be decided in line 3, right before ds(gi(t)) is needed (in line 4).
Therefore, both concepts are well deﬁned.
On the other hand, we can see that for computing ds(gi(t0)), we must compute the
truth value of the condition i /∈ path(t) for every t ∈ per(gi(t0)). Moreover, to construct
path(t) requires us to simulate the execution of asafe with t as the input. Therefore, to
compute ds(gi(t0)), we will have to compute ds(gj(t)) for all t ∈ per(gi(t0)) and j =
1, 2, . . . , i− 1. Clearly, this is an expensive process. In next section, we shall investigate a
novel family of algorithms for reducing the cost.
3.3 k-jump Strategy
In this section, we ﬁrst introduce the k-jump strategy in Section 3.3.1, and then
discuss its properties in Section 3.3.2.
3.3.1 The Algorithm Family ajump(k)
In the previous section, we have shown that the naive strategy is unsafe, and the safe
strategy is safe but may incur a high cost due to the inherently recursive process. First, we
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more closely examine the limitation of these algorithms in order to build intuitions toward
our new solution. In Figure 3.1, the upper and middle chart shows the decision process
of the previous two algorithms, anaive and asafe, respectively. Each box represents the ith
iteration of the algorithm. Each diamond represents an evaluation of the privacy property
p(.) on the set inside the diamond, and the symbol Y and N denotes the result of such an














































































Figure 3.1: The Decision Process of Different Strategies
Comparing the two charts, we can have four different cases in each iteration of the
algorithm (some iterations actually have less possibilities, as we shall show later):
1. If p(peri) = p(dsi) = false (recall that peri is an abbreviation of per(gi(t0))), then
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clearly, both algorithms will immediately move to the next iteration.
2. If p(peri) = p(dsi) = true, both algorithms will disclose gi(t0) and terminates.
3. We delay the discussion of the case of p(peri) = false ∧ p(dsi) = true to later
sections.
4. We can see the last case, p(peri) = true ∧ p(dsi) = false, is the main reason that
anaive is unsafe, and that asafe must compute the disclosure set and consequently
result in an expensive recursive process.
Therefore, informally, we penalize the last case, by jumping over the next k−1 iter-
ations of the algorithm. As a result, we have the k-jump strategy as illustrated in the lower
chart of Figure 3.1. More formally, the family of algorithms under the k-jump strategy is
shown in Table 3.8.
Input: Table t0, vector k ∈ [1, n]n;
Output: Generalization g or ∅;
Method:
1. Let path(t0) = ∅;
2. Let i = 1;
3. While (i ≤ n)
4. Let path(t0) = path(t0) ∪ {(i, 0)}; //the pair (i, 0) represents peri
5. If p(per(gi(t0))) = true then
6. Let path(t0) = path(t0) ∪ {(i, 1)}; //the pair (i, 1) represents dsi
7. If p(ds(gi(t0))) = true then
8. Return gi(t0);
9. Else
10. Let i = i + k[i]; //k[i] is the ith element of k
11. Else
12. Let i = i + 1;
13. Return ∅;
Table 3.8: The Algorithm Family ajump(k)
There are two main differences between ajump(k) and asafe. First, since now in
each iteration the algorithm may evaluate peri and dsi, or peri only, we slightly change the
deﬁnition of evaluation path to be path(.) : T → 2[1,n]×{0,1} so (i, 0) stands for peri and
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(i, 1) for dsi. Consequently, the deﬁnition of a disclosure set also needs to be revised by
replacing the condition i /∈ path(t) with (i, 1) /∈ path(t).
Second, the algorithm family ajump(k) takes an additional input, an n-dimensional
vector k ∈ [1, n]n, namely, the jump distance vector. In the case of p(peri) = true ∧
p(dsi) = false, the algorithm will directly jump to the (i + k[i])th iteration (note that
jumping to the ith iteration for any i > n will simply lead to line 13 of the algorithm, that
is, to disclose nothing). In the special case that ∀i ∈ [1, n] k[i] = k for some integer k, we
shall abuse the notation to simply use k for k.
Despite the difference between asafe and ajump(k), the ﬁnal condition for disclosing
a generalization remains the same, that is, p(dsi) = true. This simple fact sufﬁces to show
ajump(k) to be a safe family of algorithms.
3.3.2 Properties of ajump(k)
We discuss several properties of the algorithms ajump(k) in the following.
3.3.2.1 Computation of the Disclosure Set
Again, the disclosure set is well deﬁned under ajump(k), although it may seem to
be a circular deﬁnition at ﬁrst glance. First, ds(gi(t)) depends on the truth value of the
condition (i, 1) /∈ path(t). In table 3.8, we can then observe that this value can be decided
in line 6, right before ds(gi(t)) is needed (in line 7).
Although computing disclosure sets under ajump(k) is similar to that under asafe,
the former is generally more efﬁcient. Speciﬁcally, recall that under asafe, to compute
ds(gi(t0)) we must ﬁrst compute ds(gj(t)) for all t ∈ per(gi(t0)) and j = 1, 2, . . . , i − 1.
In contrast, this expensive recursive process is not always necessary under ajump(k).
Referring to the lower chart in Figure 3.1, to compute ds(gi(t0)) for any 2 < i <
2 + k, we no longer need to always compute ds(g2(t)) for every t ∈ peri. By deﬁnition,
ds(gi(t0)) = per(gi(t0)) \ {t : (i, 1) /∈ path(t)}. From the chart, it is evident that (i, 1) /∈
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path(t) is true as long as p(per(g2(t))) = true (in which case path(t) will either terminates
at ds2 or jump over the ith iteration). Therefore, for any such table t, we do not need to
compute ds(g2(t)) in computing ds(gi(t0)).
As an extreme case, when the jump distance vector is (n, n − 1, . . . , 1), all the
jumps end at ∅ (disclosing noting). In this case, the computation of disclosure set is no
longer a recursive process. To compute ds(gi(t0)), it sufﬁces to only compute per(gj(t))
for t ∈ per(gi(t0)) and j = 1, 2, . . . , i− 1. The complexity is thus signiﬁcantly lower.
3.3.2.2 ds(g1(t0)) and ds(g2(t0))
The ﬁrst two disclosure sets have some special properties. First of all, ds(g1(t0) =
per(g1(t0)) is true. Intuitively, since any given table itself generally does not satisfy the
privacy property, in computing ds1, an adversary cannot exclude any table from per1. More
speciﬁcally, when g1(t0) is disclosed, for all t ∈ per(g1(t0)), path(t) must always end at
ds1, because p(per(g1(t))) = true follows from the fact that per(g1(t)) = per(g1(t0))
(by the deﬁnition of permutation set) and p(per(g1(t0))) = true (by the fact that g1(t0) is
disclosed). Therefore, ds(g1(t0)) = per(g1(t0)) \ {t : (1, 1) /∈ path(t)} yields ds(g1(t0) =
per(g1(t0)).
Second, we show that ds(g2(t0)) is independent of the distance vector k. That is, all
algorithms in ajump(k) share the same ds(g2(t0)). By deﬁnition, ds(g2(t0)) = per(g2(t0))\
{t : (2, 1) /∈ path(t)}. As ds(g1(t0) = per(g1(t0)) is true, the case p(per(g1(t0))) =
true ∧ p(ds(g1(t0))) = false is impossible, and consequently the jump from ds1 is never
to happen (which explains the missing edge in the lower chart of Figure 3.1). Therefore,
the condition (2, 1) /∈ path(t) does not depend on the distance vector k.
3.3.2.3 Size of the Family
First, with n generalization functions, we can have roughly (n− 1)! different jump
distance vectors since the ith (2 ≤ i ≤ n) iteration may jump to (n − i + 1) different
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destinations , where the (n + 1)th iteration means disclosing nothing. Clearly, (n − 1)! is
a very large number even for a reasonably large n. Moreover, the space of jump distance
vectors will be further increased when we reuse generalization functions in a meaningful
way, as will be shown in later sections. Therefore, we can now transform any given unsafe
algorithm anaive into a large family of safe algorithms. This fact lays a foundation for
making secret choices of k-jump algorithm to prevent adversarial inferences.
Note here the jump distance refers to possible ways an algorithm may jump at each
iteration, which is not to be confused with the evaluation path of a speciﬁc table. For
example, the vector (n, n− 1, . . . , 1) yields a valid k-jump algorithm that always jumps to
disclosing nothing, whereas any speciﬁc evaluation path can include at most one of such
jumps. There is also another plausible but false perception related to this. That is, an
algorithm with the jump distance k (note that here k denotes a vector whose elements are
all equal to k) will only disclose a generalization under gi(.) where i is a multiplication of
k. This perception may lead to false statements about data utility, for example, that the data
utility for k = 2 is better than that for k = 4. In fact, regardless of the jump distance, an
algorithm may potentially disclose a generalization under every gi(.). The reason is that
each jump is only possible, but not mandatory for a speciﬁc table.
3.4 Data Utility Comparison
In this section, we compare the data utility of different algorithms. Section 3.4.1
considers the family of k-jump algorithms. Section 3.4.2 studies the case when some gen-
eralization functions are reused in an algorithm. Section 3.4.3 addresses asafe.
3.4.1 Data Utility of k-Jump Algorithms
Our main result is that the data utility of two k-jump algorithms ajump(k) and
ajump(k
′) from the same family is generally incomparable. That is, the data utility cannot
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simply be ordered based on the jump distance of two algorithms. Note that, deterministi-
cally the data utility cannot be improved without the given table, and the data utility among
algorithms is only comparable for the given table. In other words, here the comparison of
data utility is independent of the given table, accordingly, the notation ajump(k) does not
indicate the given table.
We do not rely on speciﬁc utility measures. Instead, the generalization functions
are assumed to be sorted in a non-increasing order of their data utility. Consequently, an
algorithm a1 is considered to have better or equal data utility compared to another algorithm
a2 (both algorithms are from the same family), if we can construct a table t for which a1
returns gi(t) and a2 returns gj(t), with i < j.
Such a construction is possible with two methods. First, we let path(t) under a2 to
jump over the iteration in which a1 terminates. Second, when the ﬁrst method is not an
option, we let path(t) under a2 to include a disclosure set that does not satisfy the privacy
property p(.), whereas path(t) under a1 to include one that does. We ﬁrst consider the
following two special cases.
• ajump(1) and ajump(i) (i>1) In this case, the evaluation path of ajump(1) can never
jump over that of ajump(i) (in fact, a jump distance of 1 means no jump at all).
Therefore, we apply the above second method, that is, to rely on different disclosure
sets of the same disclosed generalization.
• ajump(i) and ajump(j) (1 < i < j) For this case, we apply the above ﬁrst method,
that is, by constructing an evaluation path that jumps over the other.
From now on, we shall add superscripts to existing notations to denote the distance
vector of different algorithms. For example, dsk1 means the disclosure set ds1 under the
algorithm ajump(k).
3.4.1.1 ajump(1) vs. ajump(i) (i > 1)
First, we need the following result.
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Lemma 3.1 For any ajump(1) and ajump(i) (i > 1) algorithms from the same family, we
have dsi3 ⊆ ds13.
Proof: By deﬁnition, ds(g3(t0)) = per(g3(t0)) \ {t : (3, 1) /∈ path(t)}. Obviously,
for ajump(1), the disclosure set ds13(t0) is derived from the permutation set of g3(t0) by
excluding those are disclosed under g1 and g2, while for ajump(i) (i > 1), the disclosure
set dsi3(t0) is derived from the permutation set of g3(t0) by excluding those permutation
set are safe under g1 or g2. In other words, to remove a table t from per(g3(t0)), not
only the permutation set but also disclosure set of g2(t) must satisfy the privacy property
for ajump(1); while only permutation set of g2(t) must satisfy the privacy property for
ajump(i) (i > 1), since in this case, no matter whether the disclosure set satisﬁes or not,
(3, 1) /∈ path(t). Formally,
ds13(t0) =per3(t0)/{t|(t ∈ per3(t0)) ∧ (p(per1(t)) = true
∨ (p(per2(t)) = true ∧ p(ds12(t)) = true))} (3.1)
dsi3(t0) =per3(t0)/{t|(t ∈ per3(t0)) ∧ (p(per1(t)) = true ∨ p(per2(t)) = true)} (3.2)
from which the result follows.
From Lemma 3.1, we can have the following straightforward result for the case that
privacy property is set-monotonic (which p(S) = true implies ∀S ′ ⊇ S p(S ′) = true).
This result is needed for proving Theorem 3.1.
Lemma 3.2 The data utility of ajump(1) is always better than or equal to that of ajump(i)
(i > 1) when both algorithms are from the same family with a set-monotonic privacy
property p(.) and n = 3.
Proof: As shown in Section 3.3.2.2, per1(t0), per2(t0), and ds2(t0) are identical once
the sequence of generalization functions are given. Therefore, either t0 can be released by
g1 (or g2) in both ajump(1) and ajump(i) (i > 1), or it cannot be in both of them.
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For g3, based on Lemma 3.1 and the deﬁnition of set-monotonic, dsi3(t0) satisﬁes
privacy property only if ds13(t0) satisﬁes. The proof is complete.
Theorem 3.1 For any i > 1, there always exist cases in which the data utility of the
algorithm ajump(i) is better than that of ajump(1), and vice versa.
Proof: The key is to have different disclosure sets ds3 under the two algorithms such
that one satisﬁes p(.) and the other fails. Figure 3.2 illustrates such evaluation paths.
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Figure 3.2: The Construction for ajump(1) and ajump(i) (1 < i)
By Lemma 3.2, the case where the data utility of ajump(1) is better than or equal to
that of ajump(i) (i > 1) is trivial to construct and hence is omitted. We only show the other
case where ajump(i) has better data utility. Basically, we need to design a table to satisfy the
following. First, per1 and per2 do not satisfy p(.) while per3 does. Second, p(dsi3) = true
and p(ds13) = false are both true.
Table 3.9 shows our construction for the proof. The privacy property p(.) is that the
highest ratio of a sensitive value in a group must be no greater than 1
2
. Notice that here (and
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in the remainder of the paper) p(.) is not necessarily set-monotonic. We show that ajump(i)
can disclose using g3, whereas ajump(1) cannot.
1. For this special case, dsk3(t0) can be computed by ﬁrst excluding any table t for which
p(per1(t)) = true. The tables in dsi3(t0) must belong to one of the following four
disjoint sets.

















) = 48 × 90 = 4320. Denote this set by S1. In the
other three cases, I does not have C6 and both N and O have C7, C8, or C9, denoted





















) = 48× 24 = 1152 tables.
Now consider generalizing these tables using g2. All tables in the last three sets
cannot be disclosed under g2 since each of their permutation sets under g2 fails the
privacy property. For the same reason, tables in the ﬁrst set in which both N and O
have C7, C8, or C9, which is denoted as S ′1, cannot be disclosed under g2, either. The
















= 48× 18 = 864.
For ajump(i), all the tables in (S1 \ S ′1) will be excluded from dsi3(t0). The reason is
the following. Each of their permutation sets under g2 satisﬁes the privacy property,
so ajump(i) will disclose them either under g2 or after g3. Therefore, dsi3(t0) =
S ′1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 ∪ S4. The highest ratio of sensitive value is that of A and B associated
with C0 or C1, which is 12 . Since ds
i
3(t0) satisﬁes the privacy property, it can be
disclosed using g3 under ajump(i).
2. As to the case of ajump(1), the disclosure set of all the tables in S1 \S ′1 do not satisfy
the privacy property and hence all of them cannot be removed from ds13(t0). The
reason is as follows. First, the permutation set of each such table under g2 satisﬁes
the privacy property. Next, consider their disclosure sets under g2. The set S1 \ S ′1
can be further divided into three disjoint subsets as follows.
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= 48× 24 = 1152 tables. Based on the sensitive
value of H , this subset can be further divided into two disjoint subsets again.






















= 48 × 12 = 576 tables. For each table in this subset, to obtain its
disclosure set, we must exclude the tables that can be disclosed under g1
from its permutation set following the same rule as above. The tables in
its disclosure set must satisfy that both H and I have C6. The ratio of both
H and I being associated with C6 is 1.0 > 0.5. This clearly violates the
privacy property.





















= 48 × 12 = 576
tables. Similarly, the tables in the disclosure set must satisfy that two from
the set {E,F,G} have C6. Moreover, one and only one of H and I has
C6. Therefore, the ratio of both E, F , and G being associated with C6 is
2
3
> 0.5. This also violates the privacy property.
In summary, the disclosure set of every table in this subset under function g2 will
violate the privacy property, and consequently these tables cannot be disclosed
under g2. Therefore, the algorithm ajump(1) must continue to evaluate these
tables under g3 whose permutation set satisﬁes the privacy property.
• The other two cases are that N and O have C7 and C9, respectively, or C8
and C9, respectively. Similarly, each has 1152 tables, and for the same reason
as above, the disclosure set of each table in each subset does not satisfy the
privacy property, and hence cannot be disclosed under g2.
Consequently, all the tables in S1 \ S ′1 cannot be removed from ds13(t0). Therefore,
ds13(t0) = S1∪S2∪S3∪S4. The ratio of I being associated with C6 is 48×9048×(90+24×3) =
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0.556 > 0.5. This violates the privacy property. Therefore, the given table cannot be
disclosed using g3 under ajump(1).
QID g1 g2 g3 . . .
A C0 C0 C0 . . .
B C1 C1 C1 . . .
C C2 C2 C2 . . .
D C3 C3 C3 . . .
E C4 C4 C4 . . .
F C5 C5 C5 . . .
G C6 C6 C6 . . .
H C6 C6 C6 . . .
I C6 C6 C6 . . .
J C7 C7 C7 . . .
K C7 C7 C7 . . .
L C8 C8 C8 . . .
M C8 C8 C8 . . .
N C9 C9 C9 . . .
O C9 C9 C9 . . .
Table 3.9: The Case Where ajump(i) Has Better Utility Than ajump(1)
3.4.1.2 ajump(i) vs. ajump(j) (1 < i < j)
Next, we prove the data utility of ajump(i) and ajump(j) to be incomparable by
constructing non-overlapping evaluation paths.
Theorem 3.2 For any j > i > 1, there always exist cases where the data utility of the
algorithm ajump(i) is better than that of ajump(j), and vice versa.
Proof: Since both ajump(i) and ajump(j) can jump over iterations of the algorithm, we
can easily construct evaluation paths for the proof. Figure 3.3 illustrates such constructed
paths.
Firstly, the case where ajump(i) has better utility than ajump(j) (1 < i < j) is
relatively easier to construct. We basically need to construct a case satisfying the following
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(if ω = 1), p(perω) = false;
(if ω = 2), p(perω) = true ∧ p(dsω) = false;
(if ω = i + 2), p(perω) = true ∧ p(dsiω) = true.
The above conditions imply that gi+2 will be used to disclose under ajump(i), while
the algorithm ajump(j) will jump over the (i + 2)th function to disclose under or after gj+2
since permutation set of g2 satisﬁes privacy property while disclosure set of g2 does not.
Secondly, we show the construction for the other case where ajump(i) has worse





(if ω = 1), p(perω) = false;
(if ω = 2), p(perω) = true ∧ p(dsi,jω ) = false;
(∀ω ∈ [3, j]), p(perω) = false;
(∀ω ∈ [j + 1, j + 2]), p(perω) = true;
(if ω = j + 1), p(dsiω) = false;
(if ω = j + 2), p(dsjω) = true.
The above conditions imply that gj+2 will be used to disclose under ajump(j). On
the other hand, when ajump(i) evaluates gi+2, since its permutation set does not satisfy
the privacy property, the algorithm will move to the next function, and repeat this until it
reaches gj+1. Since dsij+1(t0) does not satisfy the privacy property, the algorithm will jump
to gj+1+i and will disclose using a function beyond gj+2.
Table 3.10 shows our construction where the privacy property is again that the high-
est ratio of a sensitive value is no greater than 1
2
. We assume the table has many others
tuples not shown (the purpose of these additional tuples is only to ensure the data util-
ity of the generalizations is in a non-increasing order). The left (right) side of Table 3.10
shows the case where the data utility of ajump(i) is better (worse) than that of ajump(j)
(1 < i < j). Without loss of generality, we discuss the ﬁrst 12 tuples in these two tables.
Firstly, we discuss the left side of Table 3.10. The given table, denoted by t0, cannot
be disclosed under g1 since p(per1) = false. For g2, we have p(per2) = true. The tables
in ds2 (note that dsi2 ≡ dsj2 as shown in Section 3.3.2.2) satisfy that E, F , G, and H have
the sensitive value C4, S, S, and C5, respectively. Clearly, p(ds2) = false, and g2(t0)
cannot be disclosed, either. Then ajump(i) and ajump(j) will jump to evaluate under gi+2
and gj+2, respectively.
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Now we show that ajump(i) can be disclosed using gi+2. The dsii+2 can be computed
ﬁrst by excluding the tables {t : p(per1(t) = true}. The tables in dsii+2 must belong to one
of the following three disjoint sets.






)× 4!× 5! = 3× 5!× 5! tables.
2. Both D and E have S. This subset has 5!× 5! tables.
3. Both F and G have S. This subset also has 5!× 5! tables.
Next, ajump(i) will evaluate these tables using g2. Clearly, the permutation set of
each of these tables satisﬁes privacy property. The ajump(i) will further evaluate their ds2.
As discussed above, all the tables in last set cannot be disclosed under g2. Similarly, those
in second set cannot either. For the ﬁrst set, all the tables which D has S are safe under g1.
In other words, the ds2 for each table in this set satisﬁes that two of A, B, and C have S,
which violates the privacy property. Summarily, all these tables are in dsii+2(t0). The ratio
of A, B, and C being associated with S are 2
5
, which is the highest ratio. Thus, gii+2(t0) can
be safely released. Besides, ajump(j) must disclose table t0 under or after gj+2, therefore,
in this case, ajump(i) has better data utility than ajump(j).
Secondly, we discuss the right side of Table 3.10. Similarly, ajump(i) will jump to
evaluate gi+2 while ajump(j) will jump to gj+2. For ajump(j), since p(perj+2) = true and




is highest ratio), therefore, ajump(j) will disclose gj+2. For ajump(i), since p(peri+2) =
false, it will move to evaluate gi+3 and repeat until gj+1 due to the same reason. Obviously,
the tables in dsij+1 satisfy that both F and G have sensitive value S, which violates the
privacy property. Therefore, the algorithm ajump(i) jumps beyond gj+2 since j + 2 <
j + 1 + i. Clearly, with these constructions, both ajump(i) and ajump(j) will follow the
desired evaluation paths as shown in Figure 3.3.
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(a). ajump(i) better than ajump(j) (b). ajump(i) worse than ajump(j)
QID g1 g2 . . . gi+2 . . . gj+2 . . .
A C0 C0 . . . C0 . . . C0 . . .
B C1 C1 . . . C1 . . . C1 . . .
C C2 C2 . . . C2 . . . C2 . . .
D C3 C3 . . . C3 . . . C3 . . .
E C4 C4 . . . C4 . . . C4 . . .
F S S . . . S . . . S . . .
G S S . . . S . . . S . . .
H C5 C5 . . . C5 . . . C5 . . .
I C6 C6 . . . C6 . . . C6 . . .
J C7 C7 . . . C7 . . . C7 . . .
K C8 C8 . . . C8 . . . C8 . . .
L C9 C9 . . . C9 . . . C9 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
QID g1 g2 g3 . . . gj gj+1 gj+2 . . .
A C0 C0 C0 . . . C0 C0 C0 . . .
B C1 C1 C1 . . . C1 C1 C1 . . .
C C2 C2 C2 . . . C2 C2 C2 . . .
D C3 C3 C3 . . . C3 C3 C3 . . .
E C4 C4 C4 . . . C4 C4 C4 . . .
F S S S . . . S S S . . .
G S S S . . . S S S . . .
H C5 C5 C5 . . . C5 C5 C5 . . .
I C6 C6 C6 . . . C6 C6 C6 . . .
J C7 C7 C7 . . . C7 C7 C7 . . .
K C8 C8 C8 . . . C8 C8 C8 . . .
L C9 C9 C9 . . . C9 C9 C9 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 3.10: The Data Utility Comparison Between ajump(j) and ajump(i) (1 < i < j)
3.4.1.3 ajump(k1) vs. ajump(k2) (k1 = k2)
Next, we extend the above results to the more general case in which the two algo-
rithms ajump(k1) and ajump(k2) both have an n-dimensional vector as their jump distances.
Theorem 3.3 For any k1, k2 ∈ [1, n]n, there always exist cases in which the data utility of
the algorithm ajump(k1) is better than that of ajump(k2), and vice versa.
Proof: Suppose the ﬁrst element with different jump distance of k1 and k2 is the ith
element. Without the loss of generality, assume that k1[i] < k2[i]. Figure 3.4 illustrates
such constructed paths. There are two cases as follows,









can construct in a similar way as in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Basically, we construct the
following evaluation path: per1 → per2 → . . . → peri → peri+1 → dsi+1 so that in one
case we have p(ds
k1
i+1) = true ∧ p(ds
k2
i+1) = false, whereas in the other case we have
p(ds
k1
i+1) = false ∧ p(ds
k2
i+1) = true.
Second, k1[i] > 1: In this case, we consider two sub-cases.
1. (∃j)((i + k1[i] ≤ j < i + k2[i]) ∧ (j + k1[j] > i + k2[i])):
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Figure 3.4: The Construction for ajump(k1) and ajump(k2) (k1 = k2)
(a) ajump(k1) : per1 → per2 → . . .→ peri → ds k1i → peri+ k1[i] → . . .→ perj →
ds
k1
j → perj+ k1[j] → . . .










ajump(k2) : per1 → per2 → . . .→ peri → ds k2i → peri+ k2[i] → . . .
Since j + k1[j] > i+ k2[i], the data utility of ajump(k1) in the ﬁrst case is worse than
that of ajump(k2). Meanwhile, since i+ k1[i] < i+ k2[i], we have the converse result
in the second case.
2. ¬(∃j)((i + k1[i] ≤ j < i + k2[i]) ∧ (j + k1[j] > i + k2[i])):





. We can reason as follows. The disclosure set
of gi+ k2[i] under ajump(
k2) is computed by excluding from its permutation set the
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tables which can be disclosed using g1 and those which p(per2(t)) = true; however,
the disclosure set under ajump(k1) needs to further exclude the tables which can be
disclosed under some function gj and (j, 0) is in the evaluation path, where (i +
k1[i] ≤ j ≤ i + k2[i] − 1). Based on this result, we can construct the following
evaluation paths.
(a) ajump(k1) : per1 → per2 → . . . → peri → ds k1i → peri+ k1[i] → . . . →









(b) ajump(k1) : per1 → per2 → . . . → peri → ds k1i → peri+ k1[i] → . . . →









Clearly, the data utility of ajump(k1) in the ﬁrst (second) case is worse (better) than
that of ajump(k2).
3.4.2 Reusing Generalization Functions
With the naive strategy, whether a generalization function satisﬁes the privacy prop-
erty is independent of other functions. Therefore, it is meaningless to evaluate the same
function more than once. However, we now show that with the k-jump strategy, it is mean-
ingful to reuse a generalization function along the evaluation path. This will either increase
the data utility of the original algorithm, or lead to new algorithms with incomparable data
utility to enrich the the existing family of algorithms. That is, reusing generalization func-
tions may beneﬁt the optimization of data utility.
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Theorem 3.4 Given the set of generalization functions, there always exist cases in which
the data utility of the algorithm with reusing generalization functions is better than that of
the algorithm without reusing, and vice versa.
Proof: Consider two algorithms a1 and a2 that deﬁne the functions g1, g2, g3, g4, . . .
and g1, g2, g3, g2′ , g4, . . ., respectively, where g2′(.) and g2() are identical. Suppose both al-
gorithms has the same jump distance k = 1, and the privacy property is not set-monotonic.
We can construct the following two evaluation paths.
1. a1(t0) : per1(t0) → per2(t0) → ds12(t0) → per3(t0) → per4(t0) . . .
a2(t0) : per1(t0) → per2(t0) → ds12(t0) → per3(t0) → per2′(t0) → ds12′(t0) →
p(ds12′(t0)) = true
2. a1(t0) : per1(t0) → per2(t0) → per3(t0) → per4(t0) → ds14(t0) → p(ds14(t0)) =
true
a2(t0) : per1(t0) → per2(t0) → per3(t0) → per2′(t0) → per4(t0) → ds14(t0) →
p(ds14(t0)) = false
Clearly, the data utility of a1 in the ﬁrst case is worse than that of a2, while in the
second case it is better.
It is worth noting that although the same generalization function is repetitively eval-
uated, its disclosure set will depend on the functions that appear before it in the evaluation
path. Take the identical functions g2 and g′2 above as an example, the disclosure set of g2
is computed by excluding from its permutation set the tables which can be disclosed under
g1; however, the disclosure set of g′2 needs to further exclude tables which can be disclosed
under g3. Therefore, ds2′ ⊆ ds2. Generally, dsi′ ⊆ dsi when gi(.) is reused as gi′(.) in a
later iteration. This leads to the following.
Proposition 3.1 With a set-monotonic privacy property, reusing generalization functions
in a k-jump algorithm does not affect the data utility under ajump(1).
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Proof: Suppose gi(.) is reused as gi′(.) in a later iteration of the algorithm. For
any table t, since dsi′(t) ⊆ dsi(t), p(dsi′(t)) = true implies p(dsi(t)) = true for any
set-monotonic privacy property p(.). Therefore, if p(dsi′(t)) = true, the algorithm will
disclose under gi(.); if p(dsi′(t)) = false then the algorithm will continue to the next
iteration. In both cases, gi′(.) cannot exclude the tables from permutation set other than
gi(.) can do, therefore, gi′(.) does not affect the data utility.
On the other hand, when generalization functions are reused at the end of the orig-
inal sequence of functions, some tables which will lead to disclosing nothing under the
original sequence of functions may have a chance to be disclosed under the reused func-
tions, which will improve the data utility.
Proposition 3.2 Reusing a generalization function after the last iteration of an existing
k-jump algorithm may improve the data utility when p(.) is not set-monotonic.
Proof: We construct a case in which reusing a function will improve the data utility.
Consider two algorithms a1 and a2 that deﬁne the functions g1, g2, g3 and g1, g2, g3, g2′ ,
respectively, where g2′(.) and g2(.) are identical. Suppose both algorithms have the same
jump distance k = 1, and the privacy property is not set-monotonic. We need to construct
the following two evaluation paths by which a1 will disclose nothing, while a2 will disclose
using g2′ .
1. a1(t0) : per1(t0) → per2(t0) → ds12(t0) → p(per3(t0)) = false
2. a2(t0) : per1(t0) → per2(t0) → ds12(t0) → per3(t0) → per2′(t0) → ds12′(t0) →
p(ds12′(t0)) = true
Table 3.11 shows our construction. The table will lead to disclosing nothing without
reusing g2, whereas reusing g2 will lead to a successful disclosure. In this example, the
jump distance is 1, and the privacy property is that the highest ratio of any sensitive value




More speciﬁcally, the given table, denoted by t0, cannot be disclosed under g1(.) or
g3(.) since p(per1) = p(per3) = false. For g2, we have p(per2) = true. The tables in ds2
must be in one of the following three disjoint sets.










Denote this set by S1.










tables. Denote it by S2.
3. C does not have C3, and both F and G have C3. Similarly, there are 8 such tables.
Denote this set by S3.
We then have ds2 = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3. The ratio of C being associated with C3 is
24
24+8+8
= 0.6 > 0.5, so g2(t0) cannot be disclosed, either.
Now, consider the case that g2 is reused as g2′ . To calculate the disclosure set of g2′ ,
the tables which can be disclosed under g1, g2, and g3 must be excluded from ds2′ . After
excluding the tables which can be disclosed under g1, we have that the remaining tables in
ds2′ are the same as above, that is, S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3. These tables cannot be disclosed under
g2 as mentioned above. We further evaluate whether these tables can be disclosed using g3.
S1 can be further divided into three disjoint subsets as follows.












= 16 tables, and is denoted by S11 .







= 4 tables, and is denoted by S12 .
3. Both F and G have C3. This subset also has 4 tables, and is denoted by S13 .
All the tables in S12 , S13 , S2, and S3 cannot be disclosed under g3 since their per-
mutation sets under g3 do not satisfy the privacy property (the highest ratios of a sensitive
value are respectively 0.6, 1.0, 0.6, and 1.0). On the other hand, the tables in S11 can be
disclosed under g3. We can reason as follows. Consider each table t in S11 under g3. Since
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the tables which can be disclosed under g1 must be excluded from ds3(t), the remaining
tables in ds3(t) must be in one of the following two disjoint sets.
1. Both A and B have C3. This subset has 3!× 2! = 12 tables, and is denoted by S111 .













and is denoted by S112 .
We must exclude from ds3(t) the tables which can be disclosed using g2. The tables
in S111 cannot be disclosed under g2 since their permutation sets under g2 do not satisfy the
privacy property. Furthermore, the tables in S112 can be further divided into two disjoint
subsets based on whetherC hasC3. The tables in the case thatC hasC3 cannot be disclosed
using g2 because of the same reason as those in S111 , while the tables in the case that C
does not have C3 cannot be disclosed using g2 because of the similar reason as g2(t0). In a
word, all the tables in S111 and S112 cannot be disclosed using g2, accordingly, these tables
cannot be excluded from ds3(t). Thus, ds3(t) = S111 ∪ S112 . The ratio of C, D, E, F or G
being associated with C3 in ds3(t) is 12 which is the highest ratio, accordingly, the tables in
S11 can be disclosed under g3.
Therefore, the disclosure set under the reused function g2′ must exclude the tables
in S11 , consequently, ds2′ = S12 ∪ S13 ∪ S2 ∪ S3. The ratio of F and G being associated
with C3 are 0.5, which is the highest ratio. Therefore, g2′(t0) can be safely disclosed.
QID g1 g2 g3 g2′
A C1 C1 C1 C1
B C2 C2 C2 C2
C C3 C3 C3 C3
D C4 C4 C4 C4
E C5 C5 C5 C5
F C3 C3 C3 C3
G C3 C3 C3 C3
Table 3.11: The Case Where Reusing Generalization Functions Improves Data Utility
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3.4.3 asafe and ajump(1)
We show that the algorithm asafe is equivalent to ajump(1)when the privacy property
is either set-monotonic, or based on the highest ratio of sensitive values.
Given a group ECi in the disclosed generalization, let nri be the number of tuples
and nsi be the number of unique sensitive values. Denote the sensitive values within ECi
by {si.1, si.2, . . . , si.nsi}. Denote by nsi.j the number of tuples associated with si.j .
Lemma 3.3 If the privacy property is either set-monotonic or based on the highest ratio of
sensitive values, then a permutation set not satisfying the privacy property will imply that
any of its subsets does not, either.
Proof: The result is obvious if the privacy property is set-monotonic. Now consider
a privacy property based on the highest ratio of sensitive values, which is supposed to be
no greater than a given δ. Suppose that ECi is a group that does not satisfy the privacy
property, and in particular, si.j is a sensitive value that leads to the violation. First, based
on Lemma 3.5, we have that
nsi.j
nri
> δ. Let nt be the cardinality of any subset of the
permutation set. Since all tables in this subset have the same permutation set, each such
table has totally nsi.j appearances of si.j in ECi. Therefore, among these tables, the total
number of appearances of si.j inECi is nsi.j×nt. On the other hand, assume that one subset
of the permutation set with totally nt tables actually satisﬁes the privacy property. Then,
the number of each sensitive value associated with a tuple should satisfy |si.j| ≤ δ × nt.
Therefore, the total number of sensitive values for all identities is:
nri × |si.j| ≤ nri × (δ × nt) < nri ×
nsi.j
nri
× nt = nsi.j × nt. (3.3)
Therefore, we have nsi.j ×nt < nsi.j ×nt, a contradiction. Consequently, the initial
assumption that there exists a subset of the permutation set satisfying the privacy property
must be false.
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Since the disclosure set is computed by excluding tables from the corresponding
permutation set, we immediately have the following.
Corollary 3.1 When the privacy property is either set-monotonic or based on the highest
ratio of sensitive values, the algorithm asafe has the same data utility as ajump(1).
For other kinds of privacy properties, we prove that the data utility is again incom-
parable between asafe and ajump(1). First, we compare their disclosure set under the 3rd
generalization function.
Lemma 3.4 The ds3 under asafe is a subset of that under ajump(1).
Proof: By deﬁnition, we have the following (where the superscript 0 denotes asafe).
ds13(t0) = per3(t0)/{t|(t ∈ per3(t0)) ∧ (p(per1(t)) ∨ (p(per2(t)) ∧ p(ds12(t))))} (3.4)
ds03(t0) = per3(t0)/{t|(t ∈ per3(t0)) ∧ (p(ds01(t)) ∨ p(ds02(t)))}
= per3(t0)/{t|(t ∈ per3(t0)) ∧ (p(per1(t)) ∨ p(ds12(t)))} (3.5)
Therefore, we have ds13(t0) ⊇ ds03(t0).
Theorem 3.5 The data utility of asafe and ajump(1) is generally incomparable.
Proof: Based on Lemma 3.4, we can construct the following two evaluation paths.
1. ajump(1) : per1 → per2 → per3 → p(ds13) = true
asafe : ds
0
1(per1) → ds02 → p(ds03) = false
2. ajump(1) : per1 → per2 → per3 . . .
asafe : ds
0
1 → p(ds02) = true
Clearly, the data utility of ajump(1) in the ﬁrst case is better than that of asafe, while
in the second case it is worse.
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3.5 Computational Complexity of k-Jump Algorithms
In this section, we analyze the computational complexity of k-jump algorithms.
Given a micro-data table t0 and one of its k-jump algorithm a, let nr be the cardinality of
t0, and np and nd be the number of tables in its permutation set and disclosure set under
function gi, respectively. In the worst case, np = nr! and nd ≈ np, in which there is only
one anonymized group and all the sensitive values are distinct.
Lemma 3.5 Given a micro-data table t0 under a generalization function, the distribution
of sensitive values corresponding to each identity in the permutation set is coincident with
the distribution of the multiset of sensitive values in the anonymized group the identity
belongs to.
The result of Lemma 3.5 is obvious due to the deﬁnition of permutation set. Besides,
to evaluate a permutation set against k-anonymity privacy property, we only need to count
the number of different sensitive values in each anonymized group. Based on these re-
sults, the running time of evaluating permutation set against privacy property reduces from
O(np × nr) to O(nr) for most existing privacy models, such as k-anonymity, l-diversity,
and so on. Given a table t0, let ep(t0) and ed(t0) be the running time of evaluating permuta-
tion set and disclosure set under a function gi, respectively. Since generally the disclosure
set does not satisfy Lemma 3.5, the running time of evaluating disclosure set is O(nd×nr).
Nevertheless, for simplicity, we will consider that O(ep(t)) = O(1) and O(ed(t)) = O(1)
in the following discussion. To facilitate the analysis, we elaborate the family of k-jump
algorithms as shown in Table 3.12.
Basically, an ajump(k) algorithm checks the original table t0 against privacy prop-
erty p(.) under each generalization function in the given order and discloses the ﬁrst gener-
alization gi in the sequence whose permutation set peri and disclosure set dsi both satisfy
the desired privacy property. To determine whether a table can be disclosed under certain
generalization function gi in the algorithm, its permutation set peri is evaluated ﬁrst. If
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Algorithm ajump(t0, sg,k) Algorithm ds(t0, i, sg,k)
Input: an original table t0,
sequence of functions sg =
(g1, g2, . . . , gn),
vector of jump distance k,
and a privacy property p(.);
Output: a generalization gi(1 ≤ i ≤ n) or
∅;
1: i ← 1;
2: while (i ≤ n) do
3: if (p(per(gi(t0))=true) then
4: if (p(ds(t0, i, sg,k)) = true) then
5: return gi(t0);
6: else
7: i ← i + k[i];
8: end if
9: else




Input: a table t0,
function i (to calculate t0’s disclosure
set),
sequence of functions sg =
(g1, g2, . . . , gn),
vector of jump distances k,
and a privacy property p(.);
Output: the disclosure set dsi(t0);
1: dsi ← per(gi(t0));
2: for all (t ∈ dsi) do
3: j ← 1;
4: while (j ≤ i− 1) do
5: if (p(per(gj(t))) = true) then
6: if (p(ds(t, j, sg,k)) = true)
then
7: dsi ← dsi/{t};
8: break;
9: else
10: j ← j + k[i];
11: end if
12: else
13: j ← j + 1;
14: end if
15: end while
16: if (j > i) then




Table 3.12: Algorithms: ajump(k) and ds
k
i With Any Given Privacy Property p(.)
the permutation set does not satisfy the privacy property, the table will not be disclosed
under this function and the algorithm moves to evaluate under next function, otherwise, its
disclosure set dsi is evaluated. If the disclosure set satisﬁes the privacy property, the table
can be disclosed under this function gi; otherwise, the algorithm will check the (i + k[i])th
generalization function in a similar way. This procedure will continue until the table is suc-
cessfully disclosed under a function gi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) or fails to satisfy the privacy property
for all functions and nothing is disclosed.
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To compute the disclosure set dsi of t0 under generalization function gi, we ﬁrst
enumerate all possible tables by permuting each group in the generalization gi(t0). Then,
by following the algorithm, for each table t in the permutation set peri(t0), we ﬁrst assume
it is the original table t0, check under the generalization functions in sequence following
the paths of the generalization algorithm, then determine whether it will not be disclosed
under generalization function gi. Such tables may fall into two different cases. First, the
table can be disclosured under certain generalization function gj(j < i) before gi; Second,
the table will not be checked by the generalization function gi, even it cannot be disclosed
before gi, which has been discussed in Section 3.3.2.1.
Based on the above detailed analysis of the algorithm, it can be shown that the run-
ning time of evaluating whether a given disclosure set satisﬁes privacy property is different
from the time of deriving that disclosure set. On one hand, we consider O(ed(t)) = O(1).
On the other hand, to derive dsi(t0), we must separately evaluate each table t in peri(t0) to
determine whether it is a valid guess.
With the aforementioned discussions, we can analyze the time complexity of k-jump
algorithms as follows.
Theorem 3.6 Given a micro-data table t0, a generalization algorithm of k-jump strategy
that considers the sequence of generalization functions g1, g2, . . . , gn in the given order and
the jump-distance k, the computational complexity of such k-jump strategy is O((maxp)
n
k )
where maxp is the maximal cardinality of possible tables in the permutation set among the
functions.
Proof: Given a jump-vector, we prove the result by mathematical induction on n. For
simplicity, we assume the jump-vector to be jump-distance k, where k is a constant.
The Inductive Hypothesis: To compute the disclosure set of micro-data table t0 un-




The Base Case: When i = 1, it is clear that we only need to evaluate whether the
permutation set satisﬁes the privacy property, whose running time is ep(t).
For i = 2, 3, . . . , 1+k, as mentioned before, the tables for which p(perj) = true for
any j < i will be removed from gi’s disclosure set. Therefore, the worst case is to evaluate
all the permutation sets under each j < i and evaluate both permutation set and disclosure
set under function i. Thus, the running time is O((i−1)×maxp× ep(t)+ ep(t)+ ed(t)) =
O((k ×maxp + 1)× ep(t)), which is O((maxp)1).
The Inductive Assumption: Suppose the inductive hypothesis hold for any j > 0,
the running time for i ∈ [2 + j × k, 1 + k + j × k] is O((maxp)j+1).
The Inductive Step: Now we show the hypothesis also holds for j + 1, and equiva-
lently, for i = 2+(j+1)×k, 3+(j+1)×k, . . . , 1+k+(j+1)×k. Based on the assumption
above, the most-time-consuming case is that for each table t in permutation set peri(t0),
there exists an evaluation of disclosure set psm(t) wherem ∈ [2+j×k, 1+k+j×k]. There-
fore, the running time is O(ep(t)+ . . .+maxp×O((maxp)j+1)+ed(t)) = O((maxp)j+2).
Therefore, the assumption holds for any j > 0, and equivalently, for any i ≥ 2. This
concludes the proof.
Summarily, it is shown that the computational complexity of the family of algo-
rithms is exponential in n
k
. Although the worse case complexity is still exponential, this
is, to the best of our knowledge, one of the ﬁrst algorithms that allow users to ensure the
privacy property and optimize the data utility given that the adversaries know the algo-
rithms. Furthermore, unlike the safe algorithms discussed in [53, 105] which only work
with l-diversity, the family of our algorithms ajump(k) is more general and independent of
the privacy property and the measure of data utility.
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3.6 Making Secret Choices of Algorithms
In this section, we discuss the feasibility of protecting privacy by making a secret
choice among algorithms. Recall that we say an algorithm is safe if it can ensure the
privacy property for any micro-data in the case that the adversary knows the algorithm
itself, otherwise, we say it is unsafe.
3.6.1 Secret-Choice Strategy
From previous discussions, we know that the family of algorithms ajump share two
properties, namely, a large cardinality and incomparable data utility. The practical signiﬁ-
cance of this result is that we can now draw an analogy between ajump and a cryptographic
algorithm, with the jump distance k regarded as a cryptographic key. Instead of relying
on the secrecy of an algorithm (which is security by obscurity), we can rely on the secret
choice of k for protecting privacy.
On the other hand, as discussed in previous sections, a safe algorithm (e.g., asafe
or ajump) usually incur a high computational complexity, therefore, one may suggest that
we can make the secret choice among unsafe but more efﬁcient algorithms instead of safe
algorithms to reduce the computational complexity. We ﬁrst formulate the secret-choice
strategy.
The secret-choice strategy among a set of algorithms can take the following three
stages. Given a table t0 and the set of generalization functions gi(.)(1 ≤ i ≤ n), the
strategy ﬁrst deﬁnes a large set of generalization algorithms (either safe or unsafe) based
on the set of functions, then randomly and secretly selects one of these algorithms, and
ﬁnally executes the selected algorithm to disclose the micro-data. We can thus describe the
above strategy as asecret shown in Table 3.13.
There certainly exist many approaches to deﬁning the sets of algorithms (the ﬁrst
stage of asecret). We demonstrate the abundant possibilities through the following two
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Input: Table t0, a set of functions gi(.)(1 ≤ i ≤ n);
Output: Generalization g or ∅;
Method:
1. Deﬁne a large set of generalization algorithms A = {a1, a2, . . . , am}
based on gi(i ∈ [1, n]]);
2. Select an j ∈ [1,m] randomly for representing one of the above algorithms aj;
3. Return (Call aj);
Table 3.13: The Secret-Choice Strategy asecret
examples.
First, each generalization function is slightly revised to be a generalization algo-
rithm. That is, instead of only evaluating whether the permutation set of a micro-data table
under the function satisﬁes the desired privacy property, such generalization algorithm fur-
ther discloses the generalization or nothing. To complete the random selection, the asecret
will randomly select one of such algorithms and then discloses its corresponding general-
ization if it satisﬁes privacy property or nothing otherwise. Intuitively, this approach may
be safe as long as the cardinality of the set of functions is sufﬁcient large. However, such
randomness will generally lead to worse data utility since usually the number of functions
under which the permutation sets of a given micro-data satisfy privacy property is relatively
low compared to the total number of functions. Consequently, such algorithm will disclose
nothing for the micro-data with considerably high probability. Therefore, in the following
discussion, without loss of generality, the randomness refers to the selection of algorithms
which is not to be confused with the selection of functions in an algorithm. In other words,
we assume that the algorithms sort the functions in a predetermined non-decreasing order
of the data utility.
The k-jump strategy is another possible approach to deﬁning the set of algorithms
based on a given set of generalization functions. In k-jump, k is the secret choice, while all
the functions appear in each algorithm and are sorted based on data utility. Given the set of
functions, the one and only difference among k-jump algorithms is the jump-distance (k).
As discussed above, k-jump algorithms are safe and the adversaries can at most reﬁne their
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mental image to the disclosure set no matter whether they know the k. In other words, it
is not necessary to hide the k among the family of k-jump algorithms. Similarly, we do
not need to make a secret choice among other categories of safe algorithms. Therefore, in
the remainder of this section, we will restrict the discussions on the case of secret choice
among the unsafe algorithms based on predetermined order of the generalization functions.
We show that secret choice among such unsafe algorithms cannot guarantee the privacy
through a family of unsafe algorithms.
3.6.2 Subset Approach
To facilitate our discussion, we design a straightforward subset approach to deﬁne
the set of unsafe algorithms for the ﬁrst stage of asecret. Given a set of generalization
functions G = {g1, g2, . . . , gn}, the subset approach ﬁrst construct all the subsets SG of G
which includes at least 2 functions. Then the naive strategy discussed in Section 3.2.2 is
adapted on each of such subsets to embody an algorithm. That is, the functions in a subset
is sorted in the non-increasing order of the data utility, and then the ﬁrst function under
which the permutation set of given micro-data satisﬁes the privacy property is disclosed;
otherwise, ∅ will be the output and nothing is disclosed as shown in Table 3.14. We assume
that the adversaries know the set of functions G since they know the released micro-data
and in most cases the generalization is based on the quasi-identiﬁer. We also call the secret-
choice strategy built upon subset approach subset-choice strategy.
Input: Set of function G = {g1, g2, . . . , gn};
Output: Set of algorithms SA
Method:
1. Let SA = ∅;
2. Let SG = 2G/{∅ ∪ {gi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}};
3. For each element Sf in SG
4. Create in SA an algorithm by applying naive strategy on Sf ;
5. Return SA;
Table 3.14: The Subset Approach For Designing the Set of Unsafe Algorithms
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From the adversaries’ point of view, when they know the disclosed data, the subset-
choice strategy (that is, the secret-choice strategy with the subset approach as its ﬁrst stage),
the privacy property, and the set of functions G, they may be able to validate their guesses
and reﬁne their mental image about the original data. With the knowledge about G, the












= 2|G| − |G| − 1 possible dif-
ferent secret choices; With the knowledge of the disclosed data, the adversary can further
know the following two facts. First, the original micro-data is in the permutation set of
the disclosed generalization. Second, the generalization function corresponding to the dis-
closed data should be a function in the selected algorithms, and consequently the number
of possible secret choices in his/her mental image is reduced to be 2|G|−1 − 1. Each secret
choice corresponding to an algorithm is equally likely selected. For each of these reﬁned
secret choices, the adversary ﬁrst assumes that it is the true secret choice, then deduces
the disclosure set for given disclosed data and corresponding naive algorithm in a similar
way discussed in Section 3.1. Finally, the adversary reﬁnes his/her mental image to be
(2|G|−1 − 1) disclosure sets.
Based on such a mental image, the adversary may reﬁne his knowledge about an
individual’s sensitive information. For example, for entropy l-diversity, the adversary can
calculate the ratio of an individual being associated with a sensitive value in each disclosure
set, and then average the ratio among all disclosure sets. Whenever the average ratio among
the disclosure sets of an individual being associated with a sensitive value is larger than
1
l
, the privacy of that individual is violated. Taking k-anonymity as another example, the
adversary can simply count the number of sensitive values that an individual possibly being
associated with among all disclosure sets. If the resultant number for any individual is less
than k, the privacy of that individual is violated.
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3.6.3 The Safety of Subset-Choice Strategy
In the following, we show that subset-choice strategy cannot ensure the privacy
property by constructing a counter-example.
Theorem 3.7 Given a subset-choice strategy, there exist cases that the strategy discloses
an unsafe generalization.











g1 g2 g3 g4 g5
QID S QID S QID S QID S QID S
A C0 A C0 B C0 A C0 A C0
B C0 C C0 C C0 B C0 B C0
C C0 B C0 A C0 C C0 C C0
D C1 D C1 D C1 D C1 D C1
E C2 E C2 E C2 E C2 E C2
F C3 F C3 F C3 F C3 F C3
G C4 G C4 G C4 G C4 G C4
H C5 H C5 H C5 H C5 H C5
I C6 I C6 I C6 I C6 I C6
Table 3.15: The Counter Example for Secret Choice among Unsafe Algorithms
Possible SG Probability Possible SG Probability
A B C A B C
{g1, g5} 1 1 17 {g1, g2, g5} 1 1 1
{g2, g5} 1 17 1 {g1, g3, g5} 1 1 1
{g3, g5} 17 1 1 {g1, g4, g5} 1 1 17
{g4, g5} 23 23 23 {g2, g3, g5} 1 1 1
{g1, g2, g3, g5} 1 1 1 {g2, g4, g5} 1 17 1
{g1, g2, g4, g5} 1 1 1 {g3, g4, g5} 17 1 1
{g1, g3, g4, g5} 1 1 1 {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5} 1 1 1
{g2, g3, g4, g5} 1 1 1
Table 3.16: The Possible Subsets of Functions and the Corresponding Probability of A,B,
and C Being Associated With C0
Proof: One counter example, that an algorithm taking subset-choice strategy dis-
closes a generalization while the privacy is actually violated, is sufﬁcient to prove the theo-
rem. Table 3.15 shows our construction for the proof. The left tabular shows the micro-data
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table t0 whose identiﬁers are removed. The right tabular shows the ﬁve generalization func-
tions in G. For clariﬁcation purposes, we intentionally keep the original value of QID. In
other words, we only focus on the anonymized groups as illustrated by the horizontal lines
while omitting the modiﬁcation of quasi-identiﬁers. For example, by g1, we partition t0 into
two anonymized groups: A and B form one anonymized group, while the others (C − I)
form another group. In this construction, the privacy property is 2-diversity and the data
utility is measured by discernibility measure (DM).
Suppose that the algorithm select subset SG of generalization functions to be SG =
{g4, g5}. Obviously, the permutation set of t0 under function g4 does not satisfy 2-diversity,
while it does so under g5. Therefore, based on the subset-choice strategy, the algorithm
discloses g5(t0).
Unfortunately, the knowledge of G and disclosed table will enable the adversary
to reﬁne his mental image about the original micro-data, and ﬁnally violate the privacy
property since the adversary can infer that the ratio of A, B and C being associated with

























possible secret choices of SG. By observing the disclosed data, the adversary knows that





















That is, one, two, three or all of g1, g2, g3 and g4 together with g5 form SG. Note that these
15 possible subsets are equally likely to be SG. The possible subsets of functions are shown
in the possible SG column of Table 3.16.
By the data utility measurement DM, g1, g2, and g3 have the same data utility which
is better than that of g4, and g4 has better data utility than g5. From the adversary’s point of
view, since g5 is disclosed, the micro-data t0 under any other functions in the selected SG
should violate the 2-diversity (otherwise, other generalization should be disclosed based on
the subset-choice algorithm).
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Based on the disclosed data g5, the adversary knows that only three individuals can
share the same sensitive value (C0). Therefore, the anonymized group {C−I} in g1, whose
cardinality is 7, cannot violate 2-diversity, neither do groups {B,D− I} in g2, {A,D− I}
in g3, and {D− I} in g4. In other words, the reason that subset approach does not disclose
t0 using function g1, g2, g3 or g4 is that the group {A,B}, {A,C}, {B,C} or {A,B,C}
respectively does not satisfy 2-diversity. For example, suppose that SG = {g1, g5} and g5
is disclosed, then g1 must violate 2-diversity, therefore, both A and B should be associated
with C0, while C can be associated with any sensitive value in set {Ci : i ∈ [0, 6]}. The
similar analysis can be applied to other possible subsets SG and the probability of A, B,
and C being associated with C0 are shown in Table 3.16 when corresponding subset SG











, so do B and C. In other words, once the adversary
knows G, the subset-choice algorithm, subset approach, and the disclosed data g5, he/she
can infer that A, B, and C is associated with C0 with ratio higher than 12 even in the case
that she/he does not know the secret choice (the adversary does not know which subset of G
is selected). This clearly violates the privacy property. Thus we have proved the theorem.
The counter example in the above proof is sufﬁcient to demonstrate that secret
choices made among unsafe algorithms does not always guarantee the privacy property.
Therefore, safe algorithms are still necessary for preserving the privacy property.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a novel k-jump strategy for preserving privacy in
micro-data disclosure using public algorithms. We have shown how a given unsafe general-
ization algorithm can be transformed into a large number of safe algorithms. By construct-
ing counter-examples, we have shown that the data utility of such algorithms is generally
61
incomparable. The practical impact of this result is that we can make a secret choice from
a large family of k-jump algorithms, which is analogous to choosing a cryptographic key
from a large key space, to optimize data utility based on a given table while preventing
adversarial inferences. It has been shown that the computational complexity of a k-jump
algorithm with n generalization functions is exponential in n
k
which indicates a reduction
in the complexity due to k (We shall discuss an efﬁcient solution in next chapter). We have
also shown that making a secret choice among unsafe algorithms cannot ensure the desired
privacy property which embodies the need of safe algorithms from another standpoint.
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Chapter 4
PPDP: An Efﬁcient Strategy for
Diversity Preservation With Publicly
Known Algorithms
While the strategy in previous chapter is theoretically superior to existing ones due
to its independence of utility measures and privacy models, and its privacy guarantee under
publicly-known algorithms, it incurs a high computational complexity. In this chapter, we
study an efﬁcient strategy for diversity preserving data publishing with publicly known
algorithms (algorithms as side-channel).
4.1 Overview
In many privacy-preserving applications ranging from micro-data release [46] to
social networks [44, 83], a major challenge is to keep private information secret while
optimizing the utility of disclosed or shared data. Recent studies further reveal that utility
optimization may actually interfere with privacy preservation by leaking additional private
information when algorithms are regarded as public knowledge [101,111]. Speciﬁcally, an
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adversary can determine a guess of the private information to be invalid if it would have
caused the disclosed data to take a different form with better utility. By eliminating such
invalid guesses, the adversary can then obtain a more accurate estimation of the private
information.
A natural solution to this problem is to simulate the aforementioned adversarial rea-
soning [73,101,111]. Speciﬁcally, since knowledge about utility optimization can assist an
adversary in reﬁning his/her mental images of the private information, we can ﬁrst simulate
such reasoning to obtain the reﬁned mental images, and then enforce the privacy property
on such images instead of the disclosed data. However, it has been shown that such ap-
proaches are inherently recursive and deemed to incur a high complexity [111].
In this chapter, we observe that the interference between privacy preservation and
utility optimization actually arises from the fact that those two processes are usually mixed
together in an algorithm. On the other hand, we also observe a simple fact that to meet
both goals does not necessarily mean to meet them at exactly the same time. Based on such
observations, we propose a novel privacy streamliner approach to decouple the process
of privacy preservation from that of utility optimization in order to avoid the expensive
recursive task of simulating the adversarial reasoning.
To make our approach more concrete, we study it in the context of micro-data re-
lease with publicly known generalization algorithms. Unlike traditional algorithms, which
typically evaluate generalization functions in a predetermined order and then release data
using the ﬁrst function satisfying the privacy property, a generalization algorithm under our
approach works in a completely different way: The algorithm starts with the set of gener-
alization functions that can satisfy the privacy property for the given micro-data table; it
then identiﬁes a subset of such functions satisfying that knowledge about this subset itself
will not assist an adversary in violating the privacy property (which is generally not true for
the set of all functions, as we will show later); utility optimization within this subset then
becomes simulatable by adversaries [56], and is thus guaranteed not to affect the privacy
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property. We believe that this general principle can be applied to other similar privacy pre-
serving problems, although developing the actual solution may be application-speciﬁc and
non-trivial.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, our privacy streamliner approach
is presented through a general framework that is independent of speciﬁc algorithmic con-
structions or utility metrics. This allows our approach to be easily adapted to a broad
range of applications to yield efﬁcient solutions. We demonstrate such possibilities by de-
vising three generalization algorithms to suit different needs while following exactly the
same approach. Second, our algorithms provide practical solutions for privacy-preserving
micro-data release with public algorithms. As conﬁrmed by both complexity analysis and
experimental results, those algorithms are more efﬁcient than existing algorithms.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We ﬁrst build intuitions through an
example in the remainder of this section. We then present our main approach and support-
ing theoretical results in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 devises three generalization algorithms by
following the approach. Section 4.4 experimentally evaluates the efﬁciency and utility of
our algorithms. We discuss the possibilities for extending our approach and the practicality
of the approach in Section 4.5. We ﬁnally conclude the chapter in Section 4.6.








t01 t02 t03 t04 t05 t06 t07 t08 t09 t10
Ada ﬂu cold ﬂu cold ﬂu cold ﬂu cold HIV HIV
Bob ﬂu cold ﬂu cold HIV HIV ﬂu cold ﬂu cold
Coy cold ﬂu cold ﬂu cold ﬂu HIV HIV cold ﬂu
Dan cold ﬂu HIV HIV cold ﬂu cold ﬂu cold ﬂu
Eve HIV HIV cold ﬂu ﬂu cold cold ﬂu ﬂu cold
Table 4.1: The Motivating Example
Motivating Example
The left table in Table 4.1 shows a micro-data table t0 to be released. To protect
individuals’ privacy, the identiﬁer Name will not be released. Also, the identiﬁers are
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partitioned into anonymized groups, with the quasi-identiﬁer DOB inside each such group
modiﬁed to be the same value [90] (in this chapter, we will only consider generalization
and leave suppression [29] and bucketization [107] for the future work). For simplicity,
we will focus on the partitioning of identiﬁers while omitting the modiﬁcation of quasi-
identiﬁers. For this particular example, we assume the desired privacy property to be that




By our privacy streamliner approach, we need to start with all partitions of the
identiﬁers that can satisfy the privacy property. In this example, any partition that includes
{Ada,Bob} or {Coy,Dan} will violate the privacy property, since the two persons inside
each of those groups share the same condition. It can be shown that there are totally 9
partitions satisfying the privacy property, as shown below. We will refer to the set of such
identiﬁer partitions as the locally safe set (LSS).
P1 = {{Ada,Coy}, {Bob,Dan,Eve}},
P2 = {{Ada,Dan}, {Bob, Coy,Eve}},
P3 = {{Ada,Eve}, {Bob, Coy,Dan}},
P4 = {{Bob, Coy}, {Ada,Dan,Eve}},
P5 = {{Bob,Dan}, {Ada,Coy,Eve}},
P6 = {{Bob,Eve}, {Ada,Coy,Dan}},
P7 = {{Coy,Eve}, {Ada,Bob,Dan}},
P8 = {{Dan,Eve}, {Ada,Bob, Coy}},
P9 = {{Ada,Bob, Coy,Dan,Eve}}
It may seem to be a viable solution to start optimizing data utility inside the LSS,
since every partition here can satisfy the privacy property. However, such an optimization
may still violate the privacy property, because it is not simulatable by adversaries [56]
unless if we assume the LSS to be public knowledge (that is, adversaries may know that
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each identiﬁer partition in the LSS can satisfy the privacy property for the unknown table
t0). Unfortunately, this knowledge about LSS could help adversaries to violate the privacy
property. In this case, it can be shown that adversaries’ mental image about the micro-data
table would only include t01 and t02 shown in the right table in Table 4.1. In other words,
adversaries can determine that t0 must be either t01 or t02. Clearly, the privacy property is
violated since Eve is associated with HIV in both cases.
Since the LSS may contain too much information to be assumed as public knowl-
edge, we turn to its subsets. In this example, it can be shown that by removing P7 from
the LSS, the disclosure set becomes {t01, t02, t03, t04}. The privacy property is now satisﬁed
since the highest ratio of a sensitive value for any identiﬁer is 1
2
. We call such a subset of
the LSS the globally safe set (GSS). Optimizing data utility within the GSS will not vio-
late privacy property, because the GSS can be safely assumed as public knowledge and the
optimization is thus simulatable by adversaries.
However, there is another complication. At the end of utility optimization, one
of the generalization functions in the GSS will be used to release data. The information
disclosed by the GSS and that by the released data is different, and by intersecting the
two, adversaries may further reﬁne their mental image of the micro-data table. In this
example, since the adversaries’ mental image about the micro-data table in terms of the
GSS is {t01, t02, t03, t04}, adversaries know both Ada and Bob must be associated with
either ﬂu or cold. Now suppose the utility optimization selects P3, then from the released
table, adversaries will further know that either Ada or Eve must have ﬂu while the other has
HIV. Therefore, adversaries can now infer that Ada must have ﬂu, and Eve must then have
HIV.
To address this issue, we will further conﬁne the utility optimization to a subset of
the GSS. In this example, if we further remove P3, P6, P8 from the GSS, then the corre-
sponding mental image of adversaries will contain all the 10 tables (from t01 to t10). It
can be shown that now the privacy property will always be satisﬁed regardless of which
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partition is selected during utility optimization. Taking P1 as an example, from its corre-
sponding generalized table, adversaries may further reﬁne their mental image about t0 as
the ﬁrst six tables (from t01 to t06), but the highest ratio of a sensitive value is still 12 . We
call such a subset of identiﬁer partitions the strongly globally safe set (SGSS). The SGSS
allows us to optimize utility without worrying about violating the privacy property.
Therefore, the key problem in applying the privacy streamliner approach is to ﬁnd
the SGSS. The naive solution of directly following the above example to compute the LSS,
GSS, and eventually SGSS is clearly impractical due to the large solution space. In the rest
of this chapter, we will present more efﬁcient ways to directly construct the SGSS without
ﬁrst generating the LSS or GSS.
4.2 The Model
We ﬁrst give the basic model in Section 4.2.1. We then introduce the concept of
l-candidate and self-contained property in Section 4.2.2. Finally, we prove that the SGSS
can be efﬁciently constructed using those concepts in Section 4.2.3. Table 4.2 summarizes
our notations.
t0, t, t(id, q, s) Micro-data table
I, Q, S Projection Πid(t), Πq(t), Πs(t)
Riq, Rqs, Ris Projection Πid,q(t), Πq,s(t), Πid,s(t)
C(.|t), Ci(.|t) A color of table t
SC(.|t) The set of colors in t
P (.|t), Pi(.|t) A identiﬁer partition of table t
SP (.|t) A set of identiﬁer partitions of t
ssl(.|t) Locally safe set (LSS) of t
ssg(.|t) Globally safe set (GSS) of t
sss(.|t) Strongly globally safe set (SGSS) of t
Table 4.2: The Notation Table
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4.2.1 The Basic Model
We denote a micro-data table as t0(id, q, s) where id, q, and s denote the identi-
ﬁer, quasi-identiﬁer, and sensitive value, respectively (each of which may represent mul-
tiple attributes). Denote by I, Q, S the set of identiﬁer values Πid(t0), quasi-identiﬁer
values Πq(t0), and sensitive values Πs(t0) (all projections preserve duplicates, unless ex-
plicitly stated otherwise). Also, denote by Riq, Rqs, Ris the projections Πid,q(t0), Πq,s(t0),
Πid,s(t0), respectively.
As typically assumed, I, Q, and their relationship Riq may be known through ex-
ternal knowledge, and S is also known once a generalization is released. Further, we make
the worst case assumption that each tuple in t0 can be linked to a unique identiﬁer value
through the corresponding quasi-identiﬁer value. Therefore, both Ris and Rqs need to re-
main secret to protect privacy. Between them, Ris is considered as the private information
and Rqs as the utility information.
We say a micro-data table t0 is l-eligible if at most
|t0|
l
tuples in t0 share the same
sensitive value. We call the set of all identiﬁer values associated with the same sensitive
value si a color, denoted as C(t0, si) or simply Ci when t0 and si are clear from the context.
We use SC(t0) or simply SC to denote the collection of all colors in t0.
Example 4.1 The left-hand side of Table 4.3 (the right-hand side will be needed for later
discussions) shows a micro-data table t0 in which there are two colors: C1 = {id1, id2}








P1 = {{id1, id3}, {id2, id4}}
P2 = {{id1, id4}, {id2, id3}}
P3 = {{id1, id2, id3, id4}}
P4 = {{id1, id2}, {id3, id4}}
Table 4.3: An Example
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We denote by ssl(t0), ssg(t0), and sss(t0) the locally safe set (LSS), globally safe
set (GSS), and strongly globally safe set (SGSS) for a given t0, respectively (those concepts
have been illustrated in Section 4.1).
Example 4.2 Continuing Example 4.1 and assuming the privacy property to be 2-diversity [77],
it can be shown that ssl(t0) = {P1, P2, P3} and P4 /∈ ssl where P1, P2, P3, P4 are shown on
the right-hand side of Table 4.3. Further, {P1, P3} and {P2, P3} are both GSS and SGSS.

We have previously given a sufﬁcient condition for the SGSS, namely, the l-cover
property [113]. In other words, a set of identiﬁer partitions SP is a SGSS with respect to
l-diversity if it satisﬁes l-cover (however, no concrete method is given there to satisfy this
property, which is the focus of this chapter). Intuitively, l-cover requires each color to be
indistinguishable from at least l − 1 other sets of identiﬁers in the identiﬁer partition. If
no ambiguity is possible, we also refer to a color C together with its l − 1 covers as the
l-cover of C. As these concepts are needed later in the proofs of our main results discussed
in Section 4.2.3, we repeat them in Deﬁnition 4.1 and 4.2 (note the remaining content of
this chapter can be understood without those deﬁnitions).
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Cover) We say ids1, ids2 ⊆ I are cover for each other with respect to a
set SP ⊆ ssl, if
• ids1 ∩ ids2 = ∅, and
• there exist a bijection f : ids1 → ids2 such that for any idsx ∈ Pi, Pi ∈ SP , there
always exists Pj ∈ SP satisfying idsx \ (ids1 ∪ ids2) ∪ f(idsx ∩ ids1) ∪ f−1(idsx ∩
ids2) ∈ Pj [113].
Deﬁnition 4.2 (l-Cover) We say a set SP ⊆ ssl satisﬁes the l-cover property, if every color
C has at least l − 1 covers idsi(i ∈ [1, l − 1]) with the bijections fi satisfying that
- for any id ∈ C, each fi(id) (i ∈ [1, l − 1]) is from a different color, and
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- for any idsx ∈ P and P ∈ SP , we have |idsx∩C| = |idsx∩idsi|(i ∈ [1, l−1]) [113].
Example 4.3 Continuing Example 4.2 and considering SP = {P1, P3}, the colors C1 =
{id1, id2} andC2 = {id3, id4} provide cover for each other, since forC1 we have f1(id1) =
id3 and f1(id2) = id4, and for C2 we have f2(id3) = id1 and f2(id4) = id2. Further, SP
satisﬁes the l-cover property where {C1, C2} is the l-cover of both C1 and C2.
Similarly, for SP = {P2, P3}, C1 and C2 provide cover for each other since for
C1 we have f1(id1) = id4 and f1(id2) = id3, and for C2 we have f2(id3) = id2 and
f2(id4) = id1. Further, SP also satisﬁes the l-cover property. 
4.2.2 l-Candidate and Self-Contained Property
We ﬁrst give a necessary but not sufﬁcient condition for l-cover, namely, l-candidate.
As formally stated in Deﬁnition 4.3, subsets of identiﬁers can be candidates of each other,
if there exists one-to-one mappings between those subsets that always map an identiﬁer to
another in a different color. We will prove later that any collection of subsets of identiﬁers
can be l-cover for each other only if they form an l-candidate.
Deﬁnition 4.3 (l-Candidate) Given an l-eligible micro-data table t0, we say
• ids1 ⊆ I and ids2 ⊆ I are candidate for each other, if
– ids1 ∩ ids2 = ∅ and |ids1| = |ids2|, and
– there exists a bijection f : ids1 → ids2, such that every id ∈ ids1 and f(id) ∈
ids2 are from different colors.
• ids1, ids2, . . . , idsl ⊆ I form a l-candidate, if for all (1 ≤ i = j ≤ l), idsi and idsj
are candidates for each other.
• Denote by Canl(.|t0) = (can1, can2, . . . , can|SC |) a sequence of |SC | l-candidates
each cani of which is the l-candidate for the color Ci in t0 (note that there is exactly
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one l-candidate for each color in the sequence, and Canl(.|t0) is not necessarily
unique for t0).
Example 4.4 In the table shown on the left-hand side of Table 4.3, the two colors C1 =
{id1, id2} and C2 = {id3, id4} are candidates for each other, and they together form a
2-candidate {C1, C2}. Also, we have that Canl(.|t0) = ({C1, C2}, {C1,C2}) (note that
Canl(.|t0) denotes the sequence of l-candidates and we use the indices in the multiset to
present the order in the remainder of this chapter, and if no ambiguity is possible, we shall
not distinguish the notations between a collection and a sequence). In this special case, it
has two identical elements, the ﬁrst one for C1 and the second one for C2, since both colors
have the same l-candidate. 
Next we introduce the self-contained property in Deﬁnition 4.4. Informally, an
identiﬁer partition is self-contained, if the partition does not break the one-to-one mappings
used in deﬁning the l-candidates. Later we will show that the self-contained property is
sufﬁcient for an identiﬁer partition to satisfy the l-cover property and thus form a SGSS.
Deﬁnition 4.4 (Self-Contained Property and Family Set) Given a micro-data table t0 and
a collection of l-candidates Canl, we say
• an anonymized group G in an identiﬁer partition P is self-contained with respect to
Canl, if for every pair of identiﬁers {id1, id2} that appears in any bijection used to
deﬁne Canl, either G ∩ {id1, id2} = ∅ or G ∩ {id1, id2} = {id1, id2} is true.
• an identiﬁer partition P is self-contained if for each G ∈ P , G is self-contained.
• a set SP of identiﬁer partitions is self-contained, if for each P ∈ SP , P is self-
contained; we also call such a set SP a family set with respect to Canl.
Next we introduce the concept of minimal self-contained identiﬁer partition in Def-
inition 4.5 to depict those identiﬁer partitions that not only satisfy the self-contained prop-
erty but have anonymized groups of minimal sizes. Intuitively, for any given collection
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of l-candidates Canl, a minimal self-contained identiﬁer partition may yield optimal data
utility under certain utility metrics (we will discuss this in more details later).
Deﬁnition 4.5 (Minimal Self-Contained Partition ) Given a micro-data table t0 and a
collection of l-candidatesCanl, an identiﬁer partition P is called theminimal self-contained
partition with respect to Canl, if
• P satisﬁes the self-contained property with respect to Canl, and
• for any anonymized group G ∈ P , no G′ ⊂ G can satisfy the self-contained property.
Example 4.5 In Example 4.4, assume the bijections used to deﬁne l-candidate for C1 in
Canl are f1(id1) = id3 and f1(id2) = id4 while for C2 are f2(id3) = id1 and f2(id4) =
id2, then the identiﬁer partitions P1 and P3 shown in the left-hand side of Table 4.3 satisfy
the self-contained property, whereas P2 does not. Also, P1 is the minimal self-contained
identiﬁer partition, and {P1}, {P3}, {P1, P3} are all family sets. 
Similarly, assume the bijections used to deﬁne l-candidate forC1 inCanl are f1(id1) =
id4 and f1(id2) = id3 while for C2 are f2(id3) = id2 and f2(id4) = id1, then the identiﬁer
partitions P2 and P3 satisfy the self-contained property, whereas P1 does not. Also, P2 is
the minimal self-contained identiﬁer partition, and {P2}, {P3}, {P2, P3} are all family sets.
Finally, assume f1(id1) = id3, f1(id2) = id4 and f2(id3) = id2, f2(id4) = id1, then in
this case only P3 satisﬁes self-contained property, whereas P1 and P2 do not. It is clearly
evidenced by this example that, given micro-data table, its minimal self-contained partition
is determined not only by the Canl, but also the corresponding bijections. In this chapter,
we focus on deriving Canl and constructing minimal self-contained partitions as well as
family sets based on the bijections. Therefore, unless explicitly stated otherwise, Canl is
referred to itself together with the corresponding bijections in the remainder of this chapter.
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4.2.3 Main Results
In this section, we ﬁrst prove that the self-contained property and l-candidate pro-
vide a way for ﬁnding identiﬁer partitions that satisfy the l-cover property, and then we
prove results for constructing l-candidates. All the proofs can be found in the Appendix B
due to space limitations.
First, in Lemma 4.1, we show that a minimal self-contained identiﬁer partition al-
ways satisﬁes the l-cover property.
Lemma 4.1 Given an l-eligiblemicro-data table t0, every minimal self-contained partition
satisﬁes the l-cover property. Moreover, for each color C, its corresponding l-candidate in
Canl is also an l-cover for C (that is, C together with its l − 1 covers).
Proof: To prove the lemma, we ﬁrst show the procedure l-candidate-to-P lm in Ta-
ble 4.4 based on the self-contained property to construct its minimal self-contained parti-
tion.
Input: an l-eligible table t0, a collection of l-candidates Canl
Output: the minimal self-contained partition;
Method:
1. Create a set of anonymized groups SG = ∅;
2. For each color Ci
3. For each idi,a ∈ Ci




5. Merge the anonymized groups which have common identiﬁers
to build minimal self-contained partition (P lm);
6. Return P lm;
Table 4.4: procedure: l-candidate-to-P lm
Then, we show that P lm ∈ ssl. As shown in Table 4.4, to satisfy the self-contained
property, for each identiﬁer idi,a in each color Ci, the identiﬁers to which idi,a is mapped in
each of the l-1 candidates should be in the same ﬁnal anonymized group. We call such set of
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identiﬁers ,Gi,a = {idi,a}
⋃l−1
u=1{fi,u(idi,a)}, for ath identiﬁer in color Ci is transient group.
Obviously, each transient group itself satisﬁes entropy l-diversity. Furthermore, based on
the Deﬁnition 4.4, for any colorCi in the micro-data table, if an identiﬁer idi,a inCi is in the
ﬁnal anonymized group, then its whole transient group Gi,a will be in the ﬁnal anonymized
group. In other words, in any ﬁnal anonymized group G, the ratio of any identiﬁer in any
Ci associated with the sensitive value Si equals to
|nCi |
|nCi |×l+δ
where δ ≥ 0 and |nCi| is the
number of identiﬁers from color Ci in the anonymized group. Therefore, it is less than or
equal to |nCi ||nCi |×l
= 1
l
. Thus, each anonymized group in minimal self-contained partition
satisﬁes l-diversity, so does the minimal self-contained partition. We have thus proved that
P lm ∈ ssl.
Next, consider the l − 1 covers for each color Ci ∈ SC . Without loss of generality,
we rewrite its corresponding l-candidate as canli = {Ci, idsi,1, idsi,2, . . . , idsi,l−1} so that
Ci is the ﬁrst element, we show that for the set of identiﬁer partition P lm (|P lm| = 1),
idsi,1, idsi,2, . . . idsi,l−1 are l−1 covers ofCi. By Deﬁnition 4.1, Ci and idsi,u(u ∈ [1, l−1])
should satisfy following two conditions:
- Ci ∩ idsi,u = ∅, and
- there exists a bijection fi,u : Ci → idsi,u satisfying that for any idsx ∈ P lm, idsx′ =
idsx \ (Ci ∪ idsi,u)) ∪ fi,u(idsx ∩ Ci) ∪ f−1i,u (idsx ∩ idsi,u) ∈ P lm.
The ﬁrst condition is satisﬁed by the deﬁnition of l-candidate. For the second condition,
let the bijection fi,u be the corresponding bijection for idsi,u in the l-candidate canli. It is
obvious that idsx′ = idsx. Therefore, the second condition also holds.
Finally, we further show that the previous l − 1 covers of Ci satisfy the following
three conditions deﬁned in the deﬁnition of l-cover.
- ∀(u = w), idsi,u ∩ idsi,w = ∅, and
- ∀(id ∈ Ci), each fi,u(id) (u ∈ 1, l − 1]) is from different color.
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- ∀(ids ∈ P lm), |ids ∩ Ci| = |ids ∩ idsi,u| (u ∈ [1, l − 1]).
The ﬁrst two conditions follow directly from the deﬁnition of l-candidate. The last con-
dition is satisﬁed by the property of self-contained. In other words, given such P lm, all
colors have their l-covers, therefore, P lm satisﬁes l-cover property. Thus we have proved
the lemma.
In Lemma 4.2, we prove that an anonymized group in any self-contained identiﬁer
partition must either also be a group in the minimal self-contained partition, or be a union
of several such groups. This result will be needed in later proofs.
Lemma 4.2 Given any l-eligible t0, a collection of l-candidates Canl and its correspond-
ing minimal self-contained partition P lm = {ids1, ids2, . . . , idsk}, any self-contained
identiﬁer partition P satisﬁes that ∀(G ∈ P ), either G ∩ idsi = ∅ or G ⊇ idsi (i ∈ [1, k])
is true.
Proof: We prove by contradiction. First assume that there exist G ∈ P and idsi ∈
P lm, such that G∩ idsi = ∅ and idsi−G = ∅. Then, due to idsi−G = ∅, there must exist
identiﬁer ido ∈ idsi such that ido /∈ G. Assume that ido ∈ G′, where (G′ ∈ P )∧(G′ = G).
Moreover, due to G ∩ idsi = ∅, there also exists identiﬁer idi ∈ idsi such that idi ∈ G.
Thus there exist ido and idi which is a pair of identiﬁers for some bijection in Canl, and
G ∩ {ido, idi} = {idi} and G′ ∩ {ido, idi} = {ido}. However, By deﬁnition of self-
contained, it has the following transitive property. That is, if {id1, id2}, {id2, id3}, . . .,
{ida−1, ida} each pair satisﬁes that there exists bijections for the set of l-candidates such
that fi−1,i(idi−1) = idi or fi,i−1(idi) = idi−1. Then for any self-contained anonymized
group G, either G ∩ ∪ai=1(idi) = ∅ or G ⊇ ∪ai=1(idi). Thus by deﬁnition, since ido ∈ idsi
and idi ∈ idsi, ∀(G ∈ P ), G ∩ {ido, idi} = ∅ or G ∩ {ido, idi} = {ido, idi}.
Therefore, neither G nor G′ satisﬁes self-contained, so does P , leading to a contra-
diction.
Based on Lemma 4.1 and 4.2, we now show that similar results hold for any self-
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contained identiﬁer partition and any family set, as formulated in Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.1 Given an l-eligible t0 and the l-candidates Canl, we have that
• any self-contained identiﬁer partition P satisﬁes the l-cover property. Moreover, for
each color in t0, the corresponding l-candidate in Canl is also the l-cover for P .
• any family set Sfs satisﬁes the l-cover property. Moreover, for each color in t0, the
corresponding l-candidate in Canl is also the l-cover for Sfs.
Proof: First, we prove that any self-contained identiﬁer partition P satisﬁes l-cover
property.
We ﬁrst show that P ∈ ssl. Note that the privacy model l-diversity satisﬁes the
monotonicity property. That is, for any two anonymized groups G1 and G2 satisfying
l-diversity, the ﬁnal anony-mized group derived by merging all tuples in G1 and in G2
satisﬁes l-diversity [100]. Based on Lemma 4.2, each anonymized group G in P satisﬁes
G = ∪X⊆{1,2,...,k}idsX . Therefore, each anonymized group G satisﬁes l-diversity, so does
P .
Then we have proved that, given the l-candidate canli of certain colorCi, the can
l
i\{Ci}
are the l − 1 covers of Ci for P , similar to the proof of Lemma 4.1.
Finally, the set of l−1 set of identiﬁers canli\{Ci} are l−1 covers of color Ci which
satisfy the three conditions of l-cover deﬁnition.
Second, we prove any family set satisﬁes the l-cover property.
We ﬁrst show that ∀(P ∈ Sfs), P ∈ ssl. Since the privacy model l-diversity satisﬁes
the monotonicity property [100], based on the deﬁnition of family set, it is clear that the
table generalization corresponding to each identiﬁer partition in Sfs satisﬁes l-diversity.
Similar with previous proofs, for each color Ci ∈ SC and its corresponding l-
candidate canli = {Ci, idsi,1, idsi,2, . . . , idsi,l−1}, we have proved that for the family set
Sfs, idsi,1, idsi,2, . . . , idsi,l−1 are the l− 1 covers of Ci. Moreover, these l− 1 covers of Ci
satisfy the three conditions of l-cover. This completes the proof.
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Based on the above results, once the collection of l-candidates is determined, we
can easily construct sets of identiﬁer partitions to satisfy the l-cover property. Therefore,
we now turn to ﬁnding efﬁcient methods for constructing l-candidates. First, Lemma 4.3
and 4.4 present conditions for subsets of identiﬁers to be candidates for each other.
Lemma 4.3 Given an l-eligible t0, any ids ⊆ I that satisﬁes |ids| = |C| and ids ∩C = ∅
is a candidate for color C.
Proof: By the deﬁnition 4.3, C and ids should satisfy the following two conditions:
- C ∩ ids = ∅ and |C| = |ids|;
- there exists a bijection f : C → ids, such that ∀(id ∈ C), id and f(id) are from
different colors.
The ﬁrst condition follows directly from the condition of the lemma. Since |C| = |ids|,
there must exist bijection f : C → ids. Moreover, since C ∩ ids = ∅, ∀(idx ∈ ids),
idx /∈ C, by the deﬁnition of color, idx has sensitive value other than it of color C. In other
words, idx must belong to the other color C ′ other than C. Therefore, The second condition
is also satisﬁed, which completes the proof.
Lemma 4.4 Given an l-eligible t0, any ids1, ids2 ⊆ I satisfying following conditions are
candidates for each other:
• |ids1| = |ids2| and ids1 ∩ ids2 = ∅, and
• the number of all identiﬁers in ids1∪ ids2 that belong to the same color is no greater
than |ids1|.
Proof: The ﬁrst constraint in the lemma respectively guarantees the ﬁrst condition
of deﬁnition 4.3. Consider the second condition. Since |ids1| = |ids2|, there must exist
bijections between ids1 and ids2. Assume that the second condition of deﬁnition 4.3 does
not hold. Then there must exist at least |ids1|+ 1 number of identiﬁers in ids1 ∪ ids2 with
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identical sensitive value, which is in contradiction with the second constraint in lemma.
Therefore, the second condition of deﬁnition 4.3 also satisﬁes. Since the two conditions
both hold, the proof is complete.
Based on Lemma 4.3 and 4.4, we now present conditions for constructing l-candidates
of each color in Theorem 4.2. We will apply those conditions in the next section to design
practical algorithms for building the SGSS.
Theorem 4.2 Given an l-eligible t0, each color C together with any (l−1) subsets of iden-
tiﬁers {ids1, ids2, . . . , idsl−1} that satisfy following conditions form a valid l-candidate for
C:
- ∀(x ∈ [1, l − 1]), |idsx| = |C| and idsx ∩ C = ∅;
- ∀((x, y ∈ [1, l − 1]) ∧ (x = y)), idsx ∩ idsy = ∅;
- the number of all identiﬁers in ∪l−1x=1idsx that belong to the same color is no greater
than |C|.
Proof: To prove the theorem, we should show that any two sets of identiﬁers from
the sets C and idsx (x ∈ [1, l − 1]) are candidate for each other. The fact that C and each
idsx (x ∈ [1, l−1]) are candidate follows the Lemma 4.3, while the fact any two idsx, idsy
((x, y ∈ [1, l − 1]) ∧ (x = y)) are candidate follows the Lemma 4.4. This completes the
proof.
4.3 The Algorithms
In this section, we design three algorithms for constructing l-candidates for colors
and analyze their complexities. It is important to note that there may exist many other ways
for constructing l-candidates based on the conditions given in Theorem 4.2. This ﬂexibility
allows us to vary the design of algorithms to suit different needs of various applications, be-
cause different l-candidates will also result in different SGSSs and hence algorithms more
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suitable for different utility metrics. We demonstrate such a ﬂexibility through designing
three algorithms in the following.
To simplify our discussions, we say an identiﬁer is complete (or incomplete) if it is
(or is not) included in any l-candidate; similarly, we say a color is complete (or incomplete)
if it only includes complete identiﬁers (or otherwise); we also say a set of identiﬁers is
compatible (or incompatible) with an identiﬁer id, if there does not exist (or exists) identi-
ﬁer in that set that is from the same color as id; ﬁnally, given any color, an identiﬁer from
other colors is said to be unused with respect to that color if it has not yet been selected as
a candidate for any identiﬁer in that color. Table 4.5 summarizes the notations used in the
algorithms.
n The number of (incomplete) tuples in t0
Ci The ith color, or the set of (incomplete) identiﬁers in the ith color
nc The number of (incomplete) colors in t0
SC The sequence of (incomplete) colors in t0
ni The number of (incomplete) tuples in color Ci
cania The set of (l − 1) identiﬁers selected for identiﬁer idia in color Ci
cani l-candidate for color i
Canl The collection of l-candidates
Table 4.5: Notations for Algorithms
4.3.1 The RIA Algorithm (Random and Independent)
The main intention in designing the RIA algorithm is to show that, based on our
results in Theorem 4.2, l-candidate can actually be built in a very straightforward way,
although its efﬁciency and utility is not necessarily optimal. In the RIA algorithm, to con-
struct the l-candidates for each color Ci, (l− 1) identiﬁers cania are selected randomly and
independently for each identiﬁer idia in Ci. The only constraint in this selection process for
any color is that the same identiﬁer will not be selected more than once. Clearly, designing
such an algorithm is very straightforward. Roughly speaking, for each identiﬁer idia in any
color Ci, RIA randomly selects (l− 1) identiﬁers from any other (l− 1) colors that are not
selected by other identiﬁers in Ci, and then form l-candidate cani for Ci from the cania of
each identiﬁer.
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Input: an l-eligible Table t0, the privacy property l;
Output: the set Canl of l-candidates for each color;
Method:
1. Let Canl = ∅;
2. For i = 1 to nc
// Iteratively construct l-candidate for each color Ci
3. For a = 1 to ni
// Iteratively select the l − 1 number of identiﬁers for
//each identiﬁer idi,a in color Ci
4. Randomly select l − 1 different colors SCia from SC\{Ci};
5. Randomly select one unused identiﬁer from each color in SCia;
6. Form cania by collecting the previously selected l − 1 identiﬁers in any order;
7. For i = 1 to nc
8. For w = 1 to l − 1
// Create the l-candidate cani for Ci based on the cania(a ∈ [1, ni])
9. Create in cani its wth candidate:
⋃ni
a=1 (the w
th identiﬁer in cania);
10.Let Canl = {cani : 1 ≤ i ≤ nc};
11.Return Canl;
Table 4.6: The RIA Algorithm
The RIA algorithm is shown in Table 4.6. RIA ﬁrst set Canl = φ (line 1). Then,
Given the l-eligible table t0, RIA iteratively constructs l-candidate for all its colors (line 2-
9). In each iteration, RIA ﬁrst repeatedly selects (l− 1) identiﬁers cania for each identiﬁer
idi,a in color Ci. These identiﬁers are from (l − 1) different colors and not be used yet
by the other identiﬁer in current color. Then RIA builds the (l − 1) candidates for current
color. To construct the wth candidate, RIA selects the wth identiﬁer from each cania for
each identiﬁer idi,a in color Ci. Consequently Ci, together with its (l− 1) candidates, form
the l-candidate, cani, for color Ci. Finally, all the cani for each color form the set Canl of
l-candidates, and RIA terminates and returns Canl.
The computational complexity of RIA algorithm is O(l · n) since: since: ﬁrst, for
each color, each of its identiﬁers costs exactly (l−1) many constant times (line 4-6) to select
its (l − 1) identiﬁers, and there are ni identiﬁers in the color, so totally (l − 1)× ni. Then,
based on these identiﬁers, it takes (l − 1)× ni many times to create its l-candidate. There
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are totally nc many colors in the micro-table. Finally it takes nc many times to create the set
of l-candidates. Therefore, in totally its computational complexity is O(
∑nc
i (2× (l− 1)×
ni) + nc) = O(l× n), because the size of all colors adds up to be n, and nc ≤ n. Note that
once an identiﬁer select same identiﬁer which was selected by the previously considered
identiﬁer in the color, RIA must reselect other identiﬁer for that identiﬁer. During the
analysis of computational complexity, we ignore the time of solving such conﬂicts in colors
and identiﬁers in line 4 and line 5 respectively. It is reasonable for most cases in the real
life that ni × (l − 1)  n, since in such case the probability of conﬂicts is very low. Note
that the RIA algorithm only builds the l-candidates. In order to obtain the self-contained
identiﬁer partition and hence the SGSS (as shown in Theorem 4.1), we still need to merge
the cania’s that share the common identiﬁers (which actually has a higher complexity than
O(l × n), but we will not further discuss it since our intention of introducing the RIA
algorithm is not due to its efﬁciency).
4.3.2 The RDA Algorithm (Random and Dependent)
The RDA algorithm aims at general-purpose data utility metrics that only depends
on the size of each anonymized group in an identiﬁer partition, such as the well known
Discernibility Metric (DM) [13]. As we shall show through experiments, our RDA algo-
rithm will produce solutions whose data utility by the DM metric is very close to that of
the optimal solution, since the RDA algorithm can minimize the size of most anonymized
groups in the chosen identiﬁer partition.
Roughly speaking, for the color Ci that has the most incomplete identiﬁers, the
algorithm randomly selects (l− 1) identiﬁers cania for each of its identiﬁers idia, one from
each of the next (l − 1) colors with the most incomplete identiﬁers, until the number of
incomplete colors is less than l. For the remaining identiﬁers, the algorithm simply selects
any l − 1 identiﬁers as their candidates from any compatible cania. The key difference
from the RIA algorithm is that the RDA algorithm will not consider an identiﬁer once it
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Input: an l-eligible Table t0, the privacy property l;
Output: the set Canl of l-candidates for each color;
Method:
1. Let nc be the number of colors in t0;
2. Let SC be the sequence of the colors in the non-increasing order of their cardinality;
3. Let Ci, ni (i ∈ [1, nc]) be the ith color and its cardinality;
4. While (nc ≥ l)
//Construct l-candidate for the color in which most number of incomplete identiﬁers
5. Determine the color Ci which has most number of incomplete identiﬁers;
6. For a = 1 to ni
7. If(idi,a is complete)
8. Skip to check the next identiﬁer in current color;
// Iteratively select (l−1) identiﬁers for each identiﬁer idi,a in color Ci
9. Randomly select l − 1 incomplete identiﬁers from l − 1 different colors in SC
with most incomplete identiﬁers;
10. Form cania by collecting the previously selected l − 1 identiﬁers in any order;
11. Remove the complete colors from SC , and recalculate nc;
12. Reorder the colors in SC based on their number of incomplete identiﬁers;
13. If (nc < l) Break;
14.While (SC = ∅)
15. Select any incomplete identiﬁer idj,b from the color Cj ∈ SC with the most number
of incomplete identiﬁers;
16. Select any l − 1 identiﬁers from the compatible cania with the minimal cardinality;
17. Form canjb by collecting the previously selected l − 1 identiﬁers in any order;
18. If (color Ci is complete) Remove it from SC ;
19.For i = 1 to nc
20. For w = 1 to l − 1
// Create the l-candidate cani for Ci based on the cania(a ∈ [1, ni])
21. Create in cani its wth candidate:
⋃ni
a=1( the w
th identiﬁer in cania);
22.Let Canl = {cani : 1 ≤ i ≤ nc};
23.Return Canl;
Table 4.7: The RDA Algorithm
has selected its candidates, or been selected as a candidate, in most cases. This difference
not only improves the data utility by minimizing the size of anonymized groups in the
identiﬁer partition, but also ensures the sets of candidates selected for different identiﬁers
to be disjoint, which eliminates the need for the expensive merging process required by the
RIA algorithm.
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The RDA algorithm is shown in Table 4.7. Compared to RIA algorithm, RDA
simply skips and does not reselect the l − 1 identiﬁers for the l − 1 candidates if the
identiﬁers have been selected (line 7-8), and ensures that each identiﬁer is not selected as
candidates (line 9). Speciﬁcally, RDA algorithm ﬁrst sets nc, Ci, ni, and SC to be the
number of colors, the ith color and its cardinality, and the sequence of colors in the non-
increasing order of cardinality in t0 respectively (line 1-3). Then, RDA iteratively selects
l − 1 identiﬁers cani,a for each identiﬁer idi,a in color Ci until the number of incomplete
colors is less than l (line 4-13) . Here Ci is the color which has the most number of
incomplete identiﬁers in SC . In each iteration, RDA ﬁrst selects one incomplete color with
most incomplete identiﬁers (line 5). Then for each of its incomplete identiﬁers, RDA forms
cania by randomly selecting (l − 1) incomplete identiﬁers from (l − 1) different colors in
SC (line 9-10), and removes the completed colors from SC , recounts nc, and reorders the
colors in SC in the non-increasing order of the number of incomplete identiﬁers (line 11-
12). Next, RDA forms cania for the remainder identiﬁers (line 14-18). In each iteration,
RDA ﬁrst selects any incomplete identiﬁer idj,b from the color Cj with the most number
of incomplete identiﬁers (line 15) , and then forms canjb by collecting any l− 1 identiﬁers
from any compatible cania with smallest size (line 16-17). Finally, all the cani for each
color form the set Canl of l-candidates, and RDA terminates and returns Canl (line 19-23).
Note that, we can derive the minimal self-contained partition directly through the
bijections in the l-candidates. In other words, each cania is a transient group (see proof of
Lemma 4.1) for minimal self-contained partition, furthermore, it is the anonymized group
in minimal self-contained partition when the intersection between any two cania is empty.
Actually, the construction of the set of l-candidate based on canias (Line 19-22 in RDA
algorithm) is only used to prove its existence. Therefore, in order to ensure that canias are
disjoint, line 16-17 can be replaced by: Append idj,b to its compatible cania with the mini-
mal cardinality. Since canias are disjoint, the merge process in Table 4.4 can be bypassed.
This will reduce the computational complexity and improve the data utility under certain
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type of utility measures based on the size of the QI-groups, such as DM.
Furthermore, we show that the computational complexity of Line 9-12 is linear in l.
First, the remainder colors in SC are incomplete, and we can also design certain additional
data structure to store the incomplete identiﬁers in each incomplete color and record the
cardinality. Therefore, Line 9-10 can be processed in time linear in l. Second, since after
Line 9-10, only l − 1 colors (besides color Ci) are affected and their cardinality is only
reduced by 1, Line 11-12 also can be processed in time linear in l with the assistance of
additional structure. Based on previous discussions, the computational complexity of RDA
algorithm is O(n). First, Line 1-3 runs in O(n) time by applying bucket sort (Additionally,
nc << n holds for general cases in real world). Second, from Line 4-17, each identiﬁer in
the micro-data table is considered once all through the process with the assistance of addi-
tional data structure. We will evaluate utility of the RDA algorithm through experiments in
the next section.
4.3.3 The GDA Algorithm (Guided and Dependent)
For both the RIA and RDA algorithms, we have assumed that the utility metric is
independent of the actual quasi-identiﬁer values. Our intention of designing the GDA algo-
rithm is to demonstrate how our approach also allows designing algorithms that optimize
data utility based on actual quasi-identiﬁer values. For this purpose, assuming the quasi-
identiﬁer is composed of attributes q1, q2, . . . , qd, we assign an integer weight weighti to
each attribute qi(i ∈ [1, d]), and a rank rank ∈ [1, |qi|] to each value of the attribute qi.
Given any tuple ta in the micro-data table t0 and its value of each quasi-identiﬁer attribute
ta[qi], we deﬁne its weighted-rank as wra =
∑d
i=1(weighti×rank(ta[qi])). Given any two
tuples ta and tb, we deﬁne their QI-distance as dab = |wra − wrb|. Also, given a tuple ta
and a set of tuples tB, we deﬁne the average QI-distance as daB =
∑
b∈tB (dab)
|tB | . Intuitively, a
smaller QI-distance indicates that placing the two tuples into the same anonymized group
will produce better data utility (for example, patients from the same geographical region
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should be grouped together).
Roughly speaking, for each incomplete identiﬁer idi,a in the color Ci with the most
incomplete identiﬁers, the algorithm determines l− 1 incomplete colors that can minimize
the QI-distance between their ﬁrst incomplete identiﬁer with the largest weighted-rank and
idi,a, and then selects these l − 1 identiﬁers to be the l − 1 candidates for idi,a, until the
number of incomplete colors is less than l. For each remainder identiﬁer idj,b, GDA selects
(l − 1) identiﬁers from its compatible cania which has the smallest average QI-distance
from idj,b.
Input: an l-eligible table t0, the privacy property l;
Output: the set Canl of l-candidates for each color;
Method:
1. Let nc be the number of colors in t0;
2. Let SC be the sequence of the colors in non-increasing order of their cardinality;
3. Let Ci, ni (i ∈ [1, nc]) be the ith color and its cardinality;
4. Compute the weighted-rank for each tuple in the table t0;
5. Sort the tuples in each color in ascending order of their weighted-rank values;
6. While (nc ≥ l)
7. Let Ci be the color with the most incomplete identiﬁers;
8. For each incomplete identiﬁer idi,a in Ci
9. Create cania by selecting l − 1 incomplete identiﬁers from the ﬁrst l−1
colors that minimize the QI-distance;
between their ﬁrst and idi,a;
10. For each incomplete identiﬁer idj,b
11. Create canjb by selecting l − 1 identiﬁers with minimal QI-distance from
compatible cania with the least average QI-distance;
12. For i = 1 to nc
13. For w = 1 to l − 1
// Create the l-candidate cani for Ci based on the cania(a ∈ [1, ni])
14. Create in cani its wth candidate:
⋃ni
a=1( the w
th identiﬁer in cania);
15. Let Canl = {cani : 1 ≤ i ≤ nc};
16. Return Canl;
Table 4.8: The GDA Algorithm
The GDA algorithm is shown in Table 4.8. Given a micro-data table t0 and an inte-
ger l, GDA ﬁrst initialize the following: Set nc, Ci, ni, and SC to be the number of colors,
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the ith color and its cardinality, and the sequence of colors in the non-increasing order of
cardinality in t0 respectively (line 1-3); Compute the weighted-rank for each identiﬁer (tu-
ple) based on its quasi-identiﬁer information (line 4); Sort the identiﬁers inside a color in
ascending order of their weighted-rank values (line 5). After that, GDA iteratively con-
structs cania for each identiﬁer in the micro-table t0(line 6-11). In each iteration, GDA
repeatedly selects l− 1 identiﬁers cania for each identiﬁer idi,a in color Ci. For each iden-
tiﬁer idi,a, we select the l− 1 best colors among the whole set of colors other than Ci itself.
To judge the best colors, we compare the QI-distance between the QI-attributes of idi,a and
the ﬁrst identiﬁer in each color which is not yet mapped to any identiﬁer in Ci. The less
the QI-distance is, the better the identiﬁer is. Finally, all the cani for each color forms
the set Canl of l-candidates, and GDA terminates and returns Canl (line 12-16). From
the description above, the selection of l-candidate for each color is further decided by the
selection of l − 1 identiﬁers for each of its identiﬁer, which in turn are selected based on
the QI-distance, it is, the local optimization. Therefore, the transient groups are expected
to be closer with regard to the QI-attributes, which may increase the data utility. However,
this approach cannot assure the size of the anonymized group since there may exists many
merges when construct the locally-minimal partition based on such set of l-candidates.
The computational complexity of GDA algorithm is O(n log n) since after sort-
ing each color based on the weighted-rank values, each identiﬁer is processed only once
throughout the process of building l-candidates. Since this algorithm aims at minimizing
the average QI-distance inside each anonymized group, we will evaluate its data utility in
the next section based on such a quasi-identiﬁer value-dependent metric.
4.3.4 The Construction of SGSS
Remind that our ultimate objective is to construct strongly globally safe set (SGSS)
in which the data utility is optimized later. Once Canl has been constructed by RIA,
RDA, or GDA algorithm, in this chapter we adopt the approach based on the corresponding
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bijections in Canl to building the minimal self-contained partition and then the SGSS.
More speciﬁcally, for RDA and GDA algorithms, each cania, created in step 10 in
Table 4.7 and in step 9 in Table 4.8 respectively, forms an anonymized group. Then we
simply append the idj,b, in step 15 in Table 4.7 and in step 11 in Table 4.8 respectively, to
the selected cania. Similarly, for RIA algorithm, each cania created in step 6 in Table 4.6
forms an anonymized group, and we then merge the resultant anonymized groups which
have common identiﬁers to be disjoint sets. The algorithms in the literature to achieve
disjoint sets are applicable for our problem and the details are omitted here.
For the experiments in Section 4.4, we integrate the process in building the mini-
mal self-contained partitions into the algorithms of constructing Canl for RDA and GDA
algorithms.
4.4 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the efﬁciency and utility of our proposed algorithms
through experiments. To compare our results to that reported in [105], our experimental
setting is similar to theirs. We adopt two real-world datasets, OCC and SAL, at the Inte-
grated Public Use Micro-data Series [89]. Each dataset contains 600k tuples. The domain
sizes of the six chosen attributes of both datasets are shown in Table 4.9. Among these,
we select four attributes, Age, Gender, Education, and Birthplace, as the QI-attributes for
both datasets, and we select Occupation and Income as the sensitive attribute for OCC and
SAL, respectively. For our experiment, we adopt the MBR (Minimum Bounding Rectan-
gle) function (similar to that in [105]) to generalize QI-values within the same anonymized
group once we obtain an identiﬁer partition using our algorithms. As mentioned before, the
RIA algorithm is only introduced to demonstrate how simple an algorithm can be by fol-
lowing our approach, we will not evaluate its performance, but only focus on the RDA and
GDA algorithm. In fact, in these two algorithms, each cania forms an anonymized group
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(transient group), and for the remainder identiﬁers shown in step 6 in Table 4.7 and step
7 in Table 4.8 are simply appended in the selected compatible anonymized groups (Step
19-22 in Table 4.7 and step 12-15 in Table 4.8 are used to represent the l-candidates). All
experiments are conducted on a computer equipped with a 1.86GHz Core Duo CPU and
1GB memory.
Attribute Age Gender Education Birthplace Occupation Income
Domain Size 79 2 17 57 50 50
Table 4.9: Description of OCC and SAL Datasets
We evaluate computational complexity using execution time, and evaluate data util-
ity of the released table using two measurements: Discernibility Metric (DM) [13] and
Query Workload Error (QWE, which is a utility metric that depends on quasi-identiﬁer
values) [62].
4.4.1 Computation Overhead






















































Figure 4.1: Execution Time vs. Dataset Cardinality n
Figure 4.1 illustrates the computation time of both of our algorithms on both datasets
against the dataset cardinality n. We generate n-tuple datasets by synthesizing n
600k
copies
of OCC, SAL respectively (Reminder that both OCC and SAL contain 600k tuples). We
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set l = 8 for this set of experiments, and conduct the experiment 100 times and then take
the average. From the results, it is clear that both of our algorithms are practically efﬁcient,
and the computation time increases slowly with n. The RDA algorithm is slightly more
efﬁcient than GDA. This is because, when selecting candidates for each identiﬁer, RDA
considers the l − 1 colors with the most incomplete identiﬁers while GDA considers the
l − 1 colors whose incomplete identiﬁers have the least QI-distances. Therefore, the more
complex computation required by the GDA algorithm results in slightly more overhead
than RDA.
Comparing to Results in [105] In contrast to the results reported in [105], both of our
algorithms are more efﬁcient, while the RDA algorithm requires signiﬁcantly less time than
that in [105]. Although not reported here due to space limitations, we have also investigated
the computation time against l as well as the number of QI-attributes. Both algorithms are
insensitive to these two parameters. This is as expected since the computation complexity
of both algorithms only depends on the cardinality of dataset n.
4.4.2 Data Utility
We ﬁrst conduct a set of experiments on the original SAL and OCC dataset to evalu-
ate the utility of released tables measured by the DM metric. Figure 4.2 shows the DM cost
(the lower cost the better utility) of each algorithm against l. From the results, we can see
that the DM cost of our RDA algorithm is very close to the optimal cost (calculated using
a separate algorithm), while the DM cost of the GDA algorithm is only slightly higher than
the optimal cost. This is as expected, because the RDA algorithm is speciﬁcally designed
for a general-purpose utility metric that aims to minimize the size of each anonymized
group regardless of actual quasi-identiﬁer values, whereas the GDA algorithm will attempt
to minimize the QI-distance (the assignment of weight and rank for the GDA algorithm is
described below).
Following [105], we then evaluate the query workload error (QWE) by answering
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Figure 4.2: Data Utility Comparison: DM Cost vs. l
count queries. The intention is to compare our algorithms with a utility metric that depends
on the actual quasi-identiﬁer values. For this purpose, predicates on QI-attributes are con-
structed on Age, Gender, with an and operations between them, and with an and operations
between all the QI-attributes, respectively. We set weight to be 1,10000,1, and 1 for Age,
Gender, Education, and Birthplace, respectively. By processing 1000 randomly-generated
queries for each type of predicates, we intend to investigate how well the released table
preserves the Rqs relation. For each query, we ﬁrst obtain its accurate answer acc from the
original micro-data table, and then adopt the approximation technique in [62] to compute
the approximate answer app from the released table output by our algorithms. The error
of an approximate answer is formulated as |acc−app|
max{acc,δ} [105], where δ is set to 0.5% of the
dataset cardinality. Then, the average error of all queries is taken as the QWE.
Figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 show the average relative error against different
types of predicates for l = 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 respectively. Compared to RDA, GDA now
has better utility, which is as expected since GDA does consider the actual quasi-identiﬁer
values in generating the identiﬁer partition, as mentioned in Section 4.3. Particularly, the
average relative error for querying on SAL and OCC with Gender as the only query con-
dition for l = 8 is reduced from 64%, 69% (of RDA) to 10%, 18%, respectively. Finally,
although not reported here due to space limitations, the utility result of our algorithms
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Figure 4.3: Data Utility Comparison: Query Accuracy vs. Query Condition(l = 6)














































Figure 4.4: Data Utility Comparison: Query Accuracy vs. Query Condition(l = 7)














































Figure 4.5: Data Utility Comparison: Query Accuracy vs. Query Condition(l = 8)
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Figure 4.6: Data Utility Comparison: Query Accuracy vs. Query Condition(l = 9)














































Figure 4.7: Data Utility Comparison: Query Accuracy vs. Query Condition(l = 10)
measured by QWE are close to the results reported in [105] (no result based on DM was
reported there).
4.5 Discussion
Possible Extensions In this chapter, we have focused on applying the self-contained prop-
erty on l-candidates to build sets of identiﬁer partitions satisfying the l-cover property, and
hence to construct the SGSS. However, there may in fact exist many other methods to con-
struct the SGSS, which will lead to potential directions of future work. First, there are
different ways for building the l-candidates for each color. As discussed above, theoreti-
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cally any subset of I satisfying the constraints shown in Lemma 4.3 can be a valid candidate
for a color, and l− 1 such subsets together with that color will form a valid l-candidate for
that color if they satisfy the constraints shown in Theorem 4.2. Second, once l-candidates
are given, there still exist different ways, including applying the self-contained property,
for constructing sets of identiﬁers to satisfy the l-cover property. Third, even the l-cover
property is not necessarily the only valid way for directly building the SGSS. Finally, al-
though we have focused on l-diversity and the utility measures DM and QWE, the principle
of decoupling utility optimization from privacy preservation can potentially be applied to
other privacy applications to yield efﬁcient solutions.
Practicality of Our Approach We have demonstrated the practicality of our approach by
showing through complexity analysis and experiments that our proposed algorithms are
efﬁcient enough to be applied to real world applications. It is important to note that it would
be unfair to compare the performance of our algorithms to many existing algorithms that
ignore the issue of privacy breaches caused by adversarial knowledge about algorithms [48,
98]. As to utility, as discussed earlier, our proposed algorithms produce results comparable
to existing methods. We believe the ﬂexibility of our approach may lead to other algorithms
with further improved utility. For the QWE metric, note that our experiments only evaluate
the QWE cost on the minimal self-contained partition. The utility may be increased by
ﬁne-tuning the weight information for each quasi-identiﬁer, and by optimizing among the
family set. We will conduct more experimental comparisons in terms of performance and
utility between our algorithms and the traditional approaches in our future work.
The Focus on Syntactic Privacy Principles We have focused on syntactic privacy principles
and methods, such as l-diversity and generalization, in this chapter. However, the general
approach of decoupling utility optimization from privacy preservation is not necessarily
limited to such a scope. In particular, one interesting issue is to consider its applicability to
differential privacy [40], which is being accepted as one of the strongest privacy models and
extended to privacy preserving data publishing [66]. On the other hand, since most existing
94
approaches that ensure differential privacy are random noise-based and are suitable for
speciﬁc types of statistical queries, we have regarded this direction as future work.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a privacy streamliner approach for privacy-preserving
applications. We reported theoretical results required for instantiating this approach in the
context of privacy-preserving micro-data release using public algorithms. We have also
designed three such algorithms by following the proposed approach, which not only yield
practical solutions by themselves but also reveal the possibilities for a large number of
algorithms that can be designed for speciﬁc utility metrics and applications. Our exper-
iments with real datasets have proved our proposed algorithms to be practical in terms
of both efﬁciency and data utility. Our future work will apply the proposed approach to





Padding in Web Applications
In this chapter, we present a formal PPTP model encompassing the privacy require-
ments, padding costs, and padding methods to prevent side-channel attacks due to unique
patterns in packet sizes and directions of the encrypted trafﬁc among components of the
Web application.
5.1 Overview
Web-based applications are becoming increasingly popular. In contrast to their
desktop counterparts, Web applications demand less client-side resources and are easier
to deliver and maintain through using the Web browser as a thin client. On the other
hand, Web applications also present new security and privacy challenges, partly because
the untrusted Internet has essentially become an integral component of such applications
for carrying the continuous interaction between users and servers. Recent study showed
that the encrypted trafﬁc of many popular Web applications may actually disclose highly
sensitive data, and consequently lead to serious breaches of user privacy [22]. Speciﬁcally,
by searching for unique patterns exhibited in packets’ sizes and/or timing, an eavesdrop-
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per can potentially identify an application’s internal state transitions and the corresponding
users’ inputs. Moreover, such side-channel attacks are shown to be pervasive and funda-
mental to most Web applications due to many intrinsic characteristics of such applications,
such as low entropy inputs, diverse resource objects, and stateful communications.
Taking one popular real-world search engine as an example, Table 5.1 shows the
sizes and directions of packets observed between users and the search engine. Observe that
due to the user-friendly auto-suggestion feature, with each keystroke, the browser sends
a b-byte packet to the server; the server then replies with two packets of 60 bytes and s
bytes, respectively; ﬁnally, the browser sends a 60-byte packet to the server. In addition,
in the same input string, the b value of the ﬁrst keystroke is about 50 larger than that of
the second one while each subsequent keystroke increases the b value by one byte from
the third keystroke, and the s value depends both on the current keystroke and on all the
preceding ones. Clearly, due to the ﬁxed pattern in packet sizes (ﬁrst, second, and last),
the packets corresponding to each input string can be identiﬁed from observed trafﬁc, even
though the trafﬁc has been encrypted.
User Input Observed Directional Packet Sizes
bee 641 →, ← 60, ← 544, 60 →,
585 →, ← 60, ← 555, 60 →,
586 →, ← 60, ← 547, 60 →
cab 641 →, ← 60, ← 554, 60 →,
585 →, ← 60, ← 560, 60 →,
586 →, ← 60, ← 558, 60 →
(b bytes) (s bytes)
Table 5.1: User Inputs and Corresponding Packet Sizes
Similar trafﬁc patterns have also been observed in different categories of Web ap-
plications [22]. Therefore, we assume a worst case scenario in which an eavesdropper can
pinpoint trafﬁc related to aWeb application (such as using de-anonymizing techniques [95])
and locate packets for user inputs using the above technique. We use search engines as ex-
amples in this chapter due to their distinct and representative patterns. In reality, the s value
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can be larger and more disparate as discussed in Section 5.6.
Moreover, the size of the third packet provides a good indicator of the input itself
(which again can be found in many Web applications [22]). Speciﬁcally, Table 5.2 shows
the s value for character (a, b, c and d) entered as the ﬁrst (second column) and second
(3-6 columns) keystroke for a different search engine. Observe that the s value for each
character entered as second keystroke is different from that it is entered as the ﬁrst, since
the packet size now depends on both the current keystroke and the preceding one. Clearly,
every input string can be uniquely identiﬁed by combining observations of packet sizes
about the two consecutive keystrokes (for simplicity, we only consider a−d combinations
here, whereas in reality it may take more than two keystrokes to uniquely identify an input
string).
Second Keystroke
First Keystroke a b c d
a 509 487 493 501 497
b 504 516 488 482 481
c 502 501 488 473 477
d 516 543 478 509 499
Table 5.2: s Value for Each Character Entered as the First (Second Column) and Second
(3-6 Columns) Keystroke
A natural solution for preventing such a side channel attack is to pad packets such
that each packet size will no longer map to a unique input (One extreme case is to pad all
packets to the identical size, namely, maximizing). However, such a solution does not come
free, since padding packets will result in additional communication and processing over-
head. In fact, it has been shown that a straightforward solution, such as random padding
(appending a random-length padding within a given interval to a packet) and rounding
(rounding packet sizes to the nearest intervals), may incur a prohibitive overhead (e.g.
21074% for a well-known online tax system [22]). Thus, we face two seemingly conﬂict-
ing goals. First, the difference in packet sizes needs to be sufﬁciently reduced to prevent
eavesdroppers from distinguishing between different users inputs based on corresponding
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packet sizes. Second, the overhead for achieving such privacy protection should be mini-
mized. Finally, a tradeoff naturally exists between these two objectives.
We now consider a different way for padding the packets as shown in Table 5.3. The
ﬁrst and last columns respectively show the s value and corresponding character with its
preﬁx (e.g., (c)d means the character d is entered as the second keystroke after its preﬁx c
is entered for the same input string). The middle two columns give two options for padding
packets (although not shown here, there certainly exist many other options). Speciﬁcally,
each option ﬁrst divides the six keystrokes into three (or two) padding groups, as illustrated
by the (absence of) horizontal lines. Packets within the same padding group are then padded
in such a way that the corresponding s values become identical to the maximum value in
that group, and thus the characters inside the group will no longer be distinguishable from
each other by the s values. The objective now is to ﬁnd a padding option that can provide
sufﬁcient privacy protection and meanwhile minimize the padding cost. Note that gathering
such packet information is practical for most Web applications, as we will discuss later in
Section 5.6.1.
s Value Padding (Preﬁx)Char
Option 1 Option 2
473 477 478 (c)c
477 477 478 (c)d
478 499 478 (d)b
499 499 509 (d)d
501 509 509 (c)a
509 509 509 (d)c
Quasi-ID Generalization Sensitive Value
Table 5.3: Mapping PPTP to PPDP
Interestingly, this privacy-preserving trafﬁc padding (PPTP) problem is naturally
associated with another well studied problem, namely, privacy-preserving data publishing
(PPDP) [47]. For example, in Table 5.3, if we regard the s value as a quasi-identiﬁer
(such as DoB), the input as a sensitive value (such as medical condition), and the padding
options as different ways for generalizing the DoB into anonymized groups (for example,
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by removing the day from a DoB), then we immediately have a classic PPDP problem, that
is, publishing DoBs and medical conditions while preventing adversaries from linking any
published medical condition to a person through his/her DoB [47].
The above connection between the two issues implies that we may borrow many
existing efforts in the PPDP domain to address the PPTP issue based on the similarity
between these two problems. On the other hand, there also exist signiﬁcant differences
between the two. As an example, in Table 5.3, the second option will likely be considered as
worse than the ﬁrst in the PPDP domain in terms of typical data utility measures (intuitively,
the second option leads to more utility loss due to its larger anonymized groups), whereas
it is actually better in the PPTP domain with respect to padding cost (it can be shown that
the second option incurs totally 24 bytes of overhead, in contrast to 33 by the ﬁrst option).
As another example, we will show later that the effect of combining two keystrokes will
be equivalent to releasing multiple inter-dependent tables, which actually leads to a novel
PPDP problem.
In this chapter, we ﬁrst present a model of the PPTP issue based on the mapping
to PPDP, which formally characterizes the interaction between users and Web applica-
tions, the observation made by eavesdroppers, the privacy requirement, and the overhead
of padding. Based on the model, we then formulate several PPTP problems under different
assumptions, and discuss the complexity. We show that minimizing padding cost under a
given privacy requirement is generally intractable. Next, we design several heuristic algo-
rithms for solving the PPTP problems in polynomial time with acceptable overhead. Fi-
nally, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efﬁciency of our algorithms by both analytical
and experimental evaluations.
The contribution of this chapter is threefold. First, the identiﬁed similarity between
PPTP and PPDP establishes a bridge between the two research areas, which will not only
allow for reusing many existing models and methods in the well investigated PPDP do-
main, but serve to attract more interest to the important PPTP issue. Second, to the best
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of our knowledge, our formal model is among the ﬁrst efforts on formally addressing the
PPTP issue (refer to Chapter 2 for a detailed review of related work). Third, the proposed
algorithms may provide direct and practical solutions to real world PPTP applications, as
evidenced by our implementation and comparative experimental studies. Moreover, those
algorithms demonstrate the feasibility of adapting existing PPDP methods to the PPTP
domain, and the challenges in doing so.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 deﬁnes our PPTP model.
Section 5.3 formulates PPTP problems and analyzes the complexity. Section 5.4 devises
heuristic algorithms for the formulated problems. Section 5.5 proposes an extended version
of the PPTP solution to accommodate different likelihoods of possible inputs, including a
re-deﬁned privacy model, the new PPTP problems, and corresponding PPTP algorithms.
Section 5.6 discusses the implementation of our solution, and experimentally evaluates the
performance of our algorithms. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.
5.2 The Model
Section 5.2.1 ﬁrst presents the basic model of interaction and observation. Sec-
tion 5.2.2 then maps PPTP to PPDP in order to quantify privacy protection and overhead.
Finally, Section 5.2.3 extends the basic model to more realistic cases. We will also demon-
strate its ﬂexibility to adapt different privacy properties in Section 5.5. Table 5.4 lists main
notations that will be used throughout the chapter.
a, a, Ai or A Action, action-sequence, action-set
s, v, v, Vi or V Flow, ﬂow-vector, vector-sequence, vector-set
a[i], v[i] The ith element in a and v




Table 5.4: The Notation Table
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5.2.1 The Basic Model
We model the PPTP issue from two perspectives, the interaction between users and
servers, and the observation made by eavesdroppers. First, Deﬁnition 5.1 formalizes the
interaction. Our discussions about Table 5.2 demonstrated how one keystroke may affect
another in terms of observations (packet sizes), and how an eavesdropper may combine
such multiple observations for a reﬁned inference. Such inter-dependent user actions are
modeled as an action-sequence in Deﬁnition 5.1. The concept of action-set models a col-
lection of actions whose corresponding observations may be padded together.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Interaction) Given a Web application, we deﬁne
- an action a as an atomic user input that triggers trafﬁc, such as a keystroke or a
mouse click.
- an action-sequencea as a sequence of actions with known relationships, such as con-
secutive keystrokes entered into real-time search engine or a series of mouse clicks
on hierarchical menu items. We use a[i] to denote the ith action in a.
- an action-set Ai as the collection of all the ith actions in a set of action-sequences.
We will simply use A if all action-sequences are of length one.
Example 5.1 Assume “bee” and “cab” in Table 5.1 to be the only possible inputs, we have
six actions, a11, a12, a13 and a21, a22, a23 corresponding to b, e (as second keystroke), e (as
third) in input “bee”, and c, a, b (as third keystroke) in input “cab”. There are two action-
sequencesa1=〈a11, a12, a13〉 anda2=〈a21, a22, a23〉, and three action-setsA1={a11, a21},
A2={a12, a22}, and A3={a13, a23}. 
Deﬁnition 5.2 models concepts related to the observation made by an eavesdropper.
Note that a ﬂow-vector is intended to only model those packets that may contribute to
identify an action (such as the s value in Table 5.1). Also, each action is not associated
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with a ﬂow but a ﬂow-vector, which is itself a sequence, since a single action may trigger
more than one packet. Finally, unlike an action-set, a vector-set is deﬁned as a multiset,
since it may contain duplicates (that is, packets nay share the same size).
Deﬁnition 5.2 (Observations) Given a Web application, we deﬁne
- a ﬂow-vector v w.r.t. an action a as a sequence of ﬂows, where each ﬂow s represents
the size of a directional packet triggered by a. Denoted the relation between a and v
by f(a)=v.
- a vector-sequence v as a sequence of ﬂow-vectors corresponding to an equal-length
action-sequence a, with each v[i] corresponding to a[i] (1 ≤ i ≤| v |).
- a vector-set Vi (or simply V ) as the collection of all the ith ﬂow-vectors in a set of
vector-sequences, which corresponds to an action-set in the straightforward way.
Example 5.2 Following Example 5.1, we have six ﬂow-vectors, v11 = 〈544〉, v12 = 〈555〉,
v13 = 〈547〉 and v21 = 〈554〉, v22 = 〈560〉, v23 = 〈558〉 (note that we only model those
packets whose sizes can help to identify an action), corresponding to actions a11, a12, a13
and a21, a22, a23, respectively. We have two vector-sequences v1 = 〈v11, v12, v13〉 and v2 =
〈v21, v22, v23〉, corresponding to action-sequences a1 and a2, respectively. We have three
vector-sets V1 = {v11, v21}, V2 = {v12, v22} and V3 = {v13, v23} corresponding to the three
action-sets A1, A2, and A3 in Example 5.1. 
Finally, Deﬁnition 5.3 models the joint information about interaction and observa-
tion, which is the collection of the pairs of the action and its corresponding ﬂow-vector.
Deﬁnition 5.3 (Vector-Action Set) Given an action-set Ai and its corresponding vector-
set Vi, a vector-action set VAi is the set {(v, a) : v ∈ Vi ∧ a ∈ Ai ∧ fi(a) = v}.
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Example 5.3 Following above Examples, given the action-set A1 and vector-set V1, then
the vector-action set is VA1={(v11, a11), (v21, a21)}. Similarly, VA2={(v12, a12), (v22, a22)},
VA3={(v13, a13), (v23, a23)}.
5.2.2 Privacy and Cost Model
For simplicity, we ﬁrst consider a simpliﬁed case where every action-sequence and
ﬂow-vector are of length one, namely, the Single-Vector Single-Dimension (SVSD) case.
That is, all actions are independent, and each action triggers only a single packet that can be
used to identify the action. In this case, we map a given vector-action set VA={(v, a) : v ∈
V ∧ a ∈ A ∧ f(a)=v} to a table T (v, a) with two attributes, the ﬂow-vector v (equivalent
to a ﬂow s here) as quasi-identiﬁer and the action a as sensitive attribute. Note that we will
interchangeably refer to a vector-action set and its tabular representation from now on.
Deﬁnition 5.4 quantiﬁes the amount of privacy protection under a given vector-
action set. This model follows the widely adopted approach of assuming a ﬁxed privacy
requirement while minimizing the cost.
Deﬁnition 5.4 (k-Indistinguishability) Given a vector-action set VA, we deﬁne
- a padding group as any S ⊆ VA satisfying that all the pairs in S have identical
ﬂow-vectors and no S ′ ⊃ S can satisfy this property, and
- we say VA satisﬁes k-indistinguishability (k is an integer) or VA is k-indistinguishable
if the cardinality of every padding group is no less than k.
Discussion One may argue that, in contrast to encryption, k-indistinguishability may not
provide strong enough protection. However, as mentioned before, we are considering cases
where encryption is already broken by side-channel attacks, so the strong conﬁdentiality
provided by encryption is already not an option. Second, in theory k could always be
set to be sufﬁcient large to provide enough conﬁdentiality, although a reasonably large k
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would usually satisfy users’ privacy requirements for most practical applications. Finally,
since most web applications are publicly accessible and consequently an eavesdropper can
unavoidably learn about possible inputs, we believe focusing on protecting sensitive user
input (by hiding it among other possible inputs) yields higher practical feasibility and sig-
niﬁcance than on perfect conﬁdentiality (attempting to hide everything).
As demonstrated in Section 5.1, we can map the PPTP model to PPDP. Meanwhile,
such mapped PPDP problems actually possess a unique characteristic. That is, the sen-
sitive values (actions) are always unique. Thus, by satisfying k-indistinguishability, the
vector-action set also satisﬁes l-diversity (l = k) in its simplest form [77]. Furthermore, a
probabilistic approach based on differential privacy [40] is another possible extension to
enhance our model such that the padding result will be immune to eavesdroppers’ prior
knowledge. Nonetheless, this simple model is sufﬁcient to demonstrate the usefulness of
mapping PPTP to PPDP. For simplicity, we will ﬁrst focus on k-indistinguishability in
Sections 5.2– 5.4, and delay the discussion about more general forms of l-diversity in Sec-
tion 5.5 to address cases where not all actions should be treated equally in padding.
In addition to privacy requirement, we also need a quantitative measure for the cost
of padding and processing. Across the whole vector-set, Deﬁnition 5.5 counts the number
of additional bytes after padded, while Deﬁnition 5.6 counts the number of ﬂows that are
involved in padding. We focus on these simple models in this chapter while there certainly
exist other ways for modeling such costs.
Deﬁnition 5.5 (Distance and Padding Cost) Given a vector-set V , we deﬁne
- the vector-distance between two equal-length ﬂow-vectors v1 and v2 as: vdis(v1, v2)=∑|v1|
i=1(|s1i−s2i|) where s1i and s2i are the ith ﬂow in v1 and v2, respectively.




i)) where vi and v
′
i denote a ﬂow-
vector in V and its counterpart after padding, respectively.
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Deﬁnition 5.6 (Processing Cost) Given a vector-set V , we deﬁne the processing cost of V
as the number of ﬂows in V which corresponding packets should be padded.
5.2.3 The SVMD and MVMD Cases
In the previous section, we have focused on the simpliﬁed SVSD case to facilitate
a focused discussion on the privacy and cost model. We now look at the more realistic
cases. First, we consider the Single-Vector Multi-Dimension (SVMD) case where each
ﬂow-vector may include more than one ﬂows (that is, an action may trigger more than
one packets that can be used to identify the action), whereas each action-sequence is still
composed of a single action. In this case, the vector-action set needs to be mapped to a
table T (s1, . . . , s|v|, a) with multiple quasi-identiﬁer attributes (each ﬂow corresponds to
an attribute). Thus, based on Deﬁnition 5.4, ﬂow-vectors can form a padding group only if
they are identical with respect to every ﬂow inside the vectors. Another subtlety is that the
model of vector-action set requires all the ﬂow-vectors to have the same number of ﬂows,
which is not always possible in practice. One solution is to insert dummy packets of size
zero which will then be handled as usual in the process of padding.
Next, we consider the Multi-Vector Multi-Dimension (MVMD) case in which each
action-sequence consists of more than one actions and each ﬂow-vector includes multiple
ﬂows. Deﬁnition 5.7 expresses the relationship between actions in an action-sequence.
Deﬁnition 5.7 (i-preﬁx, adjacent-preﬁx, adjacent-sufﬁx) We deﬁne
- the i-preﬁx of an action-sequence a = 〈a[1],a[2], . . . ,a[t]〉 (i ∈ [1, t]), denoted as
pre(a, i), as the sequence 〈a[1],a[2], . . . ,a[i]〉, and we say a[i−1] is the adjacent-
preﬁx (or simply preﬁx) of a[i], and a[i+1] is the adjacent-sufﬁx (or simply sufﬁx) of
a[i],
- similarly, we deﬁne the i-preﬁx of vector-sequence v, and the preﬁx, sufﬁx of v[i].
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In the MVMD case, due to the preﬁx relationship, the ﬂow-vector for an action may
provide additional information about ﬂow-vectors that correspond to the previous actions
in the same action-sequence. Such knowledge may enable the eavesdropper to reﬁne his
guesses about an action. Such a scenario is illustrated in Figure 5.1. Also, we slightly
change the deﬁnition of a vector-action set to accommodate the added preﬁx action infor-
mation, as shown in Deﬁnition 5.8. We will delay the discussion about how a padding
algorithm may satisfy k-indistinguishability in this case to the next section.




























Figure 5.1: The Vector-Action Set in MVMD Case
Deﬁnition 5.8 (Vector-Action Set (MVMD Case)) Given t action-sets {Ai : 1 ≤ i ≤ t}
and the corresponding vector-sets {Vi : 1 ≤ i ≤ t}, the vector-action set VA is the collec-
tion of sets {{(v, a) :v∈Vi ∧ a∈Ai ∧ fi(a) = v} :1 ≤ i ≤ t}.
5.3 PPTP Problem Formulation
The formal model introduced in the previous section enables us to formulate a series
of PPTP problems and study their complexity. We ﬁrst discuss the choice of our ceiling
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padding approach among other possibilities in Section 5.3.1, and then address the SVSD
and SVMD cases in Section 5.3.2 and the MVMD case in Section 5.3.3.
5.3.1 Ceiling Padding
In choosing a padding method, we need to address two aspects, privacy protection
by satisfying the k-indistinguishability property, and minimizing padding cost. As pre-
viously mentioned, an application-agnostic approach, such as packet-size rounding and
random padding, will usually incur high padding cost while not necessarily guarantee-
ing sufﬁcient privacy protection [22]. We now revisit this argument by showing that a
larger rounding size does not necessarily lead to more privacy. With our model, more
privacy can now be clearly deﬁned as satisfying k-indistinguishability for a larger k. Con-
sider rounding the ﬂows for the second keystrokes shown in Table 5.2 to a multiple of 64
(for example, 487 to 8×64 = 512). It can be shown that such rounding can achieve 2-
indistinguishability (detailed calculations are omitted), while increasing the rounding size
to 160 can achieve 3-indistinguishability. However, further increasing it to 256 can still
only satisfy 2-indistinguishability.
From another point of view, as demonstrated in Section 5.1, we can now apply
the PPDP technique of generalization to addressing the PPTP problem. A generalization
technique will partition the vector-action set into groups, and then break the linkage among
actions in the same group. One unique aspect in applying generalization to PPTP is that
padding can only increase each packet size but cannot decrease or replace it with a range
of values like in normal generalization. The above considerations lead to a new padding
method given in Deﬁnition 5.9. Basically, after partitioning a vector-action set into groups,
we pad each ﬂow in a padding group to be the maximum size of that ﬂow in the group.
Deﬁnition 5.9 (Dominance and Ceiling Padding) Given a vector-set V , we deﬁne
- the dominant-vector dom(V ) as the ﬂow-vector in which each ﬂow is equal to the
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maximum of the corresponding ﬂow among all the ﬂow-vectors in V .
- a ceiling-padded group in V as a padding group in which every ﬂow-vector is padded
to the dominant-vector. We also say V is ceiling-padded if all the groups are ceiling-
padded.
Similar to the centroid in k-means clustering [55], dominant-vector is not necessary
to be an actual vector in V . We will focus on the ceiling padding method in the rest of
the chapter. When no ambiguity is possible, we will not distinguish between vector-set,
vector-action set, ﬂow-vector, and vector-sequence.
5.3.2 The SVSD and SVMD Cases
In the SVSD case, there is only a single ﬂow in each ﬂow-vector of the vector-set.
Therefore, we only need to modify the vector-set by increasing the value of some ﬂows to
form padding groups. The padding problem can be formally deﬁned as follows.
Problem 5.1 (SVSD Problem) Given a vector-action set VA and the corresponding vector-
set V and action-set A, the privacy property k ≤ |V |, ﬁnd a partition P VA on VA such that
the corresponding partition on V , denoted as P V = {P1, P2, . . . , Pm}, satisﬁes
- ∀(i ∈ [1,m]), |Pi| ≥ k;
- The padding cost
∑m
i=1(dom(Pi)× |Pi|) is minimal. 
In the SVMD case, there are more than one ﬂows in each ﬂow-vector of the vector-
set. The padding problem can be deﬁned as follows:
Problem 5.2 (SVMD problem) Given a vector-action set VA and the corresponding vector-
set V (in which each ﬂow-vector includes np ﬂows) and action set A, the privacy property
k ≤|V |, ﬁnd a partition P VA on VA such that the corresponding partition on V , denoted
as P V = {P1, P2, . . . , Pm}, satisﬁes
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j=1((dom(Pi))[j])× |Pi|) is minimal. 
Theorem 5.1 shows that the above PPTP problem is intractable, and indicates that
Problem 5.2 is NP-hard even when there are only two different ﬂow values in the vector-set.




Proof: The proof follows the work in [4] for reduction from the well-known NP-
hard problem, namely, the problem of Edge Partition Into Triangles (EPIT) [54], which is
deﬁned as follows:
Given a graph G = (V,E) with |E| = 3m for some integer m, can the edges of G
be partitioned into m triangles with disjoint edges? This problem is still NP-hard even G
is simple.
For an arbitrary instance of EPIT problem (without loss of generality, the graph
is assumed to be simple), we construct a vector-action set VA with 3m pairs of (vector,
action) where the vector has |V | number of ﬂows. Concretely, for each edge uiuj ∈ E,
to which ui and uj are incident, we create a (v, a) pair in VA such that the two ﬂows in
v corresponding to ui and uj have zb′s and all the other ﬂows have za′s (each vertex is
bijectively mapped to a ﬂow in the ﬂow-vector denoted by the subscript), where za and zb
are two positive integers and za < zb. Obviously, this reduction works in polynomial time
O(3mn). Note that padding is represented here by modifying za′s in some ﬂows to be zb′s,
and correspondingly, the cost is shown by the total number of za′s which is changed to zb′s.
Now we show that the cost of optimal solution for Problem 5.2 is at most 3m if and
only if E in G can be partitioned into a collection of m disjoint triangles.
Suppose that there exists a partition of edges in G for EPIT. Consider any triangle
with vertexes ui,uj and ul, and edges uiuj , ujul and ului. Observe that, by modifying the
l, i, and j ﬂows from za to zb respectively in the corresponding (v, a) pairs, we obtain a
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group in size 3 with identical ﬂow-vectors. Consequently, we get a solution to Problem 5.2
with cost 3m.
Conversely, suppose that there is a 3-indistinguishability solution for Problem 5.2
of cost at most 3m. Since G is simple, any two pairs in VA are different in at least 2 ﬂows
(in the case that the corresponding edges in G share one common vertex). Consequently,
to make two pairs have identical ﬂow-vector values, we should at least modify one ﬂow
from za to zb for each (v, a) pair. Therefore, the solution cost is exactly 3m and each pair
is padded exactly one ﬂow.
Since the solution satisﬁes 3-indistinguishability, any group in VA should be in size
at least 3. Observe that, for any group with size larger than 3, any of its pairs will have at
least two ﬂows which are za and at least one other pair in the group has value zb. In other
words, in any such group, each pair should be at least padded two ﬂows. Thus, each group
has exactly three pairs. The only possibility is that the corresponding edges for the tuples
in each group composes a triangle.
Besides, a given solution of Problem 5.2 can be veriﬁed in polynomial time whether
it satisﬁes k-indistinguishability and the cost is less than a given value or not.
Note that, at ﬁrst glance, the SVMD problem may resemble the problem of k-means
clustering [55]. However, algorithms for k-means clustering cannot be directly applied
to our problem due to following differences between these two problems. First, k-means
clustering needs to partition a multiset into k groups, whereas in our problem, the minimal
size of each group must be at least k. Second, k-means clustering is to minimize the within-
cluster sum of squares, while our problem is to minimize the total distance between each
of the ﬂow-vectors and the dominant-vector.
5.3.3 MVMD Problem
As mentioned in Section 5.2.3, by correlating ﬂow-vectors in the vector-sequence,
an eavesdropper may reﬁne his guesses of the actual action-sequence. We ﬁrst discuss the
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challenges of trafﬁc padding in such cases by observing the trafﬁc for the sequence of two
keystrokes as shown in Table 5.2.
Example 5.4 To revisit Table 5.2, suppose an eavesdropper has observed the ﬂow for the
second keystroke. In order to preserve 2-indistinguishability with minimal padding over-
head, one algorithm may partition the 16 cells into eight groups such that the size of each
group is not less than 2, and assume that the queried strings (a)c and (c)a form one group.
When the eavesdropper observes that the ﬂow for the second keystroke is 501, she cannot
determine whether the queried string is (a)c or (c)a.
However, suppose the eavesdropper also observes the ﬂow corresponding to the
ﬁrst keystroke, she can determine that the ﬁrst keystroke is either (a) or (c) when the ﬂow
is 509 or 502, respectively. Consequentially, she can eventually infer the queried string by
combining these observations. 
One seemingly valid solution is padding the ﬂow-vector for each keystroke so that
2-indistinguishability is satisﬁed separately for each keystroke. Unfortunately, this will fail
to satisfy 2-indistinguishability. To pad trafﬁc for the ﬁrst keystroke, the optimal solution
is to partition {509, 504, 502, 516} into two padding groups, {502, 504} and {509, 516}.
However, when the eavesdropper observes the ﬂow corresponding to the ﬁrst keystroke,
he/she can still determine it must be either (a) or (c) when the size is 516 or 504, respec-
tively, because only when the ﬁrst keystroke starts with (a) or (c) can the ﬂow for second
keystroke be padded to 501. Therefore, the eavesdropper will eliminate (b) and (d) from
possible guesses, which violates 2-indistinguishability.
Another seemingly viable solution is to ﬁrst collect all vector-sequences for the
sequence of keystrokes and then pad them such that the current input string as a whole
cannot be distinguished from at least k− 1 others. Unfortunately, such an approach cannot
guarantee the privacy property, either. First, the auto-suggestion feature requires the server
to immediately respond to the client upon each single keystroke. Second, when receiving a
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single keystroke, the server cannot predict what would be the next input and hence cannot
decide which padding option is suitable. For example, suppose the ﬂow corresponding to
(a) in (a)c should be padded to 509, while in (a)b to 516. When the server receives (a), it
cannot determine whether to pad (a) to 509 or to 516.
The discussed challenges mainly arise due to the approach of padding each vector-
set independently. We now propose a different approach. Intuitively, the partitioning of
a vector-set corresponding to each action will respect the partitioning results of all the
previous actions in the same action-sequence. More precisely, the padding of different
vector-sets is correlated based on the following two conditions.
- Given two t-sized vector-sequences v1 and v2, any preﬁx pre(v1, i) and pre(v2, i)(i ∈
[2, t]), can be padded together only if ∀(j < i), pre(v1, j) and pre(v2, j) are padded
together.
- For any two t-sized action-sequences a1 and a2 and corresponding vector-sequences
v1 and v2, if pre(a1, i) = pre(a2, i)(i ∈ [1, t]), then pre(v1, i) and pre(v2, i) must be
padded together.
Once a partition satisﬁes these conditions, no matter how an eavesdropper analyzes
trafﬁc information, either for an action alone or combining multiple observations of pre-
vious actions, the mental image about the actual action-sequence remains the same. Due
to the similarity between the conditions and a related concept in graph theory, we call a
partition satisfying such conditions the oriented-forest partition.
Problem 5.3 (MVMD problem) Given a vector-action set VA = (VA1, VA2, . . . , VAt)
where VAi = (Vi, Ai) (i ∈ [1, t]), the privacy property k ≤ |Vt|, ﬁnd the partition P VAi on
VAi such that the corresponding partition P Vi = {P i1, P i2, . . . , P imi} on Vi satisﬁes
- ∀((i ∈ [1, t− 1]) ∧ (j ∈ [1,mi]))⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
|P ij | ≥ k, if (|Vi| ≥ k),
|P i1| = |Vi|, if (|Vi| < k);
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- ∀(j ∈ [1,mt]), |P tj | ≥ k;
- The sequence of P Vi is an oriented-forest partition;
- The total padding cost of P Vi (i ∈ [1, t]) is minimal. 
Obviously, Problem 5.3 is also NP-complete when k ≥ 3 since Problem 5.2 is
special case of Problem 5.3.
5.4 The Algorithms
In this section, we design three algorithms for partitioning the vector-action set into
padding groups to satisfy a given privacy requirement. Our intention is not to design an
exhaustive list of solutions but rather to demonstrate the existence of abundant possibilities
in approaching this PPTP issue. Note that when the cardinality of vector-action set is
less than the privacy property k, there is no solution to satisfy the privacy property. In such
cases, our algorithms will simply exit, which will not be explicitly shown in each algorithm
hereafter.
5.4.1 The svsdSimple Algorithm
The main intention of presenting the svsdSimple algorithm is to show that, when
applying k-indistinguishability to PPTP problems, an algorithm may sometimes be devised
in a very straightforward way, and yet achieve a dramatic reduction in costs when compared
to existing approaches (as shown in the Section 5.6).
The svsdSimple algorithm shown in Table 5.5 basically attempts to minimize the
cardinality of padding groups in the SVSD case. More speciﬁcally, svsdSimple ﬁrst sorts
the single ﬂow in the ﬂow-vector into a non-decreasing order of the ﬂows, and then selects
k pairs of (ﬂow-vector, action) each time in that order to form a padding group. This is
repeated until the number of pairs is less than k. The remainder of pairs is simply appended
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to the last padding group. The computational complexity is O(nlogn) where n = |VA|,
since step 2 costs O(nlogn) time and each pair is considered once for the remaining steps.
Algorithm svsdSimple
Input: a vector-action set VA, the privacy property k;
Output: the partition P VA of VA;
Method:
1. Let P VA = ∅;
2. Let SVA be the sequence of VA in a non-decreasing order of V ;




4. For i = 0 to N − 2




6. Create partition Pi on P VA;
7. Create PN−1 =
⋃|SVA|
j=(N−1)×k+1(S
VA[j]) on P VA;
8. Return P VA;
Table 5.5: The svsdSimple Algorithm for SVSD-Problem
5.4.2 The svmdGreedy Algorithm
The svmdGreedy algorithm, which aims at both SVSD and SVMD problems, is
shown in Table 5.6. Roughly speaking, the svmdGreedy recursively divides the padding
group Pi in P VA, where |Pi| ≥ 2 × k, into two padding groups Pi1 and Pi2 until the
cardinality of any padding group in P VA is less than 2 × k. When svmdGreedy splits a
padding group Pi(VAi) into two, these resultant padding groups, Pi1 and Pi2, must satisfy
that (Pi1 ∪Pi2 = Pi) ∧ (Pi1 ∩Pi2 = ∅) ∧ (|Pi1| ≥ k) ∧ (|Pi2| ≥ k). Obviously, there must
exist many solutions of Pi1 and Pi2. svmdGreedy limits the optimizing process insides a
subset of possible solutions as follows. For each ﬂow, svmdGreedy ﬁrst sorts the ﬂow-
vectors in non-decreasing order of that ﬂow, then splits Pi into Pi1 and Pi2 at position pos
in the sorted sequence where (pos ∈ [k, |Pi| − k]). There are totally (np × (|Pi| − 2× k))
possible solutions for all ﬂows in the ﬂow-vector, where np is the number of ﬂows in ﬂow-
vector. SvmdGreedy ﬁnally selects the one with minimal padding cost among this set of
solutions. Clearly, this algorithm can solve SVSD-problem when np is set to be 1.
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Algorithm svmdGreedy
Input: a vector-action set VA, the privacy property k;
Output: the partition P VA of VA;
Method:
1. If(|VA| < 2× k)
2. Create in P VA the VA;
3. Return;
4. Let np be the number of ﬂows in ﬂow-vector;
5. For p = 1 to np
6. Let SVAp be the sequence of VA in the non-decreasing order of
the pth ﬂow in the ﬂow-vector;
7. For i = k to |SVAp | − k
8. Let costp,i as the cost when SVp is split at position i;
9. Let costp be a pair (c, i) where c is the minimal in (costp,i) and
i is the corresponding position;
10.Let cost be a triple (c, p, i) where c is the minimal in c of
costp(p ∈ [1, np]), and p and i are the corresponding p and i;
11. Split SVAcost.p into VA1 and VA2 at position cost.i;
12.Return svmdGreedy(VA1);
13.Return svmdGreedy(VA2);
Table 5.6: The svmdGreedy Algorithm For SVMD-Problem
The svmdGreedy algorithm has an O(np × n2) time complexity in the worst case
(each time, the algorithm splits Pi into k-size Pi1 and (|Pi| − k)-size Pi2), and O(np× n×
logn) in average cases (each time, the algorithm halves Pi), where n = |VA|.
5.4.3 The mvmdGreedy Algorithm
Both svsdSimple and svmdGreedy algorithms tackle cases where each action-sequence
consists of a single action (correspondingly, each vector-sequence consists of a single ﬂow-
vector). Our intention now in devising the mvmdGreedy is to demonstrate how the two
conditions mentioned in Section 5.3.3 facilitate the algorithm design. In this algorithm,
we extend PPDP solutions to a sequence of inter-dependent vector-action sets. The only
constraint in partitioning vector-action set VAi is to ensure all ﬂow-vectors in a padding
group should have their preﬁx in an identical padding group of VAi−1.
The mvmdGreedy algorithm for MVMD-Problem is shown in Table 5.7. Roughly
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speaking, mvmdGreedy partitions each vector-action set in the sequence in the given order,
each for the ﬂow-vector corresponding to an action in an action-sequence. More specif-
ically, mvmdGreedy applies svmdGreedy to partition the ﬁrst vector-action set in the se-
quence. For each remaining vector-action set VAi, mvmdGreedy ﬁrst partitions it into
|P VAi−1| number of padding groups based on the adjacent-preﬁx of the ﬂow-vectors, and
then applies svmdGreedy to further partition these padding groups.
Algorithm mvmdGreedy
Input: a t-size sequence D of vector-action sets, the privacy property k;
Output: the partition PD of D;
Method:
1. Let D = (VA1, VA2, . . . , VAt);
2. Let P 1 = svmdGreedy(VA1, k);
3. For each (w ∈ [1, |P 1|]), assign group G1w ∈ P 1 a unique gid = w;
4. For i = 2 to t
5. Create in P i |P i−1| number of empty groups Giw(w ∈ [1, |Pi−1|]);
6. For each via in VAi
7. Let w be the gid of the group Gi−1w in P i−1 that the preﬁx of
via in VAi−1 belongs to;
8. Insert via into Giw;
9. For each (w ∈ [1, |P i−1|])
10. P i = (P i \Giw) ∪ svmdGreedy(Giw, k);
11. For each (w ∈ [1, |P i|]), assign group Giw ∈ P i a unique gid = w;
12.Return PD = {P i : 1 ≤ i ≤ t};
Table 5.7: The mvmdGreedy Algorithm For MVMD-Problem
Similarly, the mvmdGreedy also has an O(np × n2) time complexity in the worst
case (each time, the algorithm splits VAi into k-size VAi1 and (|VAi| − k)-size VAi2), and
O(np × n × logn) in average cases (each time, the algorithm halves VA), where n is the
total number of ﬂow-vectors in those vector-sets.
5.5 Extension to l-Diversity
In previous discussion, we implicitly assume that each action in an action-set is
equally likely to occur. However, in real life, each action is not necessary to have equal
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probability to be performed. In this section, we discuss an extension to our model to further
demonstrate that many existing PPDP concepts may be adapted to address PPTP issues.
Speciﬁcally, we adapt the l-diversity [77] concept to address cases where not all actions
should be treated equally in padding (for example, some statistical information regarding
the likelihood of different inputs may be publicly known).
5.5.1 The Model
We ﬁrst assign an integer weight to each action to catch the information about its
occurrence probability among the action-set that it belongs to. The reason for assigning
weight instead is due to the utilization of such as access counter for visit statistics in most
applications.
Deﬁnition 5.10 (Weight-Set) Given an action-set Ai, the weight-set Wi is deﬁned as the
collection of integer weights associated with the actions in that action-set.
Deﬁnition 5.11 (Occurrence Probability) Given an action-setA and corresponding weight-




Example 5.5 To revisit Example 5.1, given the action-set A1 = {a11, a21}, assume that the
weight for a11 = b and a21 = c are 20 and 5 respectively (clearly, in practice the value of
weight should be assigned based on the characteristics of applications). Then, the weight-
set is W1 = {20, 5}. Moreover, in action-set A1, the occurrence probability of b and c is
20
20+5
= 80% and 5
20+5
= 20%, respectively. 
Then we slightly change the deﬁnition of vector-action set to accommodate the
weight information. Since SVSD and SVMD are special cases of MVMD, w.l.o.g., we
only redeﬁne the concept for MVMD.
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Deﬁnition 5.12 (Vector-Action-Weight Set) Given t action-sets {Ai : 1 ≤ i ≤ t}, and
the corresponding weight-sets {Wi : 1 ≤ i ≤ t} and vector-sets {Vi : 1 ≤ i ≤ t}, the
vector-action-weight set VAW is the collection of sets {{(v, a, w) : v ∈ Vi ∧ a ∈ Ai ∧w ∈
Wi} : 1 ≤ i ≤ t}.
Example 5.6 Following Example 5.5, given the action-set A1 = {b, c}, weight-set W1 =
{20, 5} and vector-set V1 = {544, 554}, the corresponding vector-action-weight set is
VAW1={(544, b, 20), (554, c, 5)}. 
We regard weight information as an additional information about the action, there-
fore, the mapping from PPTP to PPDP is consistent with what has been discussed before.
Deﬁnition 5.13 applies l-diversity to quantify the amount of privacy protection under a
given vector-action-weight set.
Deﬁnition 5.13 (l-Diversity) Given a vector-action set VAW , we deﬁne
- a padding group as any S ⊆ VAW satisfying that all the pairs in S have identical
ﬂow-vectors and no S ′ ⊃ S can satisfy this property, and
- we say VAW satisﬁes l-diversity (l is an integer) or VAW is l-diverse if the occur-
rence probability of any action in any padding group is no greater than 1
l
.









, VAW1 does not satisfy 2-diversity. 
5.5.2 The Problem
With the revised deﬁnitions, we now formulate the diversity problems, namely,
SVSD-Diversity, SVMD-Diversity, and MVMD-Diversity, for the SVSD case, SVMD
case, and MVMD case, respectively. Clearly, the main difference between the l-diversity
problems and aforementioned k-indistinguishability problems is the condition on the padding
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group. That is, for k-indistinguishability, the cardinality of each padding group should be at
least k, whereas, for l-diversity, the maximal occurrence probability of each group should
be at most 1
l
, as demonstrated by Problem 5.4 for MVMD case.
Problem 5.4 (MVMD-Diversity Problem) Given a vector-action-weight set VAW = (VAW1,





, ﬁnd the partition P VAWi on V AWi such that the corresponding partitions
PAi = {PAi1 , PAi2 , . . . , PAimi} on Ai and P Vi = {P Vi1 , P Vi2 , . . . , P Vimi} on Vi satisfy


















- ∀(j ∈ [1,mt]), max
a∈PAtj




- The sequence of P Vi is an oriented-forest partition;
- The total padding cost of P Vi (i ∈ [1, t]) after applying ceiling padding is minimal.

Observe that when the weights of all actions in any VAWi are set to be identical, and
l = k, Problem 5.4 is simpliﬁed to Problem 5.3. Informally, Problem 5.4 is at least as hard
as Problem 5.3.
Although l-diversity in PPTP shares the same spirit with that in PPDP, algorithms for
l-diversity in PPDP cannot be directly applied to our PPTP problems due to the following
main difference between these two problems. In PPDP, there are many tuples with same
sensitive values in the micro-data table, while in our problem, the action in an action-set is
not duplicated, and we assign a weight for each action to distinguish its possibility to be
performed by a user from other actions.
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5.5.3 The Algorithms
To facilitate the explanation, we ﬁrst present the svsdDiversity algorithm for SVSD
case to show the essence of design ideas to satisfy l-diversity as shown in Table 5.8.
Roughly speaking, svsdDiversity algorithm ﬁrst sorts the actions in non-increasing order
of their weight values, and then among the actions with same weight, sorts them in a prede-
ﬁned order based on their ﬂow-vectors. In this algorithm, we sort them in non-increasing
order of the ﬂows (note this step aims at reducing the padding cost in the resultant group
and there must exist alternative solutions for ordering). Based on the sorted version S
of vector-action-weight set, svsdDiversity iteratively removes actions from S to construct
the padding group until S is empty. In each iteration, svsdDiversity splits the sequence S
into two l-diverse sub-sequences, Pα− and Pα+, such that the ﬁrst sub-sequence Pα− has
minimal possible cardinality.
Algorithm svsdDiversity
Input: a vector-action-weight set VAW , the privacy property l;
Output: the partition P VAW of VAW ;
Method:
1. Let P VAW = ∅;
2. Let S be the sequence of VAW in a non-increasing order of its W ;




5. Sort elements in S with same weight value
in non-increasing order of its V ;
6. While (S = ∅)
7. Let Pα− = {S[i] : i ∈ [1, α]}, Pα+ = {S[i] : i ∈ [α + 1, |S|]};
8. Let α ∈ [l, |S|] be the smallest value such that:
pr(S[1], Pα−) ≤ 1l and
(pr(S[α + 1], Pα+) ≤ 1l or Pα+ ≡ ∅)
9. Create partition Pα− on P VAW ;
10. S = Pα+;
11. Return P VAW ;
Table 5.8: The svsdDiversity Algorithm For SVSD-Diversity Case
Note that, in each iteration, the algorithm removes Pα− from S and further splits
Pα+. Before discussing the reasons, we ﬁrst introduce the undividable diverse group con-
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cept to deﬁne the padding group which can not be further split without reordering the
sequence.
Deﬁnition 5.14 (Undividable Diverse Group) Given a vector-action-weight set VAW , and
denote by S = (S[1], S[2], . . . , S[|A|]) the sequence of VAW in the non-increasing order
of its W , we say Pα− = (S[1], S[2], . . . S[α]), a sub-sequence of S, is a undividable diverse
group, if
- pr(S[1], Pα−) ≤ 1l , and
- there does not exist any integer β ∈ [1, α), such that
both pr(S[1], (S[1], . . . , S[β])) ≤ 1
l
and pr(S[β+1], (S[β+1], . . . , S[α])) ≤ 1
l
hold.
The Pα− in step 9 is a undividable diverse group by reasoning as follows. If α is the
smallest position that Pα− satisﬁes l-diversity, clearly, it cannot be further split. Otherwise,
suppose that β is the smallest position such that β < α and P1 = (S[1], S[2], . . . , S[β])
satisﬁes l-diversity, then P2 = (S[β + 1], . . . , S[α]) is not l-diverse, since based on the








Pα− at any position between β and α leads to same result, which conﬁrms the statement.
Furthermore, svsdDiversity always terminates since appending action with smaller
weight value to an l-diverse padding group will never produce a group violating l-diversity.
Therefore, each iteration will result in either two l-diverse groups or one whole sequence
together with an empty sequence.
The svsdDiversity algorithm has O(nlogn) time complexity since step 2 and step
5 cost (nlogn) time and each action is considered once for the remaining steps, where
n = |VAW |.
Then, we design svmdDiversity and mvmdDiversity algorithms for SVMD-Diversity
and MVMD-Diversity problems, respectively. Similar to svsdDiversity, svmdDiversity fol-
lows the conditions shown in step 8 in Table 5.8 to split S as shown in Table 5.9. In contrast
to svsdDiversity, svmdDiversity ﬁrst identiﬁes all possible positions of given VAW which
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satisfy the conditions for each ﬂow, and then selects the one with minimal cost among all
possible positions in all the ﬂows. The svmdDiversity has O(np×n2) in the worst case and
O(np × n× logn) in average cases.
Algorithm svmdDiversity
Input: a l-diverse vector-action-weight set VAW , the privacy property l;
Output: the partition P VAW of VAW ;
Method:
1. If(|VAW | < 2× l)
2. Create in P VAW the VAW ;
3. Return;
4. Let S be the sequence of VAW in a non-increasing order of its W ;
5. Let np be the number of ﬂows in ﬂow-vector V ;
6. For p = 1 to np
7. Sort elements in S with same weight value in non-increasing order
of the pth ﬂow in its V ;
8. Let Pαp,i− = {S[r] : r ∈ [1, αp,i]}, and
Pαp,i+ = {S[r] : r ∈ [αp,i + 1, |S|]};
9. Let Zp ⊆ {i : l ≤ i ≤ |S|} be the set of values such that:
∀(αp,i ∈ Zp), pr(S[1], Pαp,i−) ≤ 1l and
(pr(S[αp,i + 1], Pαp,i+) ≤ 1l or Pαp,i+ ≡ ∅)
10. Let αp be the value in Zp such that the cost is minimal among
all αp,i ∈ Zp when S is split at αp,i;
11. Let α ∈ {αp : p ∈ [1, np]} with the minimal cost;
12. If (Pα+ is empty)




Table 5.9: The svmdDiversity Algorithm For SVMD-Diversity Case
Similar to mvmdGreedy, mvmdDiversity ﬁrst ensures that the partitioning satisﬁes
the conditions of an oriented-forest partition (refer to Section 5.4.3 for the main idea).
There is still another complication. In mvmdGreedy, an initial padding group based on
preﬁxes certainly satisﬁes k-indistinguishability only if the set of preﬁxes satisﬁes. How-
ever, this is not the case in mvmdDiversity since a vector-action set with size larger than l
will not necessarily be a l-diverse set. To address this issue, we conﬁne the Zp in step 9 of
svmdDiversity in Table 5.9 to further satisfy that both the set formed by all sufﬁxes (refer
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to Deﬁnition 5.7) of Pαp,i− and that of Pαp,i+ are l-diverse. To facilitate the evaluation of
these two additional conditions, for each action, the algorithm can precompute the maximal
value and the summation of weight values of all its sufﬁxes. Clearly, such computation can
be an integrated part of reading inputs, and does not increase the order of computational
complexity. Thus, the mvmdDiversity algorithm has O(np × n2) time complexity in the
worst case and O(np × n × logn) in average cases (detailed algorithm descriptions are
omitted due to space limitations).
5.6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our solutions and efﬁciency through
experiments with real world Web applications. First, Section 5.6.1 discusses the imple-
mentation of our techniques. Section 5.6.2 then elaborates on the experimental settings.
Finally, Section 5.6.3, 5.6.4, and 5.6.5 present experimental results of the communication,
computation, and processing overhead, respectively.
5.6.1 Implementation Overview
In previous sections, we have presented algorithms for determining the amount of
padding for each ﬂow given the vector-action set. To incorporate our techniques into an
existing Web application requires following three steps. First, gather information about
possible action-sequences and corresponding vector-sequences in the application. Second,
feed the vector-action sets into our algorithms to calculate the desired amount of padding.
Third, implement the padding according to the calculated sizes. The main difference be-
tween implementing an existing method (such as rounding) and ceiling padding lies in the
second stage. Thus, we have focused on this stage in this chapter. Nonetheless, we will also
brieﬂy describe how to collect the vector-action sets in Section 5.6.2 and how to facilitate
the third stage in Section 5.6.5.
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One may question the practicality of gathering information about possible action-
sequences since the number of such sequences can be very large. However, we believe it is
practical for most Web applications due to following three facts. First, the aforementioned
side-channel attack on web applications typically arises due to highly interactive features,
such as auto-suggestion. The very existence of such features implies that the application
designer has already proﬁled the domain of possible inputs (that is, action-sequences) for
implementing the feature. Therefore, such information must already exist in certain forms
and can be easily extracted at a low cost. Second, even though a Web application may take
inﬁnite number of inputs, this does not necessarily mean there would be inﬁnite action-
sequences. For example, a search engine will no longer provide auto-suggestion feature
once the query string exceeds a certain length. Third, all the three steps mentioned above
could be part of the off-line processing, and would only need to be repeated when the Web
application undergoes a redesign.
Note that implementing an existing padding method, such as rounding, will also
need to go through the above three steps if only the padding cost is to be optimized. For
example, without collecting and analyzing the vector-action sets, a rounding method cannot
effectively select the optimal rounding parameter.
5.6.2 Experimental Setting
We collect testing vector-action sets from four real-world web applications, two
popular search engines engineB and engineC (where users’ searching keyword needs to
be protected) and two authoritative information systems, drugB for drugs and patentC
for patents, from two national institutes (where users’ health information and company’s
patent interest need to be protected, respectively). Such data can be collected by acting as a
normal user of the applications without having to know internal details of the applications.
For our experiment, these data are collected using separate programs whose efﬁciency is
not our main concern in this chapter.
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We observe that the ﬂows of drugB and patentC are more diverse and larger than
those of engineB and engineC evidenced by the standard deviations (σ) and the means (μ)
of the ﬂows, respectively. Besides, the ﬂows of drugB, patentC are much more disparate
in values than those of engineB, engineC . Later we will show the effect of these different
characteristics of ﬂows on the costs.
All experiments are conducted on a PC with 2.20GHz Duo CPU and 4GB memory.
We evaluate the overhead of computation, communication, and processing using execution
time, padding cost ratio, and processing cost ratio, respectively. Speciﬁcally, for each
application, we ﬁrst obtain the total size of all ﬂows ttl for all possible actions before
padding, and then compute the padding cost cost as shown in Deﬁnition 5.5 after padding.
The padding cost ratio is formulated as cost
ttl
. We also count the number of ﬂows which
need to be padded, and then formulate the processing cost ratio as the percent of ﬂows to
be padded among all ﬂows. Clearly, given the interval Δ for random padding, theoretically
the padding and processing cost ratio equal to Δ
2×ttl and 1− 1Δ respectively. Thus, we omit
the comparison with it through the experiments.
To facilitate comparison, we use the engineB and drugB sets to compare the over-
heads for k-indistinguishability against an existing padding method, namely, packet-size
rounding (simply rounding) [22], and the engineC and patentC sets to compare those for
l-diversity against the other, namely, maximizing (a naive solution which pads each to be
maximal size in the corresponding ﬂow). For rounding, we set the rounding parameter
Δ=512 and Δ=5120 for engineB and drugB, respectively. Note that these Δ values just
lead to results satisfying 5-indistinguishability in the padded data, and are adapted only for
the comparison purpose. For l-diversity, we assign each action a uniformly random inte-
ger in a given range as its weight value (default [1, 50]). Note that our algorithms ensure
the privacy for l-diverse vector-action sets and report exception for other sets regardless of
the distribution and values of weights, and in real-life, the weight value could be assigned
based on such as statistical results.
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5.6.3 Communication Overhead
We ﬁrst evaluate the communication overhead of our algorithms in the case of
length-one action-sequences. In such cases, the svmdGreedy and svmdDiversity algorithms
are equivalent to mvmdGreedy and mvmdDiversity, respectively. To apply the svsdSimple,
svsdDiversity algorithms, we generate four vector-action sets by synthesizing the ﬂow-
vectors for the last action of the four collected sets.
For k-indistinguishability, ﬁgure 5.2(a) shows padding cost of each algorithm against
k. Compared to rounding [22], our algorithms have less padding cost, while svmdGreedy
incurs signiﬁcantly less cost than that of rounding.











































Figure 5.2: Padding Cost Overhead Ratio (k-Indistinguishability)
For l-diversity, ﬁgure 5.3(a) shows padding cost of each algorithm against l. From
the results, the padding costs of our algorithms are signiﬁcantly less than that of maximiz-
ing. We observe that our algorithms are superior specially when the number of ﬂow-vectors
in a vector-action set is larger since our algorithms have high possibility to partition the
ﬂow-vectors with close value into padding group.
We then compare our algorithms with existing methods in the case of action-sequences
of lengths larger than one. Figure 5.2(b) and 5.3(b) show padding costs of our mvmdGreedy
and the rounding algorithm against k, and our mvmdDiversity and the maximizing algo-
rithm against l, respectively. Rounding and maximizing incur larger padding cost than
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Figure 5.3: Padding Cost Overhead Ratio (l-Diversity)
mvmdGreedy and mvmdDiversity in all cases. For example, the padding cost ratio of max-
imizing for patentC is prohibitively high as 418%, which is 140 times higher than that
of mvmdDiversity when l=64. The reason for mvmdGreedy, mvmdDiversity algorithms
have more padding cost in the case of many-level action than in one-level is as follows.
In many-level action, these algorithms ﬁrst partition each vector-action set (except VA1)
into padding groups based on the preﬁx of actions and regardless of the values of ﬂow-
vectors. Besides, the further ordering by the weight in mvmdDiversity results in slightly
more overhead than mvmdGreedy when l = k.
5.6.4 Computational Overhead
We ﬁrst study the computation time of our mvmdGreedy andmvmdDiversity against
the ﬂow data cardinality n as shown in Figure 5.4(a) and 5.5(a). We generate n-sized
ﬂow data by synthesizing n∑
i(|VAi|) copies of the four collected vector-action sets. We set
k(l) = 160 for this set of experiments, and conduct each experiment 1000 times and then
take the average.
As the results show, our algorithms are practically efﬁcient (1.2s and 0.98s for
2.7m ﬂow-vectors for mvmdGreedy and mvmdDiversity, respectively) and the computa-
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(a) Flow Data Cardinality




















Figure 5.4: Execution Time in Seconds (k-Indistinguishability)
tion time increases slowly with n, although our algorithms require slightly more overhead
than rounding (when it is applied to a single Δ value) and maximizing. However, this is
partly at the expense of worse performance in terms of padding cost. Note that the slight
reduction of execution time observed in Figure 5.5(a) for patentC at 32× |patentC | is
reasonable since: ﬁrst, the cardinality of each initial padding group based on the adjacent-
preﬁxes may be smaller, which leads to less accumulated sorting time. Second, doubling
the size of vector-action sets may result in less execution time based on the complexity in
the average and worst cases (2nlog2n < n2).
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Figure 5.5: Execution Time in Seconds (l-Diversity)
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We then study computation time against privacy property k on the two synthesized
vector-action sets (6×engineB and 64×drugB), and against l on the other two sets (6×
engineC and 64×patentC). As expected, rounding and maximizing are insensitive to k
and l since they do not have the concept of k and l, respectively. On the other hand, a
tighter upper bound on the time required for mvmdGreedy is O(np×n× 2k×λ) in the
worse case and O(np×n× log(2k×λ)) in the average case, where λ is the maximal number
of actions which has the same preﬁx in all action-sequences. Clearly, when λ is O(n), the
computational complexity here is equivalent to that in Section 5.4.3.
The reason for this tighter upper bound is that mvmdGreedy always feeds a vector-
action set with maximal 2k×λ cardinality to svmdGreedy (except VA1 whose size is 26,
a constant, for searchB), since: ﬁrst, for each vector-action set VAi, mvmdGreedy ﬁrst
partitions it into padding groups based on the preﬁx (which hasO(|VAi|) solution). Second,
there are at most 2k adjacent-preﬁxes in same padding group of VAi−1. Therefore, when
2k×λ n, the execution time of mvmdGreedy should be in the range of [log(2k×λ), 2k×λ]
times of O(np×n) which is the execution time of rounding algorithm. These two datasets in
our experimental environment satisfy above condition, for example, 26(λ)×320(k)2.7m
for searchB. Observe that, mvmdDiversity does not satisfy the tighter upper bound since a
vector-action set with size larger than 2l probably cannot be split into two l-diverse subsets.
Figure 5.4(b) illustrates the computation time of mvmdGreedy against the privacy
property k. Interestingly, the computation time increases slowly (from 1.19s to 1.42s) with
k for engineB, and decreases slowly (from 0.147s to 0.136s) for drugB. Stress that the
results are reasonable since both results fall within the expected range. Figure 5.5(b) shows
that the computational time of mvmdDiversity increases slowly with l for patentC , and is
almost same for different l in the case of engineC .
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5.6.5 Processing Overhead
Our previous discussions have focused on reducing the communication overhead
of padding while ensuring each ﬂow-vector to satisfy the desired privacy property. To
implement trafﬁc padding in an existing Web application, if the HTTPS header or data
is compressed, we can pad after compression, and pad to the header; if header and data
are not compressed, we can pad to the data itself (e.g., spaces of required padding bytes
can be appended to textual data). Clearly, the browser’s TCP/IP stack is responsible for
the header padding, while the original web applications regard the data padding as normal
data. An application can choose to incorporate the padding at different stage of processing
a request. First, an application can consult the outputs of our algorithms for each request
and then pad the ﬂow-vectors on the ﬂy. Second, an application can modify the original
data beforehand based on the outputs of our algorithms such that the privacy property is
satisﬁed under the modiﬁcations. However, padding may incur a processing cost regardless
of which approach to be taken. Therefore, we must aim to minimize the number of packets
to be padded. For this purpose, we evaluate the processing cost ratio, which captures the
proportion of ﬂow-vectors to be padded among all such vectors.






























Figure 5.6: Processing Cost Overhead Ratio (k-Indistinguishability)
Figure 5.6 shows the processing cost of each algorithm against k. Rounding al-
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gorithm must pad each ﬂow-vector regardless of the k’s and the applications, while our
algorithms have much less cost for engineB and slightly less for drugB.
Similarly, from the results of the processing cost against l shown in Figure 5.7, we
can see that maximizing algorithm almost pads each ﬂow-vector regardless of the l’s and
the applications, while our algorithms have much less cost for engineC and slightly less
for patentC .






























Figure 5.7: Processing Cost Overhead Ratio (l-Diversity)
5.7 Summary
As Web-based applications become more popular, their security issues will also
attract more attention. In this chapter, we have demonstrated an interesting connection
between the trafﬁc padding issue of Web applications and the privacy-preserving data pub-
lishing. Based on this connection, we have proposed a formal model for quantifying the
amount of privacy protection provided by trafﬁc padding solutions. We have also designed
algorithms by following the proposed model. Our experiments with real-world applications
have conﬁrmed the performance of our solutions to be superior to existing ones in terms of




Resistant Trafﬁc Padding for Privacy
Preserving in Web Applications
The solutions in the previous chapter rely on the assumption that adversaries do
not possess prior background knowledge about possible user inputs, which is a common
limitation shared by most existing solutions. In this chapter, we propose a novel random
ceiling padding approach whose results are resistant to such adversarial knowledge.
6.1 Overview
Today’s Web applications allow users to enjoy the convenience of Software as a
Service (SaaS) through their feature-rich and highly interactive user interfaces. However,
recent studies show that such features may also render Web applications vulnerable to side
channel attacks, which employ observable information, such as a sequence of directional
packet sizes and timing, to recover sensitive user inputs from encrypted trafﬁc [22]. Intrin-
sic characteristics of Web applications, including low entropy inputs, diverse resource ob-
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jects, and stateful communications render such attacks a pervasive and fundamental threat
in the age of cloud computing.
Existing countermeasures include packet-size rounding (increasing the size of each
packet up to the closest multiple of given bytes) and random padding (increasing each
packet size up to a random value). Those straightforward approaches have been shown to
incur a high overhead and require application-speciﬁc implementation, while still not being
able to provide sufﬁcient privacy guarantee [22]. A more recent solution, ceiling padding,
inspired by similar approaches in privacy-preserving data publication, partitions packets
into padding groups and increases the size of every packet inside a group to the maximum
size within that group in order to provide required privacy guarantee [71]. However, an
important limitation shared by most existing solutions is that they assume adversaries do
not possess any background knowledge about possible user inputs; the privacy guarantee
may cease to exist when such knowledge allows adversaries to reﬁne their guesses of the
user inputs.
A natural way to address the above issue is to apply the well-known concept of
differential privacy [40], which provides provable resistance to adversaries’ background
knowledge. Nonetheless, applying differential privacy to trafﬁc padding will meet a few
practical challenges. Speciﬁcally, introducing noises is more suitable for statistical aggre-
gates (e.g., COUNT) or their variants, which have more predictable, and relatively small
sensitivity; it is less applicable to trafﬁc padding which has less predictable and often un-
bounded sensitivity (due to diverse resource objects), and individual packets’ sizes, instead
of their statistical aggregates, are directly observable. Moreover, while the qualitative sig-
niﬁcance of the privacy parameter  is well understood in the literature, the exact quanti-
tative link between this value and the degree of privacy guarantee is what an application
provider would need to convince users about the level of privacy guarantee, which has re-
ceived less attention. Therefore, the discussion of differential privacy is beyond the scope
of this chapter and is regarded as a future direction.
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In this chapter, we propose a novel random ceiling padding approach to providing
background knowledge-resistant privacy guarantee to Web applications. We ﬁrst adopt an
information theoretic approach to modeling a padding algorithm’s resistance to adversaries’
prior knowledge about possible user inputs. Armed with this new uncertainty privacy met-
ric, we then design a generic scheme for introducing randomness into the previously de-
terministic process of forming padding groups. Roughly speaking, the scheme makes a
random choice among all the valid ways for forming padding groups to satisfy the privacy
requirement. Consequently, an adversary would still face sufﬁcient uncertainty even if s/he
can exclude certain number of possible inputs to reﬁne his/her guesses of the true input.
We show that our proposed scheme may be instantiated in distinct ways to meet different
applications’ requirements by discussing two examples of such instantiation. Finally, we
conﬁrm the correctness (the algorithms provide sufﬁcient privacy guarantee) and perfor-
mance (the padding and processing cost), through both theoretic analysis and experiments
with two real world Web applications.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, the proposed random ceiling
padding approach may lead to practical solutions for protecting user privacy in real-life
Web applications. As evidenced by our experimental results, the two padding algorithms
instantiated from the generic approach can provide required privacy guarantee with reason-
able costs. Second, although we have focused on the trafﬁc padding issue in this chapter,
similar principles can be readily applied in other domains, such as privacy preserving data
publication [47], in order to enhance syntactic privacy metrics [77, 90] with the capability
of resisting adversarial background knowledge.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The remainder of this section builds
intuitions through a running example. Section 6.2 deﬁnes our models. Section 6.3 intro-
duces a generic scheme and instantiates it into two concrete padding methods. Section 6.4
presents analysis on the privacy, costs, and complexity. Section 6.5 experimentally evalu-
ates the performance of our algorithms. We conclude the chapter in Section 6.6.
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Motivating Example
Consider a ﬁctitious website which, upon the login of a user, displays information
about the disease with which s/he is most recently associated. Table 6.1 shows a toy exam-
ple of sizes and directions of encrypted packets for the diseases starting with the letter C.
Clearly, the ﬁxed patterns of directional sizes of the ﬁrst, second, and last packets will allow
an adversary to pinpoint packets corresponding to different diseases from the observed traf-
ﬁc. In this example, if an adversary observes a s-byte value to be 360 when a patient logins,
s/he can infer that the patient was likely diagnosed Cancer (note this example is simpliﬁed
to facilitate discussions, and the trafﬁc pattern may be more complicated in reality).
Diseases Observed Directional Packet Sizes
Cancer 801 →, ← 54, ← 360, 60 →
Cervicitis 801 →, ← 54, ← 290, 60 →
Cold 801 →, ← 54, ← 290, 60 →
Cough 801 →, ← 54, ← 290, 60 →
(s bytes)
Table 6.1: User Inputs and Corresponding Packet Sizes
We now examine two existing solutions, rounding [22] and ceiling padding [71],
when applied to this example. Both solutions aim to pad packets such that each packet size
will no longer map to a unique disease. In this example, we should pad s-byte such that
each packet size maps to at least k = 2 different diseases, namely, 2-indistinguishability.
In Table 6.2, the third column shows that a larger rounding size does not necessarily lead
to more privacy, since rounding with Δ=112 and 176 cannot achieve privacy (the s-value
of Cancer after padding is still unique), whereas Δ = 144 does. Therefore, we may be
forced to evaluate many Δ values before ﬁnding an optimal solution, which is clearly an
impractical solution.
Next, the last column in Table 6.2 shows that the ceiling padding approach [71]
achieves 2-indistinguishability. When an adversary observes a 360-byte packet, s/he can
only infer that the patient has either Cancer or Cervicitis, but cannot be sure which is true.
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Diseases s Value Rounding (Δ) Ceiling
112 144 176 Padding
Cancer 360 448 432 528 360
Cervicitis 290 336 432 352 360
Cold 290 336 432 352 290
Cough 290 336 432 352 290
Padding Overhead(%) 18.4% 40.5% 28.8% 5.7%
Table 6.2: Rounding and Ceiling Padding for Table 6.1
However, if the adversary happens to also possess some background knowledge through
outbound channels that, say, this particular patient is a male, then it is obvious now that the
patient must have Cancer.
In this chapter, we will adopt a different approach to trafﬁc padding. Instead of de-
terministically forming padding groups, the server randomly (at uniform, in this example)
selects one out of the three possible ways for forming a padding group. Therefore, we





probability to receive a 290-byte and 360-byte packet, respectively,
as shown in Table 6.3.











Table 6.3: Proposed Solution for Table 6.1
To see why this approach provides better privacy guarantee, suppose an adversary
observes a 360-byte packet and knows the patient to be a male. Under the above new
approach, the adversary can no longer be sure that the patient has Cancer, because the
following three cases will equally likely lead to a 360-byte packet to be observed. First,
the patient has Cancer and the server selects either Cervicitis, Cold, or Cough to form
the padding group. In the second and third case, the patient has either Cold or Cough,
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respectively, while the server selects Cancer to form the padding group. Consequently, the
adversary now can only be 60%, instead of 100%, sure that the patient is associated with
Cancer.
6.2 The Model
We ﬁrst describe our trafﬁc padding model in Section 6.2.1. We then introduce
the concept of uncertainty in Section 6.2.2 and the random ceiling padding method in
Section 6.2.3. Finally we deﬁne our cost metrics in Section 6.2.4. Table 6.4 lists our main
notations.
a, a, Ai or A Action, action-sequence, action-set
si, v, v, Vi or V Flow, ﬂow-vector, vector-sequence, vector-set
VAi or VA Vector-action set
VA Vector-action sequence
dom(P ) Dominant-Vector
Table 6.4: The Notation Table
6.2.1 Trafﬁc Padding
We model the trafﬁc padding issue from two perspectives, the interaction between
users and servers, and the observation made by adversaries. For the interaction, we call an
atomic input that triggers trafﬁc an action, denoted as a, such as a keystroke or a mouse
click. We call a sequence of actions that represents a user’s complete input information an
action-sequence, denoted as a, such as a sequence of consecutive keystrokes entered into a
search engine. We also call the collection of all the ith actions in a set of action-sequences
an action-set, denoted as Ai.
Correspondingly, for the observation, we denote a ﬂow-vector as v to represent a
sequence of ﬂows,
〈
s1, s2, . . . , s|v|
〉
, that is, the sizes of packets triggered by actions. We
denote a vector-sequence as v to represent the sequence of ﬂow-vectors triggered by an
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action-sequence, and a vector-set as Vi corresponding to the action-set Ai. Finally, given
a set of action-sequences and corresponding vector-sequences, we deﬁne all the pairs of
ith actions and corresponding ith ﬂow-vectors as the vector-action set, denoted as VAi or
simply VA when no ambiguity is possible. For a given application, we call the collection
of all the vector-action sets vector-action sequence, denoted as VA.
6.2.2 Privacy Properties
We model the privacy requirement of a trafﬁc padding scheme from two perspec-
tives. First, when adversaries observe a ﬂow-vector triggered by a single action, they should
not be able to distinguish this action from at least k − 1 other actions that could have also
triggered that same ﬂow-vector, which is formalized in the following.
Deﬁnition 6.1 (k-Indistinguishability) Given a vector-action set VA, a padding algo-
rithm M with output range Range(M, VA), we say M satisﬁes k-indistinguishability
w.r.t. VA (k is an integer) if
∀(v∈Range(M, VA)), |{a : Pr(M−1(v)=a)>0 ∧ a∈A}|≥k.
Example 6.1 Assume that there are only four possible diseases in Table 6.2, then the ceil-
ing padding solution as shown in the right column satisﬁes 2-indistinguishability. 
In the previous section, we have illustrated how adversaries’ background knowl-
edge may help them to breach privacy even though the k-indistinguishability may already
be satisﬁed. Therefore, our objective here is to ﬁrst formally characterize the amount of
uncertainty faced by an adversary about the real action performed by a user (we will then
propose algorithms to increase such uncertainty in the next section). For this purpose, we
apply the concept of entropy in information theory to quantify an adversary’s uncertainty
in the following.
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Deﬁnition 6.2 (Uncertainty) Given a vector-action sequence VA, a padding algorithm
M, we deﬁne















Example 6.2 To illustrate the above notions, following Example 6.1, the uncertainty of the
ﬂow 360, denoted as ϕ(360, VA,M) (or simply ϕ(360) hereafter when no ambiguity is















= 1. Further, since the vector-action sequence is composed of a
single vector-action set, Φ( VA)=φ(VA)=1. 
Finally, we model the privacy of a padding algorithm as its joint capabilities of
satisfying k-indistinguishability and δ-uncertainty. Note that here the former serves as a
basic privacy requirement (when no resistance to background knowledge is needed) while
the latter can be regarded as an enhanced requirement. Both parameters may be adjusted
according to different applications’ unique requirements for privacy.
Deﬁnition 6.3 (δ-uncertain k-indistinguishability) An algorithmM gives δ-uncertain k-
indistinguishability for a vector-action sequence VA if
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- M w.r.t. anyVA∈ VA satisﬁes k-indistinguishability, and
- the uncertainty ofM w.r.t. VA is not less than δ.
6.2.3 Padding Method
To be more self-contained, we ﬁrst review the ceiling padding method [69,71]. The
method deterministically partitions a vector-action set into padding groups, each of which
has a cardinality no less than k, and then breaks the linkage among actions in the same
group by padding the ﬂows to be identical, as described in the following.
Deﬁnition 6.4 (Dominance and Ceiling Padding [71]) Given a vector-set V , we deﬁne
- the dominant-vector dom(V ) as the ﬂow-vector in which each ﬂow is equal to the
maximum of the corresponding ﬂow among all the ﬂow-vectors in V .
- a ceiling-padded group in V as a padding group in which every ﬂow-vector is padded
to the dominant-vector.
Clearly, the ceiling padding method is only designed to achieve the k-indistinguishability,
and will not provide sufﬁcient privacy guarantee if the adversary possesses prior back-
ground knowledge.
In this chapter, we propose to introduce randomness into the process of forming
padding groups per each user request. Speciﬁcally, to response to an action, we ﬁrst select
at random, from certain distributions, k− 1 other actions to form the padding group. Then,
we apply ceiling padding on the resultant group. To differentiate from the aforementioned
ﬁxed padding group and the original ceiling padding method, we call the group formed on
the ﬂy with randomness the transient group, and our method the random ceiling padding
in the following.
Deﬁnition 6.5 (Transient Group and Random Ceiling Padding) We say a mechanismM
is a random ceiling padding method if, when responding to an action a, it randomly selects
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k−1 other actions and pads the ﬂow-vector of action a to be the dominant-vector among the
corresponding ﬂow-vectors of selected k−1 actions together with the original ﬂow-vector
of action a. We also call those k actions a transient group.
Example 6.3 To achieve 2-indistinguishability, a mechanismM selects uniformly at ran-
dom 1 other action to form the transient group (Table 6.2). Then, the following two cases
could both lead to an observed s = 360 ﬂow. First, the patient has Cancer andM selects
any one of the others to form the group (there are 3 possible transient groups in this case).
Second, the patient does not have Cancer but has one of the other threes, and M selects












Now, if the adversary knows that the patient can not have Cervicitis and observes
the s-byte value to be 360, s/he will no longer be able to infer which disease the patient










)) = 1.37. 
6.2.4 Cost Metrics
In addition to privacy requirements, we also need metrics for the communication
and processing costs. For the former, we measure the proportion of packet size increases
compared to the original ﬂow-vectors. For the latter, we measure how many ﬂow-vectors
need to be padded among all the vectors in a VA, as formalized in Deﬁnition 6.6 and 6.7,
respectively.
Deﬁnition 6.6 (Expected Padding Cost) Given a vector-action sequence VA, an algo-
rithmM,





(Pr(M(a) = v′)× v′)− v||1;
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- the expected padding cost of a vector-action set VA ∈ VA under algorithm M is
deﬁned as pcos(VA,M)=∑(a,v)∈VA(pcos(a, VA,M)) and that of the vector-action
sequence is deﬁned as pcos( VA,M)=∑VA∈ VA(pcos(VA,M)).
Deﬁnition 6.7 (Expected Processing Cost) The expected processing cost of a vector-action






VA∈ VA |{(a, v) : (a, v) ∈ VA}|
;
Surprisingly, while introducing randomness into the process of forming padding
groups improves the privacy, this improvement does not necessarily come at a higher cost,
as shown in Example 6.4 (we will only compare the cost with the original ceiling padding
method hereafter, since ceiling padding has much less overhead than other methods, such
as rounding, as shown in our previous work [71]).
Example 6.4 For ceiling padding shown in last column of Table 6.2, the expected padding
cost can be calculated as pcos(VA, ceiling padding) = 70, and the expected processing
cost as rcos(VA, ceiling padding) = 25%.










That is, these two methods actually lead to exactly the same expected padding and
processing costs, while the latter clearly achieves higher uncertainty (with the same k-
indistinguishability). 
6.3 The Algorithms
We ﬁrst introduce a generic random ceiling padding scheme in Section 6.3.1, and
then discuss two example ways for instantiating the scheme into concrete algorithms in
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Section 6.3.2. The main intention here is to show that the random ceiling padding method
can potentially be instantiated in many different ways based on speciﬁc applications’ needs.
In the coming sections, we will further show that even those straightforward ways we de-
scribe here can still achieve good performance in terms of the privacy guarantee and the
costs.
6.3.1 The Random Ceiling Padding Scheme
The main idea of our scheme is the following. In responding to a user input, the
server will form a transient group on the ﬂy by randomly selecting members of the group
from certain candidates based on certain distributions (different choices of such candidates
and distributions will lead to different algorithms, as demonstrated in Section 6.3.2).
Our goal is two-fold. First, the privacy properties, k-indistinguishability and δ-
uncertainty, need to be ensured. Second, the costs of achieving such privacy protection
should be minimized. Clearly, a trade-off naturally exists between these two objectives.
We will demonstrate how to address this trade-off through two instantiations of the general
scheme with different methods of forming transient groups.
The generic random ceiling padding scheme consists of two stages as shown in Ta-
bles 6.5 and 6.6. The ﬁrst stage (Table 6.5), a one-time process, derives the randomness
parameters and accordingly determines the probability of an action being selected as a
member of a transient group. As exempliﬁed later in Section 6.4, both δ and costs are re-
lated to k (which is considered as a given constant), the vector values and their cardinalities
(which is determined for a given vector-action set), and the parameters of distribution from
which the randomness is drawn. Clearly, to determine the randomness parameters such that
δ is not less than a desired value while keeping the costs minimal is naturally an optimiza-
tion problem. In this chapter, we simplify the process by setting the size of each transient
group to k to ensure the indistinguishability (the proof is omitted due to space limitations).
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Stage 1: One-Time Preprocessing
Input: the vector-action set VA,
the privacy properties kmin and δmin,
the randomness generator G;
Output: the parameters 〈P 〉 of G
Method:
1. Let V be the vector-set of VA, and A be the action-set of VA;
2. If (|VA| ≤ kmin) Return;
3. Compute the distribution DV of V ;
4. Compute 〈P 〉 based on its relation with δ, k, pcos, rcos, DV
when random ceiling padding is applied, such that
(1). k ≥ kmin and δ ≥ δmin;
(2). pcos and rcos are minimal;
5. Return 〈P 〉;
Table 6.5: The Random Ceiling Padding Scheme: Stage One
Once the randomness parameters are set, then repeatedly, upon receiving an action
a0, the second stage (Table 6.6) selects, randomly following the results of stage one, k −
1 other actions from the corresponding action-set A of vector-action set VA to form the
transient group, and then returns the dominant-vector of this transient group.
Stage 2: Real-Time Response
Input: the vector-action set VA,
the randomness parameters 〈P 〉 of G,
the privacy properties kmin and δmin,
the action a0
Output: the ﬂow-vector v′0;
Method:
1. Let V be the vector-set of VA, and A be the action-set of VA;
2. Create AC by randomly selecting kmin−1 actions from
the subset of A based on 〈P 〉 of G;
3. AC = AC ∪ {a0};
4. Let VC be the subset of vector-set V which corresponds to AC ;
5. Return the dominant-vector of VC ;
Table 6.6: The Random Ceiling Padding Scheme: Stage Two
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6.3.2 Instantiations of the Scheme
In this section, we discuss two example instantiations of the proposed random ceil-
ing padding scheme, and illustrate two different ways for reducing the padding and pro-
cessing costs while satisfying the privacy requirements. Basically, the two instantiations
differ in their ways of selecting candidates for members of the transient group, in order to
reduce the cost. First, to facilitate discussions, we introduce two new notions.
In Deﬁnition 6.8, intuitively, function fv(.) sorts a vector-action set VA based on
the padding cost, and we denote the resultant totally ordered set (chain) under the binary
relation v by 〈VA〉v. The main objective of this step is to adjust the probability of an
action being selected as a member of the transient group, in order to reduce the expected
costs. Besides, in the case that each ﬂow-vector in V includes a single ﬂow, the ﬂows
(integers) ordered by the standard larger-than-or-equal relation ≥ is also a chain that is
naturally identical for each v. Therefore, although the chain 〈VA〉v for different v∈V may
be different, in the rest of this chapter, we will use a single chain (simpliﬁed as 〈VA〉) for
analysis and experiment.
Deﬁnition 6.8 (Larger and Closer) Given a vector-action set VA, a pair (a, v) ∈ VA,
deﬁne a function fv :V →I (I for integers) as fv(v′)= ||dom({v, v′})− v||1. Then, we say,
w.r.t. (a, v),
- (a′, v′)∈VA is larger than (a′′, v′′)∈VA, denoted by (a′, v′)v (a′′, v′′), if fv(v′)>
fv(v
′′)∨ ((fv(v′) = fv(v′′)) ∧ (a′  a′′)), where  is any predeﬁned order on the
action-sets;
- (a′, v′)∈VA is closer to (a, v) than (a′′, v′′)∈VA if |fv(v′)|< |fv(v′′)|.
a) Option 1: Randomness from Bounded Uniform Distribution
The step 2 of stage 2 in Table 6.6 may be realized in many different ways by choosing
group members from different subsets of candidates and based on different distributions.
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Note that although choosing the members uniformly at random from all possible candidates
certainly leads to highest possible uncertainty, this also will incur prohibitive processing
cost. In fact, in Section 6.4, we will show through theoretical analysis that the uncertainty
of an algorithm can be dramatically increased even by a slight increase in the cardinality of
possible candidates for forming the transient group.
This ﬁrst option draws candidates from a uniform distribution. It also allows users
to constraint the cardinality of candidate actions to be considered (ct) and the number of
such actions that are larger than given action (cl). More speciﬁcally, given a vector-action
set VA, and a pair (ai, vi) being the ith pair of its corresponding chain 〈VA〉, the transient
group of (ai, vi) will be selected uniformly at random from the sub-chain of the chain in the
range of [max(0,min(i− cl, |VA| − ct)),min(max(0,min(i− cl, |VA| − ct))+ ct, |VA|)]
(complete algorithms will be omitted due to space limitations) .
The action in a transient group which is in the least position of the chain 〈VA〉 will
determine the padding cost of (a, v) when a is performed. Thus, from this perspective, cl
should be as small as possible. However, cl should also be sufﬁciently large. For example,
if cl = 0, each action should be deterministically padded. Moreover, the ct determines
the cardinality of possible transient groups. More possibilities of transient groups will
complicate adversaries’ tasks in attacking (collecting the data of directional packet sizes
and analyzing the distribution of ﬂow-vector information).
b) Option 2: Randomness from Normal Distribution
In this option, the action closer to a in the chain has higher probability to be selected as
a member of a’s transient group. To select a member, the distance between the selected
action and the performed action a in the chain 〈VA〉 (that is, the difference of the positions)
is drawn from normal distribution (rounded up to the nearest integer).
When the mean of normal distribution is set to zero, the two actions with equal
distance in the both sides of the performed action a in the chain are equally likely selected.
As mentioned before, the action in transient group with least position in the chain 〈VA〉
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determines the padding cost. Thus, the mean can be adjusted to a positive integer, such
that the actions in larger positions than a would have a higher chance to be selected, and
consequently the expected cost will be reduced.
In addition, since increasing the standard deviation ﬂattens the curve of the distri-
bution and allows more chances to draw a value far from the mean, it yields a higher prob-
ability to select an action farther away from the performed one in the chain 〈VA〉. Thus,
in practice, the standard deviation should be small enough to reduce the padding cost; it
also should not be too small in order to prevent the adversary from collecting the data and
analyzing the distribution of ﬂow-vector values.
6.4 The Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the privacy degree, the costs, and the computational
complexity of our solution. For simplicity, we analyze those parameters for scenarios in
which each action-sequence and ﬂow-vector are of length one, referred to as VAs, and the
randomness in our scheme (shown in Tables 6.5, 6.6) is drawn from a uniform distribution,
denoted byMu.
To simplify the discussions, we use s=
〈
s1, s2, . . . , s|s|
〉
to denote the sequence of
distinct ﬂow values in decreasing order, and use n=
〈
n1, n2, . . . , n|s|
〉
to denote that there
is ni number of actions in VAs whose ﬂow value is si. We let L=
〈





j=i nj for (i ∈ [1, |s|]). Also, we set N =
∑|s|
i=1 ni (L1 = N ). We say an action a in
VAs is an si-type action if its ﬂow value equals to si before padding, denoted by a ∈ VAsi .
6.4.1 Analysis of Privacy Preservation
For the purpose of analyses, we need to characterize the cardinality of transient
groups. Given a vector-action set VAs = (V,A) and its action a ∈ A, the Mu algorithm
selects k−1 other actions uniformly at random to form its transient group. For any action,
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[85]. Given a si-type action, we partition its sample space Ωi into i number
of disjoint events Ei,j , where j ∈ [1, i] and Ei,j is the set of transient groups for which the
maximal ﬂow value is sj , as shown in Table 6.7.
Clearly, the actions with the same ﬂow-vector value have the sample space with sim-
ilar events and corresponding cardinality. Note that there may exist some i such that Li < k
(Li as deﬁned above). That is, the number of actions, whose ﬂow values are less than or
equal to si, is less than k. However, since our algorithms always select k different actions
to form a transient group on-demand, without loss of generality, we assume that n|s¯| ≥ k
for the purpose of the analysis whereas our algorithms does not need such assumption.
Sample Number of Possible Events (Based on the Maximal Flow Value)
Space Transient Groups Event Cardinality








































Ωi+1 . . . . . . . . .
Table 6.7: The Sample Space for Transient Groups by Random Ceiling Padding and Cor-
responding Events
For a si-type action a, if the actions selected in a transient group are from those
whose ﬂow value is less than or equal to si, the maximal ﬂow value will be si in that group.
There are totally Li−1 such actions (excluding action a itself). Therefore, the cardinality





. Similarly, a transient group belongs to an event Ei,j where j < i
only if, in that group, there is at least a sj-type action and there is not any sk-type action
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for one given execution, if the resultant transient group is in event Ei,j , the ﬂow value of
action a is padded to sj by theMu algorithm. The cardinality of each event in the sample
space for an action is shown in Table 6.7.
Note that the probability that the ﬂow of an action is padded to a value is different
from the probability that the trafﬁc with a padded ﬂow value is triggered by an action. For
example, the ﬂow of any s1-type action is always padded to s1. However, one observing a







Moreover, the adversary cannot collect the vector-action set even if s/he acts as a
normal user of the application using random ceiling padding technique. The reason is as
follows. First, the sample space is huge even for small-size vector-action set with reason-
able k value. For example, when |VA|=100 and k=20, the cardinality of sample space for




) ≈ 266. Second, since all users share one uniform random process
in the scheme, the distribution of events cannot be sufﬁciently approximated by collecting
ﬂow-vector values for a special action just as many times as the cardinality of its sample
space.










































Proof: First, for the si (i ∈ [1, |s| − 1), there are two cases for the action a that
Mu(a) = si as follows.
- Action a is a si-type action. Denote the set of such actions by A1. Clearly, |A1| = ni.
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The Mu selects k − 1 actions which ﬂow value is no larger than si to form the











transient groups in total. Note that the
transient group could be identical for different actions. For such cases, it should be
counted once for each action since it is triggered by different actions.
- Action a is a sj-type action (j > i, that is, sj < si). Denote the set of such actions by
A2. Then, |A2| =
∑|s|
j=i+1 = Li+1. The Mu selects at least one si-type actions and
zero number of actions which ﬂow value is larger than si to form the transient group.















) transient groups in total.


















if a ∈ A2,
which leads to the ﬁrst two lines of Equation 6.1.
Second, for the s|s|, the only case thatMu(a) = s|s| is as follows. Action a is a s|s|-
type action and all the members of its transient group are also s|s|-type actions. The number





. We then have Pr((M−1u (s|s|)) =
a) = 1
n|s|
for any s|s|-type action, which leads to the last line of Equation 6.1. Thus we have
proved the lemma.
In summary, in random ceiling padding, an action cannot be distinguished from
at least other k − 1 different actions based on the trafﬁc triggered, which satisﬁes k-
indistinguishablility. Moreover, the adversary cannot deterministically infer the action only
by the observation even s/he can further remove a limited number of actions based on prior
knowledge.
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6.4.2 Analysis of Costs
In this section, we ﬁrst compare the padding cost between ceiling padding and ran-
dom ceiling padding, then formulate the upper bound of padding cost for random ceiling
padding.
First, we show that the padding cost and the processing cost of ceiling padding
and random ceiling padding is deterministically incomparable. That is, these costs cannot
simply be ordered based on the algorithms themselves and will depend on speciﬁc vector-
action sets.
Lemma 6.2 There exist cases in which the expected padding cost of random ceiling padding
Mu is less than that of ceiling paddingMc, and vice versa.
Proof: For simplicity, we omit the action information and model the vector-action set
as an integer vector, where each entry represents the single ﬂow value corresponding to an
action.
Firstly, we show the construction for the case where random ceiling padding has
less expected padding cost than ceiling padding.
Equation 6.1 shows our construction for the proof, where n = 2k − 1 and s1 > s2.
That is, s = 〈s1, s2〉 and n = 〈1, 2k − 2〉. Note that the equation presents a category of





s2, s2, . . . , s2︸ ︷︷ ︸
2k−1
(6.1)
To achieve k-indistinguishability, since the number of actions is less than 2k, ceil-
ing padding can only partition the sets into a padding group. Therefore, the ﬂow corre-
sponding to s2-type actions must be padded to s1. Consequently, its expected padding cost
pcos(VA1,Mc)=1×(100%×(s1−s1))+(2k−2)×(100%×(s1−s2)) = (2k−2)×(s1−s2).
On the other hand, in random ceiling padding, given any action, the algorithm can
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select any k−1 other actions from all the other 2k−2 possible actions to form its transient





number of different transient groups. For the s1-
type action, the dominant-vector of any combination is s1 because s1 > s2. For the other
(2k − 2) s2-type actions, the corresponding ﬂow will be padded to s1 only if that s1-




























possible combinations. In other words, the ﬂow of the s2-type




= 50% chance of being padded to s1, and a 50% chance of remaining




× (s2− s2) = s1−s22 . Thus, pcos(VA1,Mu) = 1× (s1− s1) + (2k− 2)× s1−s22 =
(k − 1)× (s1 − s2).
In summary, for such category of vector-action sets, the expected padding cost of
ceiling padding is as twice as that of random ceiling padding.
Secondly, we show the construction for the other case where ceiling padding has
less expected padding cost that random ceiling padding.
Equation 6.2 shows our construction for the proof, where n = 2k and s1 > s2.




s1, s1, . . . , s1,
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
s2, s2, . . . , s2︸ ︷︷ ︸
2k
(6.2)
To achieve k-indistinguishability, the padding cost of ceiling padding equals to 0,
since ceiling padding can simply partition the actions into two groups. One group in-
cludes all the actions which ﬂow value equals to s1, and the other equals to s2. That is,
pcos(VA2,Mc) = 0.
On the other hand, in random ceiling padding, given an action, the algorithm will







number of different combinations. Furthermore, for the
actions with the ﬂow is s1, no matter which combination is selected, the dominant-vector is
s1 since s1 > s2. For those ﬂow is s2, if and only if the k−1 other actions are selected from
the left k − 1 s2-type actions, the dominant-vector is s2, otherwise the dominant-vector is








)×(s1−s2). Thus, pcos(VA2,Mu) = k×(s1−s1)+k×(1− 1(2k−1k−1 ))×(s1−s2) ≈
k × (s1 − s2) for sufﬁciently large k.
In summary, for such category of vector-action sets, the expected padding cost of
ceiling padding is zero while it of random ceiling padding is around k × (s1 − s2).
Finally, based on the two constructions above, we have proved the lemma.
Through similar constructions in the proof of Lemma 6.2, we have result that the
processing cost between them is also incomparable (we omit the details in this paper due
to space limitations). Next, more generally, we formulate the padding and processing cost
of random ceiling padding as shown in Lemma 6.3.
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Proof: Based on Table 6.7, we can lead to the aforementioned results.
First, we prove the result for the expected padding cost.
For any s1 type action, the expected padding cost equals 0. For an action which is
any si-type action other than s1-type,




















) si − si.
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which leads to the formula above.
Second, we prove the result for the expected processing cost.
For a si-type action (a, si),





























which leads to the above formula. Thus, we prove the lemma.
6.4.3 Analysis of Computational Complexity
The computational complexity of random ceiling padding algorithm, in the case that
randomness is drawn from a uniform random distribution, is O(k) due to the following.
First, the ﬁrst stage of our scheme can be pre-calculated only once, when the vector-action
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set is given, and does not need to be repeatedly evaluated each time when the scheme is
invoked to respond to an action. Therefore, although it runs in polynomial time of N (N as
above deﬁned), for continuous execution of the algorithm, the computational complexity
for responding to each action is still O(1). Second, to select k random actions without
duplicates, Line 2 of second stage can be realized in O(k) time with many standard algo-
rithms. Finally, it takes O(k) times to select the corresponding vector-set for the selected
actions in Lines 3-4 and calculate their dominant-vector in Line 5.
6.5 Experiment
In this section, we evaluate the uncertainty and the cost under two implementa-
tion options of our scheme (see Section 6.3) through experiments with two real world
Web applications. First, Section 6.5.1 describes the experimental settings, and then Sec-
tion 6.5.2, 6.5.3, and 6.5.4 present experimental results for randomness drawn from bounded
uniform distribution and normal distribution, respectively.
6.5.1 Experimental Setting
We collect testing vector-action sets from two real-world web applications, a popu-
lar search engine Engine (where users’ searching keyword needs to be protected) and an
authoritative drug information system Drug (where users’ health information needs to be
protected).
We compare our solutions with the svmdGreedy (short for SVMD) [71] on four-
letter combinations in Engine and the last-level data in Drug due to the following. First,
one vector-action set is sufﬁcient to demonstrate the results. Thus, we use a single vector-
action set instead of vector-action sequence. Second, as reported in [71], rounding and
random padding [22] lead to even larger overheads while they cannot ensure the privacy.
Thus, we compare our results with SVMD only.
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In the ﬁrst option (see Section 6.3.2), namely, TUNI option, we constraint the num-
ber of larger actions (cl) and the minimal number of possible actions to be selected (ct)
when the probability of an action to be selected is drawn from uniform distribution. In the
meantime, in the second option, namely, NORM option, we allow to adjust the mean (μ)
and standard deviation (σ) when it is drawn from normal distribution.
All experiments are conducted on a PC with 2.20GHz Duo CPU and 4GB memory
and we conduct each experiment 1000 times. To facilitate the comparisons, we use padding
cost ratio, processing cost ratio to measure the relative overheads of the padding cost and
processing cost, respectively.
6.5.2 Uncertainty and Cost v.s. k
The ﬁrst set of experiments evaluates the uncertainty and cost of TUNI and NORM
options against SVMD. Figure 6.1(a), (b), and (c) illustrate the padding cost, uncertainty,
and processing cost against the privacy property k, respectively. In general, the padding
and processing costs of all algorithms increase with k, while TUNI and NORM have less
costs than those of SVMD. Meanwhile, our algorithms have much larger uncertainty for
Drug and slightly larger for Engine.
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Figure 6.1: Uncertainty and Cost Against k
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6.5.3 Randomness Drawn from Bounded Uniform Distribution
Figure 6.2 illustrates the uncertainty and cost of TUNI option on both vector-action
sets against the top limit cl. As expected, SVMD is insensitive to cl since it does not have
the concept of cl. On the other hand, both costs increase slowly with cl for TUNI. This
is because, larger cl allows the algorithm to have more chances to select larger actions
for transient group. The largest action in the transient groups determines the padding cost
in this case, and a single larger action leads to an increase of processing cost. From the
results, TUNI performs worse on Drug than on Engine w.r.t. cost. This is because, the
more diverse in the ﬂow of Drug leads to more chances to select larger action even with
a small increase of cl. Despite the slight increase of cost with cl, TUNI generally has less
cost and larger uncertainty than SVMD for both vector-action sets.
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Figure 6.2: Uncertainty and Cost for Bounded Uniform Distribution Against Top Limit
Figure 6.3 shows the uncertainty and cost against the minimal cardinality ct. Sim-
ilarly, SVMD is insensitive to ct due to the same reason. Also, TUNI demonstrates same
results on engine in terms of both uncertainty and cost regardless of the value of ct. This
is because, the constraint of minimal cardinality works only when the cardinality of pos-
sible actions is less than ct after applying cl parameter. In engine, the number of actions
which have the smallest ﬂow value is extremely larger than the ct values in the experiment.
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In other words, ct does not affect the results. For drug, the padding and processing costs
increase slowly with ct while the uncertainty decreases slowly.
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Figure 6.3: Uncertainty and Cost for Bounded Uniform Distribution Against Minimal Car-
dinality
6.5.4 Randomness Drawn from Normal Distribution
Figure 6.4 illustrates the uncertainty and cost of NORM option on both vector-action
sets against the mean (μ) of normal random function. Compared with SVMD, NORM has
less cost and yet higher uncertainty. The mean values do not affect the uncertainty and
cost of SVMD since it does not take mean as a parameter. On the other hand, the cost of
NORM decreases almost linearly with the increase of mean from 0 to 16, and rapidly as μ
grows to 32 on both vector-action sets. In the meanwhile, the uncertainty of NORM slightly
changes for the mean from 0 to 16, and decreases rapidly when μ = 32. This is because,
when μ=32, NORM has negligible chance to select a larger actions for the group. In other
words, the vectors need not to be padded in most cases. Thus, in practice, we must tune the
parameters (μ and σ) to avoid such situation.
Figure 6.5 shows the uncertainty and cost against the standard deviation σ of normal
random function. Basically, all the three measurements decreases with the decrease of
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Figure 6.4: Uncertainty and Cost for Normal Distribution Against Mean
σ. Compared with SVMD, the less the σ, NORM exhibits better. This is as expected
since the larger the standard deviation is, the ﬂatter the curve of normal distribution is, and
consequentially, the more chances to draw a value far from the mean, which is equal to
select an action far from the performed one.
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Figure 6.5: Uncertainty and Cost for Normal Distribution Against Standard Deviation
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6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a solution to reduce the impact of adversaries’
background knowledge in privacy-preserving trafﬁc padding. The approach can poten-
tially be applied to other privacy-preserving issues, although we have focused on the trafﬁc
padding issues in this chapter. We have also instantiated two algorithms by following the
proposed solution. Our experiments with real-world applications conﬁrmed the perfor-
mance of the proposed solution in terms of both privacy and overheads. Our future work
will apply the proposed approach to privacy-preserving data publishing to achieve syntactic





In this chapter, we present an efﬁcient technique for privacy-preserving smart me-
tering to simultaneously achieve multiple privacy objectives.
7.1 Overview
Smart meter with ﬁne-grained consumption information beneﬁts both utility (to bet-
ter schedule electric production) and customers (to cut down the cost) . However, recent
studies show that such features may also lead to serious breaches of customers’ privacy.
There typically exist two categories of approaches to prevent adversaries from violating
the individual’s privacy.
First, the smart meter, with the tariff information, accumulatively calculates the
amount of billing and sends the billing information once to the service provider (utility)
at each billing period. In such a way, the utility only knows the ﬁnal billing and cannot
compromise the customers’ privacy. However, it may be challenging for such method
to remain consistent of the tariff information between utility and meters. Furthermore, the
utility cannot learn the trend of electrical consumptions for ﬁne-grained period. Also, in the
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cases that arguments on the billing between users and providers, such information cannot
be used as an evidence.
Second, at each time slot (e.g. 6 minutes), all the meters send the consumption
information to the predetermined collector, which then sums up (through homomorphic
encryption) and then sends the results to the utility. In such a way, the utility can learn
the total consumptions for each reading period and consequently can dynamically adjust
the producing of electric based on the consumptions. However, such approach does not
provide individual information in terms of consumptions and billings, and consequently,
the utility can only charge the collector totally and cannot charge individually.
Consequently, the aforementioned two solutions must both be applied to achieve
these two objectives. In the sequel, the privacy of both objectives must be preserved. Re-
cent solution in the literature integrates two objectives into one protocol with a single set
of security primitives. However, the communication between the smart meters and corre-
sponding counterparts remain separately which still incurs high overhead.
In this chapter, we observe that preserving the privacy with regard to the readings of
a customer’s electric consumption does not necessarily lead to preserving that customers’
privacy. On the other hand, we also observe that to preserve the privacy of both aggrega-
tion of readings and the billing of consumptions can be concurrently achieved. Based on
such observations, we propose a novel privacy model in smart meter to preserve semantic
privacy, which allows the smart grid to have one unique set of consumption readings for
each smart meter for the purpose of both aggregation analysis and billing.
The contribution of this chapter is two fold. First, we observe that the privacy issue
is not due to the readings themselves but the sensitive information behind the readings. Sec-
ond, to the best of our knowledge, our novel privacy model is the ﬁrst effort on preserving
the individual sensitive information (compared with preserving the readings information).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.We ﬁrst build intuitions through a
running example in the remainder of this section. Section 7.2 deﬁnes our model. Sec-
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tion 7.3 design the algorithm for the smart meters, and brieﬂy introduce the algorithms for
the other component of smart grid. We conclude the chapter in Section 7.4.
Motivating Example
The left table in Table 7.1 shows the electric appliances together with their cor-
responding labeled consumptions in watts for a ﬁctitious household. For this particular
example, to simplify our discussion, we make the following assumptions. The smart meter
will send the consumption information once per 6 minutes (reading period), and the appli-
ances will be on or off for a complete reading period. Further, the measured consumption
of the appliances is consistent with the labeled one and the load type of the appliances
are const load [60]. Later we will remove this assumption by allowing the appliances to
consume in a given bounded range.












Table 7.1: An Example
We ﬁrst examine the privacy issue behind the readings. The right table in Table 7.1
shows all the possible readings and corresponding possible usage of appliances (note that
the reading may be given by watts or kilowatt-hour. In this example, we use watt-hour for
explanation). For example, when Fan is on, and either Bulb or TV is on, the reading is 30;
when either Fan is on, or both Bulb and TV are on, the reading will be 20.
One existing solution is to add an amount of noise drawn from a geometric distribu-
tion with parameter p = 
Δ
to the consumption in order to achieve -differential privacy for
the readings, where Δ is the maximum difference of two readings of given household [32].
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Unfortunately, achieving differential privacy in readings does not mean to preserve the pri-
vacy of the customers. For example, suppose that  = 0.1, a 20 reading implies that the
probability that Fan is not used is as 3.90 ≈ e1.36 times as that Fan is used.
The adversary can reason as follows. Δ = 40 which is the reading difference be-
tween the case that all appliances are used and the case that no appliance is used, con-




. There are totally 5 possible cases which equally likely lead
to a 20 noise reading as shown in Table 7.2. On one hand, the only case, that Fan is
used, is that the original reading is 20 and the noise is 0. The probability of this case




. On the other hand, there are four
cases that Fan is not used. That is, none, one, or both of Bulb and TV is used and the noise
is 20, 10, or 0, respectively. Therefore, when reading is 20, Pr[(Fan is off)
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Table 7.2: The Possible Cases For a 200 Noise Reading
We have shown that, although the above mechanism achieves 0.1-differential pri-
vacy, the adversary still can learn that the Fan is more likely off in the case that the reading
is 20. On the other hand, actually a special reading is not necessary to violate a given
privacy in terms of the usages of the appliances.
We need to switch to the adversary’s point of view. When an adversary observes a 20
reading, s/he knows that the customer either use the Fan or use both Bulb and TV, however,
s/he is not sure that which option is. In other words, s/he can only know that these two
options are equally likely true. However, when an adversary observes a 30 reading, s/he
will be fully sure that Fan is used no matter whether Bulb or TV is used.
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In this chapter, we will adopt a novel privacy property to quantify such privacy
concerns. Intuitively, we must set the threshold of the maximal acceptable probability that
any appliances in a given household are used in any given reading period. In this example,
we assume that this probability is not less than 1
2
. Thus, the 20 reading is safe since all the
three appliances have 1
2
probability to be used. Moreover, the 30 reading is unsafe since
Fan is used for sure. Similarly, reading 40 is unsafe while readings 10 and 0 are safe.
However, sometimes the cases that an appliance is not used will also release private
information. Take an extreme case as an example. The reading 0 may infer that nobody is
at home in that reading period. Therefore, we need to also set the threshold of the minimal
acceptable probability that any appliances are used in any given reading period. In this
example, we assume the minimal probability to be 1
2
also. Considering both these two




Correspondingly, we will adopt a different approach to achieve the privacy. Basi-
cally, instead of adding noise to the reading such that the reading cannot be distinguished
from others, we send the safe readings directly, while for the unsafe readings we send the
most close safe readings (it could be larger or less than the original reading value) and leave
the remainder (it could be positive or negative) to the next reading period. In such way, we
will directly send 20 to the utility for a 20 reading while we will send 20 and leave the left
10 to a certain preassigned period when the consumption is 30. Therefore, for the reading
sequence of consumption 30,20,10, we will send 20,20,20 to the utility. It is worthy noting
that, when the adversary observes the third 20, s/he cannot infer that the original reading is
10 (either Bulb or TV is used) or 20 (either Fan is used or both Bulb and TV are used).
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7.2 The Model
We ﬁrst describe the adversary model and corresponding assumptions in Section 7.2.1.
We then introduce the privacy property in Section 7.2.2. Finally, we deﬁne the cost metrics
in Section 7.2.3. Table 7.3 lists our main notations which will be deﬁned in this chapter.
A Appliance Set
U Utility, or Customer Set in Utility
G, Gs Candidate Set, Safe Candidate Set
Cr r-consumed Set (Consumption Set)
R, T Reading Sequence, Tariff Sequence
Table 7.3: The Notation Table
7.2.1 Adversary Model
The adversary can eavesdrop the encrypted readings at any point in the trafﬁc path
between the smart meters and the utility. However, the adversary cannot break the security
of a cipher unless the utility can decrypt it.
We have the following assumptions about the smart grid and the adversary’s capa-
bility.
- The appliances will be on or off in the whole reading slot and will not switch between
on and off during a reading slot.
- The households are aware of the appliances they will use upon the installations of
the smart meters, and the maximal number of appliances in a household is not larger
than 30.
- There exist some safe readings for the given set of appliances.
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7.2.2 Privacy Property
For a given household h, we denote an appliance set as Ah(id, l, d), where id, l,
and d denote the identity of appliance unique to the household, its corresponding labeled
electrical consumption in watts, and the possible bounded deviation from the labeled in
percentage for the real consumption, respectively. We denote reading frequency as φ to rep-
resent the number of hours between two readings. Denote by ID and L the set of appliance
identities
∏
id(Ah), and labeled electrical consumption
∏
l(Ah) (all projections preserve
duplicates, unless explicitly stated otherwise). Note that different households may have
different appliance set. When no ambiguity is possible, we will not specify the subscript
for household, and will not distinguish between A and L.
First, we introduce the concept of candidate set and r-consumed set in Deﬁnition 7.1
to depict all the possible reading values for the given appliance set, and all the possible
combination of appliances which can sum up to r watts.
Deﬁnition 7.1 (Candidate Set and Consumption Set) Given an appliance set A, we de-
ﬁne,
- the candidate setG as the set {∪{sum : sum ∈ [∑(id,l,d)∈SA(l×(1−d)),∑(id,l,d)∈SA(l×
(1 + d))]} :SA∈2A};
- the r-consumed set Cr as the collection of sets
{{id : (id, l)∈SA} : (SA∈2A)∧ (
∑




Example 7.1 Given the appliance set A in the left tabular of Table 7.1, and assume that
the deviation for each appliance is 0.0, then the candidate set G={0, 100, 200, 300, 400}.
Correspondingly, there are 5 consumption sets as shown in right tabular of Table 7.1,









We then measure the probability that an appliance is used for a given reading r, as
formalized in Deﬁnition 7.2.
Deﬁnition 7.2 (Occurrence Probability) Given a r-consumed set Cr corresponding to
the appliance set A, the occurrence probability of an appliance id ∈ ID w.r.t. Cr is de-
ﬁned as
pr(id, Cr) =
|{I : (id∈I) ∧ (I∈Cr)}|
|Cr|
Example 7.2 Following Example 7.1, pr(Fan,C200) = 12 since Fan appears in one of the
two elements in C200. Similarly, pr(Bulb, C200)=pr(TV,C200)= 12 . 
Based on the occurrence probability, Deﬁnition 7.3 quantiﬁes the amount of privacy
protection under a given r-consumed set. Basically, a reading r satisﬁes (δ1, δ2)-bounded
certainty, if the occurrence probability of each appliance in the corresponding r-consumed
set falls in the range of [δ1, δ2].
Deﬁnition 7.3 ((δ1, δ2)-Bounded Certainty) Given an appliance setA and the correspond-
ing candidate setG, we say a r-consumed setCr (r∈G) satisﬁes (δ1, δ2)-bounded certainty
(0≤δ1≤δ2≤1) or Cr is (δ1, δ2)-bounded w.r.t. A if
∀(id∈ID), δ1 ≤ pr(id, Cr) ≤ δ2.








)-bounded hereafter when no ambiguity is possible) since, for all
appliances in A, the occurrence probability equals to 1
2
. 
Finally, we model the privacy of an algorithm for a sequence of readings in Deﬁ-
nition 7.4. Informally, the privacy model requires at least a pre-conﬁgured percentage of
readings in the sequence is (δ1, δ2)-bounded.
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Deﬁnition 7.4 ((α, δ1, δ2)-Undisclosed Privacy) An algorithmM gives (α, δ1, δ2)-undisclosed
privacy for a reading sequence Rin (one record per φ hours) w.r.t. an appliance set A, if
the output, another equal-length reading sequence, Rout = M( Rin, A) satisﬁes that
1−
∣∣∣{r : r∈ Rout ∧ C r
φ
is (δ1, δ2)−bounded}
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Rout∣∣∣ ≤ α
7.2.3 Cost Metrics
In addition to privacy requirements, we also need metrics for the billing accuracy
for each user, the consumption accuracies for each user and for the utility. For the billing
accuracy, we measure the billing difference in total for the given period, as formulated in
Deﬁnition 7.5.
Deﬁnition 7.5 (Billing Error Rate) Given an input reading sequence Rin for a customer
u, the corresponding output reading sequence Rout and equal-length tariff sequence T , the
billing error rate of u is deﬁned as
errb(u, Rin, Rout, T ) =
|( Rout − Rin) · T |
Rin · T
,
where · represents the dot product of two vectors.
Deﬁnition 7.6 measures the relative error rate of the readings for a customer in a
given sequence.
Deﬁnition 7.6 (Customer Consumption Error Rate) Given an input reading sequence
Rin for a customer u, the corresponding output reading sequence Rout, the customer con-
sumption error rate of u is deﬁned as
errc(u, Rin, Rout) =
∑




where Rin[i] and Rout[i] are the ith reading in Rin and Rout, respectively.
Example 7.4 Following Example 7.3, given the input reading sequence Rin=〈30, 20, 10〉,
the output reading sequence Rout = 〈20, 20, 20〉 for the customer u in Table 7.1, suppose
that the corresponding tariff sequence T =〈1, 2, 1〉, then the billing error rate errb(u, Rin, Rout, T )













Deﬁnition 7.7 (Utility Consumption Error Rate) Given the utilityU ={u1, u2, . . . , u|U |},
in which, each customer um has the corresponding input reading sequence Rmin and output
reading sequence Rmout, we deﬁne






- the utility consumption error rate of the reading sequence is deﬁned as
err(U) =
∑
i∈[1,| Rmin|] err(i, U)
| Rmin|
.
Example 7.5 Following Example 7.4, assume that there is only another customer in the
utility whose Rin= 〈10, 30, 20〉, and Rout= 〈20, 20, 20〉, then the error rate of ﬁrst reading
slot err(1, U) = |(20−30)+(20−10)|
30+30
= 0. Similarly, err(2, U) = 1
5














In this section, we design algorithms for revising the readings to satisfy given (δ1, δ2)-
bounded certainty whereas minimize the aggregating error rate and billing error rate. Our
intention is not to design an exhaustive list of solutions but rather to demonstrate the exis-
tence of abundant possibilities in ensuring such privacy property with negligible commu-
nication and computation overheads.
Remind that the smart grid makes use of the ﬁne-grained readings. Without loss of
generality, we split the consumption information intoK×S readings as shown in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1: Sequence of Meter Readings For a Smart Meter
Basically, for a customer, a reading period (e.g. a day or a week) is split into S
number of reading slots such that any two neighbor reading slots have different tariff. A
billing cycle (e.g. a month or a year) includes K number of days which is the period of time
between billing statements as usual. In the billing cycle we preassign a special day, called
billing point, for each reading slot. Correspondingly, we regard the reading sequence as a
K×S reading matrix in our algorithms. Note that the subscripts in the matrix is just to show
the position of a reading in the billing cycle for different tariff and aggregated consumption,
and in our algorithm we handle each reading in real time.
The process in smart meter is divided into three steps. First, initialize the smart
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meter to determine the safe readings (one-time process). Second, modify the reading such
that the resultant reading satisﬁes desired privacy property. Third, send the resultant reading
to the utility in a secure way.
7.3.1 Smart Meter Initialization
Before modifying the readings, we should ﬁrst tell apart the readings which satis-
ﬁes given (δ1, δ2)-bounded certainty, called Safe Candidate Set, from all possible readings
given the appliance set, called Candidate Set. In other words, we should identify all the
possible (δ1, δ2)-bounded readings.
Note that building safe candidate set is part of the one-time off-line processing given
the appliance set. In this section, we devise a very straightforward yet not necessarily
efﬁcient way to build it as shown in Table 7.4. Nonetheless, the discussion of optimal
solution is regarded as future work.
Input:an appliance set A, the certainty property δ1, δ2,
the reading frequency φ;
Output: the safe candidate set Gs;
Method:
1. Let each consumption set Cr = ∅;
2. For each SA in 2A
3. Let r =
∑
(id,l)∈SA(l);
4. Create SA on Cr;
5. For each Cr
6. If (Cr is (δ1, δ2)-bounded)
7. Create r on Gs;
8. Return Gs × φ;
Table 7.4: The Safe Candidate Producer (SCP)
Roughly speaking, given the appliance set A, the SCP algorithm examines each
possible appliance usage situations and corresponding electric power consumptions (lines
2-4), and then for each possible consumption value r, the algorithm justiﬁes whether it is
(δ1, δ2)-bounded by verifying the corresponding r-consumed set (lines 5-7 in Table 7.4).
The computational complexity of SCP algorithm is O(|A|×2|A|) since: evaluating r
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for each SA costs O(|A|) many times, and there are 2|A| many SAs, so totally O(|A|×2|A|).
Then, evaluating each Cr also costs O(|A|) many times and there are maximal 2|A| many
Crs.
Besides the safe candidate set, we should also randomly select a special day for
each reading slot, called Building Point Set. Note that, although for a single customer, the
building points are randomly selected, we should select the building point of any reading
slot for all the customers evenly distributes among the K days to reduce the errors of the
aggregated consumption.
7.3.2 Reading Modiﬁcations
With the information of safe candidate set, we next modify the reading to satisfy
(δ1, δ2)-bounded certainty. It is important to note that we may vary the design of algo-
rithms to suit different needs of smart meter capabilities, and the privacy and accuracy
requirements. We demonstrate such a ﬂexibility through designing three light-weight algo-
rithms in the following.
7.3.2.1 Option 1: the CRC algorithm
The cyclical reading converter (CRC) algorithm aims at maximal billing accuracy
with reasonable utility consumption error as shown in Table 7.5. Roughly speaking, given
a reading rij which is at the ith reading period in the billing cycle and the jth reading slot
in that reading period, CRC ﬁrst justiﬁes whether the reading is on the billing point of jth
reading slot. If yes, CRC will sum up the current reading to the accumulated hold of jth
reading slot, reset the hold to be zero, and return the summation. Otherwise, the algorithm
returns the closest value in Gs (the one has minimal absolute difference between it and the
reading), and adds the difference to the hold of the jth reading slot.
The CRC algorithm achieves 0% billing error rate (100% billing accuracy) with-




Input:a reading rij , the safe candidate set Gs,
the billing point set B[S], the hold set H[S];
Output: the resultant reading r′;
Method:
1. If (i=B[j]) //the billing point
2. Let r′ = H[j] + rij;
3. Let H[j] = 0;
4. Return r′;
5. If (rij ∈ Gs)
6. Return rij;
7. Let closest be r ∈ Gs with the minimal |r − rij| value;
8. H[j]+ = (closest− rij);
9. Return closest;
Table 7.5: The Cyclical Reading Converter (CRC)
privacy due to the following. First, the accumulated consumptions of any reading slots
for any customer in any billing cycle is identical before and after modiﬁcation. Formally,
∀j,∑i(Rout[i][j] − Rin[i][j]) = 0 Thus, the billing of Rout is identical with that of Rin .
Second, there are at most S number of readings, which may be not (δ1, δ2)-bounded, among
the total S×K readings.
7.3.2.2 Option 2: the PRC algorithm
The perpetual reading converter (PRC) algorithm aims at strict privacy preservation
with reasonable billing error rate and utility consumption error rate as shown in Table 7.6.
Compared with CRC algorithm, the hold of each reading slot in PRC algorithm will never
be reset. Roughly speaking, if a reading rij is safe (in the safe candidate set), PRC returns
that reading directly, otherwise, PRC returns the closest value in Gs (the one has minimal
absolute difference between it and the reading), and adds the difference to the hold of the
jth reading slot.
The PRC algorithm ensures (0, δ1, δ2)-undisclosed privacy with reasonable billing
error rate and utility consumption error rate. First, the algorithm ensures that each returned
reading satisﬁes pre-determined (δ1, δ2)-bounded certainty. Second, the hold in each read-
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Input: a reading rij , safe candidate set Gs, hold set H[S];
Output: the resultant reading r′;
Method:
1. If (rij ∈ Gs)
2. Return rij;
3. Let closest be r ∈ Gs with the minimal |r − rij| value;
4. H[j]+ = (closest− rij);
5. Return closest;
Table 7.6: The Perpetual Reading Converter (PRC)
ing slot is the only reason to cause the billing and consumption inaccurate, which can be
deemed as negligible for negligible for a long-term period in most cases.
7.3.2.3 Option 3: the LRC algorithm
For both CRC and PRC algorithms, we assume that the smart meters are aware of
the existence of different tariffs (note that such knowledge is different from knowing the
different tariffs themselves and the smart meters using our algorithms do not need to know
the tariffs). The parameters of those algorithms may need to be updated due to the change
of the tariff structure. Our intention of designing LRC algorithm is to demonstrate the
possibilities of totally tariff structure irrelevant solutions.
Input: a reading r, safe candidate set Gs;
Output: the resultant reading r′;
Method:
1. Let h = h + r;
2. Let closest be rc∈Gs with the minimal |h− rc| value;
3. Let h = h− closest;
4. Return closest;
Table 7.7: The Light Reading Converter (LRC)
In contrast to previous two algorithms, all reading slots share a single hold to store
the difference between original reading and returned reading in LRC algorithm as shown
in Table 7.7. Roughly speaking, LRC ﬁrst sums up current reading with the accumulated




In previous sections, we have presented a vital component of handling the informa-
tion with regard to electric consumption exchanged between utility and customers. That is,
how the smart meters can modify the reading information to ensure the privacy property
while maximizing the billing accuracy and minimizing the consumption error.
To incorporate our techniques into the smart grid also requires ensure the integrity,
non-reputation when sending the consumption information from smart meter to the utility.
These objectives can be achieved by utilizing the existing solutions in the literature, such
as, TPM, encryption, and so on. In this chapter, we specially focus on the process in smart
meter to modify the information before communicating with the counterpart in the system.
7.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a novel light-weight approach to concurrently
achieve two privacy objectives (billing and load monitoring) through a single set of data
and fully under control of the smart meters. Based on the semantic explanation of privacies,
we have presented a formal model for privacies in smart grid. We have also designed three
efﬁcient algorithms for reading modiﬁcation and outlined implementation issue for our
approach. We will continue this preliminary work with experiments using both real and
synthetic data to conﬁrm the effectiveness and efﬁciency of our solutions.
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Chapter 8
Generic Model for Privacy Preserving
against Side-Channel Leaks
In this chapter, we outline the preliminary work on generic model for privacy-
preserving against side-channel leakages. We then demonstrate three example instantia-
tions of the generic model through aforementioned three different scenarios.
As discussed in previous chapters, we apply the following similar idea for the afore-
mentioned applications: we divide all the possible information into groups and then break
the linkage inside each group by obfuscating the observable information, such as, encrypted
packet sizes in web applications, smart reading for smart meters. Based on the similarity
of the components and solutions, we can extract the common information from different
domains and design a generic model over the models for speciﬁc applications.
8.1 Outline of Generic Model
8.1.1 Privacy-related Components of an Application
To prevent a side-channel attack, we need to ﬁrst answer the following three ques-
tions: Who is the victim? What is the sensitive information? What is the side-channel
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information? Correspondingly, we need the following three concepts to model these three
pieces of information. Note that, we preserve duplicates for all the sets in the remainder of
this chapter, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
- Identity Set: Denote by I the set of identity of each victim which can be used to
uniquely identify a victim. Note that the domain of identity set varies from appli-
cation to application and side-channel to side-channel. For example, it could be the
identiﬁer of a record holder in a micro-data, such as, social insurance number, drive
license number.
Furthermore, the identities could be either permanent or temporary. For instance, a
session ID between a client and the Web application may expire or be abandoned.
However, it is typically assumed that this session information, together with addi-
tional information such as IP address and the access time of the client, enable an
adversary to associate it with a victim.
- Sensitive Set: Denote by S the set of sensitive person-speciﬁc information about the
victim for the given application. In contrast to conﬁdentiality, for privacy, sensitive
set itself alone can be not private. In other words, knowing the possible sensitive
values does not mean to violate the privacy. However, the linkage between an identity
and the sensitive values is regarded as private.
For instance, the disease information in a medical record for a patient is considered
as sensitive information. Note that the sensitive information may be legible in some
scenarios and be illegible in others, specially in high-dimensional micro-data. Also,
it varies from applications whether a piece of information with which an identity is
associated is sensitive or not.
- Observable Set: Denote by O the set of observable information exposed due to the
side-channel leakages. Such information is usually different from the sensitive in-
formation which need to be protected. However, it can allow the adversary to reﬁne
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her knowledge about the possibility of an identity being associated with a sensitive
value.
For example, the directional packet sizes in the encrypted trafﬁc between victims and
Web-based applications are visible to the adversaries. Different inputs or actions in a
Web application may lead to different patterns of such observable information which
allows adversaries to infer the victim’s actions.
With these three concepts, we call the victims’ information in a given scenario Orig-
inal Set, denoted as a relation t(i, o, s), where i ∈ I , o ∈ O, and s ∈ S denote the identity
value, observable value, and sensitive value, respectively. Denote by T the set of all rela-
tions with the same sets of I , O, and S as those of t.
We make the worst case assumption that each victim can be uniquely associated
with an observable value. For example, An adversary knows the quasi-identiﬁer of a vic-
tim (identity) in a micro-data through extra knowledge such as voter list. Note that such
association could be time-sensitive. An adversary knows who triggers the trafﬁc between
client and web application through de-anonymizing techniques [95] and the methods dis-
cussed in Chapter 5 for a specially given time.
Therefore, we need to remain Πi,s(t) and Πo,s(t) secret to protect the privacy. There
exist two seemingly conﬂicting goals. First, the sensitive information about an identity
must be limited to a given acceptable level to preserve the privacy, such as k-anonymity,
l-diversity, -differential privacy. Second, the costs to achieve the desired privacy should
be minimized. For example, the data utility for analysis or information loss in privacy-
preserving data publishing should be maximized or minimized; the padding overhead in
privacy-preserving trafﬁc padding in Web application should be minimized.
There exist many methods to protect the sensitive information as well as minimize
the costs as discussed in Chapter 2. In the context of privacy preserving data publish-
ing, grouping-and-breaking basically partitions the records into groups and then breaks the
linkage between the quasi-identiﬁer value and the sensitive value inside each group. In this
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generic model, we extend such operation in PPDP to other applications. However,the way
to divide identities’ records into groups and the way to break the linkage inside a group
may be different. For example, for data publishing, we replace the quasi-identiﬁer values
by a less accurate one; for trafﬁc padding in Web applications, we increase the packet sizes
to a closer value; for privacy-preserving smart metering, we replace the readings by the
closest safe one. We shall discuss the differences in more detail in the next section.
8.1.2 Privacy Properties
As mentioned above, privacy concerns that the degree about how likely an identity
is associated with a sensitive value from the adversary’s perspective. Therefore, we need to
ﬁrst formulate the adversary’s mental image given the ﬁnally released information (see next
subsection 8.1.3) and the side-channel information, such as, the algorithms themselves, the
observable encrypted packet sizes. We slightly abuse the concept of fuzzy set to model the
adversary’s mental image.
The mental image of an adversary about the sensitive information of an identity
in an application is denoted by a pair (i, (S, fiS)), where i is the identity, (S, fiS) is a
corresponding fuzzy set denoting the probability that the given identity is associated with
each sensitive value from the adversary’s perspective. Obviously, the values of member
function fiS : S → [0, 1] could be different for different identity. We call the collection
of all the (i, (S, fiS)) pairs for the identities in an application Inferred Set, denoted as
rI = (I, (S, fIS)). Different mechanisms may lead to different Inferred Set. Denote by
RI(t) the set of all possible inferred sets for a given original set t, and short as RI , if no
ambiguity is possible.
The concept of Inferred Set is generic enough to model different syntactic privacy
properties. Furthermore, Inferred Set simulates the view of an adversary instead of the
released information itself. To illustrate, we model two main privacy properties mentioned
in previous chapters in Deﬁnition 8.1 and 8.2.
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Deﬁnition 8.1 (k-anonymity) Given an inferred set rI ∈ R, we say a rI satisﬁes k-
anonymity (k is an integer) if
∀((i, (S, fiS)) ∈ rI), |{s ∈ S : fiS(s) > 0}| ≥ k.
Deﬁnition 8.2 (l-diversity) Given an inferred set rI ∈ R, we say a rI satisﬁes l-diversity
if






In addition to privacy requirements, we also need metrics for the costs, such as
information loss, padding cost, processing cost, reading error rate, billing error rate, and
so on. The costs mainly incur due to the difference between the original information and
released information. Similar with inferred set, we also model the released information
based on the concept of fuzzy set.
The sensitive information of an identity of an application based on the released in-
formation is denoted by a pair (o, (S, f ′oS)), where o is the observable information, (S, f
′
oS)
is a fuzzy set denoting the probabilistic distribution of sensitive information corresponding
to a given possible observable information. We call the collection of all the (o, (S, f ′oS))
pairs in an application Released Set, denoted as rD = (O, (S, f ′OS)). Similarly, different
mechanisms may lead to different Released Sets. Denote by RD(t) the set of all possible
released sets for a given original set t, and short as RD if no ambiguity is possible. Note
that, the Original Set t(i, o, s) can be also represented by a release set by removing identity
information i.
These concepts, together with some necessary information such as ﬁne-grained tar-
iff for smart metering, allow us to model different costs. To illustrate, we exemplify the
discernibility measure (DM) for data publishing in Deﬁnition 8.3 and customer consump-
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tion error rate for smart metering in Deﬁnition 8.4.
Deﬁnition 8.3 (Discernibility Measure (DM)) Given a released set rD = (O, (S, f ′OS))





|{o′ : (o′ ∈ O) ∧ (o′ = o)}| .
Deﬁnition 8.4 (Customer Consumption Error Rate) Given a customer i, an original set
t(i, o, s) (a reading sequence of that customer) and its corresponding released set rD(O, (S, f ′OS))






Previous two sections model the privacy properties and the corresponding cost met-
rics introduced to satisfy the privacy. In this section, we formulate the effect of the mecha-
nisms on the privacy degree and the overheads.
In addition to the released set, the adversary may also have some extra knowledge,
denote as E, such as the generalization algorithms, the observable encrypted packet size,
and so on. The effectiveness of mechanism M in terms of adversaries’ mental image
can now be formulated as M : T × E → RD × RI . A mechanism may have different
methods to affect the adversary’s inferred set and/or the released set, either by obfuscating
the relation between I and O, or by obfuscating the relation between O and S, or by both.
To facilitate the computation of the privacy guarantee and costs, we deﬁne an operation,
called concatenation and denoted by , for two fuzzy sets given the corresponding three
sets as follows.
Deﬁnition 8.5 (Concatenation) Given three sets I , O and S, the concatenation between
(I ×O, fIO) and (O × S, fOS) is deﬁned as (I ×O, fIO) (O × S, fOS) = (I × S, fIS),
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where fIS is calculated as follows.




Note that, (I × S, fIS) is a variant of inferred set, and the former facilitates the
computation of the latter. The concrete mechanisms must be customized for applications.
8.2 Instantiations of Generic Model
Table 8.1 shows the mapping between the generic model and the models in previ-
ously chapters. We have customized the notions and notations in the three scenarios for
the purpose of explanation in Chapters 3- 7. In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the main
challenges for the aforementioned three applications.
PPDP PPTP PPSM
identity set identiﬁer (session id) (household)
observable set quasi-identiﬁer vector-set candidate set
sensitive set sensitive attribute action-set consumption set
Table 8.1: Customized Notions in Three Scenarios
8.2.1 Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing
The main challenge for privacy-preserving data publishing is that the adversary may
be able to further infer the sensitive information when she knows the generalization algo-
rithm itself. The inferred set of the adversary is continuously reﬁned during the running of
the algorithm.
Table 8.2 shows a toy example of micro-data table t(Name, gender, condition)
(original set) to be released. The privacy objective is to ensure that the highest ratio of a
sensitive value condition for each identiﬁer Name must be no greater than 2
3
. When the
adversary only knows the released set g1(t), the desired privacy property is satisﬁed.
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Table 8.2: A Micro-Data Table and its Generalization
However, assume that the adversary knows about the generalization algorithmworks
as follows: the algorithm releases
∏
(gender, condition), if it satisﬁes the privacy property;
Otherwise, it further replaces the gender by person, then either releases it if it satisﬁes, or
release nothing if it does not. Based on the released set, the adversary can reason that∏
(gender, condition) will not be disclosed only if both males are associated with HIV,
which violates the privacy. In such case, the inferred set is different from the released set.
Therefore, we need to evaluate the desired privacy property on the inferred set in-
stead of the released set. However, the recursive nature of computing the inferred set is
deemed to incur a high complexity. To avoid such recursion, we decouple the two pro-
cesses, privacy preservation and utility optimization, to improve the efﬁciency.
8.2.2 Privacy-Preserving Trafﬁc Padding
In privacy-preserving trafﬁc padding against side-channel due to encrypted packet
sizes, the side-channel information is modeled as observable set. We assume that the adver-
sary can locate the trafﬁc between a victim and the web server. A straightforward solution is
to obfuscate the observable information by padding to the maximal in the group. However,
the correlation among the observable information in the sequence of actions may cause
additional complications.
The left tubular of Table 8.3 shows a toy example of the auto-suggestion feature in
Web-based application (suppose that it shows all the possible inputs). The privacy objective
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in this example is to ensure that the adversary cannot distinguish from at least 2 different
inputs when observing the encrypted packet sizes.
Original Set Released Set
Observable Sensitive
(s-byte) (user input)
50 → 75 → 65 b→ u→ s
60 → 55 → 70 c→ a→ r
60 → 55 → 65 c→ a→ t
70 → 55 → 80 d→ o→ g
Observable Sensitive
(s-byte) (user input)
60 → 75 → 70 b→ u→ s
60 → 75 → 70 c→ a→ r
70 → 55 → 80 c→ a→ t
70 → 55 → 80 d→ o→ g
Table 8.3: Original Set and Possible Released Set for an Action-Sequences
When an adversary only observes the packet size of second keystroke is 55, she can
only infer that ’car’, ’cat’, and ’dog’ are equally likely to be the real input. However, when
she also observes the packet size of the ﬁrst keystroke is 70, she can conclude that the input
is ’dog’, which violates the privacy requirement.
The aforementioned grouping and breaking techniques alone may lead to the re-
leased set as shown in right tabular of Table 8.3. That is, one algorithm may split cat and
car into two different groups. Unfortunately, this released set cannot be used in real case.
When the web server receives ﬁrst keystroke ’c’, it must immediately response due to auto-
suggestion feature. However, since the server cannot predict the input is ’car’ or ’cat’, it
cannot decide whether to remain ’c’ to 60 or pad it to ’70’. Therefore, we need to apply
further constraints when splitting the inputs into groups as discussed in Chapter 5.
8.2.3 Privacy-Preserving Smart Metering
In privacy-preserving smart metering against side-channel due to ﬁne-grained read-
ings, the side-channel information is also modeled as observable set. A straightforward
solution is to obfuscate the observable information by replacing the unsafe readings to the
closest safe readings. However, such mechanism may not ensure the privacy requirements.
The left tubular of Table 8.4 shows a toy example of all the possible readings and
the corresponding usage of appliances for a household. The privacy objective is to ensure
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Original Set Released Set
Observable Sensitive
(reading) (usage of appliances)
400 {{Fan, Bulb, TV}}
300 {{Fan, Bulb},{Fan,TV}}




(reading) (usage of appliances)





Table 8.4: Original Set and Possible Released Set for the Readings in a Household
that the probability that any appliance is used inferred by any reading is no greater than 1
2
.
Obviously, the readings 200 is safe since all the three appliances have 1
2
probability to be
used. Similarly, readings 100 and 0 are safe, while 300 and 400 are not safe. The released
set will be as shown in right tubular of Table 8.4 by replacing a unsafe reading to the closest
one. Obviously, when an adversary observes a reading is 200, she can infer that Fan has
4
5
probability to be used, which violates the privacy. Besides, it usually incurs a high
computational complexity to enumerate all the possible usage of appliances. Therefore, it
is a must to design efﬁcient heuristic methods to ensure the privacy as well as minimize the
billing and consuming error rate.
8.2.4 Others
Our generic model can also be applied to other categories of domains, such as,
android applications, cryptography, and so on. For example,
- The data-usage statistical information can be modeled as the observable information
in our model and apply grouping-and-breaking technique to make user’s identity
indistinguishable by observing the statistics for android system.
- The lengths of speech for voice guidance in Google Navigator for smart phone can
be partitioned into different groups, and uniﬁed inside each group such that a route
cannot be distinguished from sufﬁcient other routes.
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- We may consider the execution time of a cipher as the observable information and
obfuscate it of one secret-key to be identical with sufﬁcient large number of other
keys of the cipher.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Direction
9.1 Conclusion
As technology has advanced, new applications and products have emerged end-
lessly. Willingly or unwillingly, more and more information was spread out globally and
rapidly. The privacy preserving issues are becoming increasingly severe and accordingly
receiving signiﬁcant attentions.
In this thesis, we studied privacy preservations against different types of side-channel
leakages in different scenarios: publicly-known algorithms in data publishing (Chapter 3
and Chapter 4), observable encrypted trafﬁc information in web applications (Chapter 5
and Chapter 6), and ﬁne-grained reading in smart metering (Chapter 7). We then made the
ﬁrst effort on extracting a general framework to model side-channel attacks across different
domains (Chapter 8). The main works throughout this thesis can be summarized as follows.
For data publishing, we have proposed a novel k-jump strategy for micro-data dis-
closure. This strategy ensures the data privacy even in the case that the adversaries know
the disclosure algorithms. We have shown how to transform a given unsafe generalization
algorithm into a large number of safe algorithms. By constructing counter-examples, we
have shown that the data utility of such algorithms is generally incomparable.
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To improve the efﬁciency, we have further proposed streamliner approach to pre-
serving diversity for data publishing. Instead of sequentially evaluating generalization
functions in a given order, and disclosing the ﬁrst safe generalization, this strategy decou-
ples the process of preserving the diversity from the process of optimizing the data utility,
and consequently reduces the computation complexity.
ForWeb applications, we have established a mapping between the privacy-preserving
trafﬁc padding (PPTP) and privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) issues, which allows
reusing many existing models and methods in PPDP as potential solutions for PPTP prob-
lems. We have also designed a formal model for the PPTP issue based on the mapping,
which allows quantifying privacy properties and padding overheads.
To relax the assumption on the adversaries’ prior knowledge about user input, we
have further proposed random ceiling padding approach to providing background knowledge-
resistant privacy guarantee to Web applications. Through our solution, the adversary would
still face sufﬁcient uncertainty even if s/he can exclude certain number of possible inputs
to reﬁne his/her guesses of the true input.
For smart metering, we have proposed a light-weight approach to simultaneously
achieving the objectives of preserving privacy on both billing and consumption aggregation
based on the key observation about the privacy issue beyond the ﬁne-grained readings. Our
solution precedes existing ones by efﬁciently realizing multiple privacy objectives.
Finally, we formulate a generic model for privacy preserving against side-channel
leaks. The model encompasses privacy requirements, overheads, and methods to ensure
privacy and minimize the overheads. Such a study will bridge the gap among different
communities on study of side-channel attacks.
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9.2 Future work
In the near future, I plan to focus on conducting the following studies. First, we will
further study the side-channel attacks in different applications, extract their commonali-
ties, and complete the generic model for privacy preserving against side-channel leakages.
Second, we will propose a privacy-preserving querying system to allow users to request for
desired micro-data through specially designed queries. Third, we will study data disclosure
and its safety issue in different settings, such as, cloud computing, big data.
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